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NIXON
Federal/Civil

v.

ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES
I. SUMMARY.

-c

Richard M. Nixon challenges the constituionality
...

of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act
(Reproduced in J.S. App. 11Oa).

The Act directs the

Administrator of General Services to take custody of appellant's
presidential papers and tape recordings, and to promulgate
regulations that would provide for the orderly processing of

2.
,-

such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant such
of them as are personal and private in nature, and of determining
the terms and conditions upon which public access may eventually

-

be had to those remaining in the Government's possession.
The questions presented are whether Title I of the Act is
unconstitutional on its face as a violation of (1) the separation
of powers doctrine; (2) presidential privilege doctrines; (3)
appellant's right to privacy; (4) the First Amendment; (5) the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment; or (6) the Bill of Attainder Clause.

--

The DC (in a 100-page opinion) concluded that there was no
constitutional infirmity in the Act on its face requiring its
enforcement to be enjoined.

(J.S. App. la-104a).

II. BACKGROUND
1.

The Materials:

effective August 9, 1974.

Appellant resigned as President
When he left office a large quantity

of documents, files, and other materials, which had been
accumulated by him and his staff during his term as President,
remained in the White House.

These materials include

approximately 42 million pages of documents and more than 800

\

reels of taE.,e recordings of conversations.
Personal and official materials are comingled.

Appellant

estimated that he had personally prepared or reviewed 200,000
of the documents, including staff memoranda, preliminary drafts,
'-"

(_

, staff memoranda, memoranda of meetings, and personal

3.

(

correspondence.

The DC found that private materials comprise

a small fraction of the total (J.S. App. 71a).
2.

The Initial Arrangements:

After appellant's resignation,

government archivists began to collect the materials for shipment
to California, in accord with appellant's instructions.

But when

the Special Prosecutor indicated a continuing need for the
materials, President Ford halted shipment and asked the Attorney
General for advice about the ownership of the materials.

The

Attorney General concluded that most of the materials were owned
by appellant by virtue of historical practice and the absence of
any statute to the contrary, but added that ownership of the
materials might not control their disposition, given the public
interests at stake.
At about the same time negotiations commenced between
the new administration and appellant, culminating in an
agreement between appellant and Arthur Sampson, Administrator
of the General Services Administration.

(JS App. 134a).

Under

the terms of the agreement, appellant retained title to all of
his presidential historical materials but agreed to donate a
substantial portion of the materials to the United States at
a future date so that they would "be made availabl~ with
For the time being the materials were to be deposited with
appropriate restrictions, for research and study." /GSA under
the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 2101, e t ~ - , and transferred
to California, where they would be stored in locked areas.
Neither appellant nor GSA could gain access to the materials

( -__

'without the consent of the other.

4.
For a period of three years or, in the case of tape
recordings, five years, access to the materials would be limited
to appellant or persons authorized by him.

No original materials

could be withdrawn during this initial stage, but appellant
could reproduce any document and, with the agreement of GSA,
any tape recording.

After the three-year period had expired

appellant could withdraw from deposit any documentary materials
he wished and dispose

of them as he saw fit.

As of September

1, 1979, appellant made a gift to the United States of the tape
recordings, subject to the conditions that he could direct
destruction of such tapes as he wished and that all of them
were to be destroyed after ten years or upon appellant's death,
whichever occurred first.

\

When implementation of this agreement was delayed at the
request of the Special Prosecutor, appellant brought suit for
its specific performance.

The case was consolidated with actions

seeking to enjoin transfer of the materials and to gain access
to them under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. (Supp.

IV)

§

552.
3.

The Act. While thPse consolidated actions were pending,

I

Congress passed and the President signed the Presidential

Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (J.S. App. 110a),

abrogati£!g
a£eellant's agreement with GSA, and directing the
w:=
~

GSA Administrator to obtain and retain possession and control

5.
the
1
of all/presidential historical materials and tape recordings
from appellant's administration. (Section 101).
Section 102(b) provides that these materials and recordings
shall be made available for use in any judicial proceeding,
"subject to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the Federal
Government or any person may invoke.

. .

.'·'
.

Section 102(c)

and (d) provides that appellant (or his designee) and the
Executive ,,,,-,,._..,--,,-,
Branchzww shall have access to the materials, subject to

-

the Administrator's regulations.

Section 103 requires the Administrator to issue regulations
to gov~rn c:stc:iy of and access to the materials. Section 104
I requires
the Administrator to issue regulations providing for

-----~

"public access" to the materials; these regulations must "take
into account" seven factors:
"(1) the need to provide the public with the full
truth, at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses
of governmental power popularly identified under the
generic term "Watergate";
~

......--

(2) the need to make such recordings and materials
available for use in j~ic~al p~ings;

I
1.

(3) the need to £ revent general access, except
in accordance with appropriate procedures es t ablished
for use in judicial proceedings, s o information relating
to the Nation's securit;
(4) the need to protect every individual's right
to a f_a_i_r_ a_n_d_ i_n:p
..__a_r_t_1._~ a l ;

Section 10l(b)(2) incorporates by reference the definition
of "historical materials" given in 44 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970),
which includes "books, correspondence, documents, papers,
, pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, photographs, plats,
maps, films, motion pictures, sound recordings, and other
objects or materials having historical or commemorative
value."

•tr.

..
-- .
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_

_

_
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6.

~~~~~

(5) the
to protect any party's opportunity
to assert an
ally or constitutionally based right
or privilege which would prevent or otherwise limit
access to such recordings and materials;

(

(6) the need to provide public access to those
materials which have general historical significance,
and which are not likely to be related to t he need
described in paragraph (l); and
(7) the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, or his ~
heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings, ~ /
and other materials which are not likely to be related
,
to the need described in paragraph (1) and are not
otherwise of general historical significance."
Section 104(b) requires the Administrator to submit the "public
access" regulations and any subsequent changes in them to both
Houses of Congress and provides that the regulations or changes
can be disapproved by a resolution of either House within 90
legislative days of submission.
Section lOS(a) provides for eepedited judicial r..aview in
the D.D.C. of the Act and any regulations issued under its
authority.

Section lOS(c) provides for "just compensation"

to any individual who may have been deprived of private property
by the Act.
Title II of the Act establishes a National Study Commission
to study and recommend procedures regarding the control,
disposition, and preservation of the records of all federal

. _J))- ,

executive judicial, and legislative officers.

V.~Jl'-1~

~~~s

Vk r_/

The National

Commission has been appointed but has not yet submitted

report; it is not involved in this litigation.
4. The regulations.

The Administrator has submitted to

~~Congress three sets of "public access" regulations.

v{ ~

set was disapproved by the Senate.

The first

S. Res. 244, 94th Cong.,

7.
1st Sess. (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. Sl5803-S15808 (daily ed.,
September 11, 1975).

The second set was withdrawn; the Senate

disapproved seven provisions of those regulations, believing that
the Administrator lacked power to withdraw them.

S. Res. 428,

94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. S5290-S5291 (daily
ed. April 8, 1976).

The third set was submitted on April 13,
2

1976, and is pending. (SG's Motion to Affirm at 9 n. 4).
Regulations to assure preservation of the materials in
custody and to prevent unauthorized access, which Section 103
of the Act does not require to be submitted to Congress, were
published on January 14, 1975.
105-63.

40 Fed. Reg. 2669; 41 C.F.R.

The DC has enjoined the effectiveness of some of

these regulations (J.S. App. 107a-108a), and has clarified
appellant's right under the Act to have access to the materials
and to copy any documents, pending disposition of this appeal.
(J.S. App. 13a n.7, 107a).
5.

The DC proceedings:

One day after the Act became

effective appellant commenced this action for declaratory
and injunctive relief.

Although the complaint sought the

convening of a three-judge ~ourt, the single judge (Richey)
(\

declined to rule upon the request, proceeding iptead to file
an opinion in the consolidated cases growing out of appellant's

2.

The SG be[ieves that the provision for a "one-house veto"
in§ 104(b) of the Act is an unconstitutional attempt by
Congress to participate in the detailed administration of
the Act (citing separation of powers and Art. 1, § 7, cl. 3).
But the SG says that that provision is not in issue here,
since appellant does not challenge it and claims no right
• under the regulations disapproved by the Senate.

I

8.
,,:;:.,

r

agreement with GSA.

Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.DC.. l<i75)~

CADC stayed entry of judgment on that opinion, however, to
enable a three-judge district court to proceed with priority
in accordance with§ 105 of the Act.

Nixon v. Richey, 513

F.2d 427, 430 (CADC 1975) (per curiam)

3

(J.S.App. 139a-202a).

The three-judge DC convened and, having permitted the parties
4

in the consolidated actions to intervene,

independently

considered appellant's arguments.
III. HOLDINGS, CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION

A.

Separation of powers

1.

Holding:

The DC held that the Act on its face does

not violate the principle of separation of powers (J.S. App.
31a-35a).

The court understood appellant to ~e asserting that

the three branches of government must be "airtight"' and

No

dismissed that view as archaic, citing United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)("the separate powers were not intended
to operate with absolute independence").

It observed that the

only injury to the executive branch that appellant was claiming

3.

The recent enactment repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2282 does not
apply to actions commenced before August 12, 1976. P.L. 94-381.

4. Intervenors included the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, et al., which has filed a motion
to affirm, and Jack Anderson and Lillian Hellman, et al.,
each of whom has filed a motion to dismiss or affirm.-

9.
was one involving the confidentiality of communications.

Since

the need to protect such confidentiality had been recognized
in United States v. Nixon, in the form of a qualified privilege
for executive communications deriving from the separation of
powers, the court proceeded to consider appellant's arguments
within the framework of the executive privilege doctrine.
(See B infra).
2.

Contentions.

Appellant appears to contend that

privilege doctrines are inadequate to deal with the Act's
"unprecedented inva sion of the autonomy of the Executive Branch."
He relies on Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629-630 (1935) for the principle that each of the three branches
of the federal government must be "free from the control or
.._

coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the
others."

He claims that by directing control over every paper

and recording of appellant's administration, Congress has made
uncertain the confidential status of communications of current
employees of the Executive and Judicial Branches:
"If Congress may, immediately upon termination of
a President's tenure in office, impound his documents

and other materials and prescribe the terms of their
public disclosure, the effect on the President and
his advisors is the same as if their communications
were currently open to public inspection. The
inevitable posturing for sake of appearance, and
the reluctance to advance unpopular or novel
positions, will diminish the President's ability
to make the informed decisions vital to his role
under the Constitution."
The SG responds that far from invading the automony of

--

the Executive Branch, the Act places the materials in the custody
I

\

of the Administrator , an executive official responsible to
....,

10.

------

/

the President; provides that Executive Branch employees have
access to the materials "for lawful Government use, subject
to the [Administrator's] regulations" (Section 102(d)); and
ensures that there will be no disclosure of the materials to
persons outside the Executive Branch in violation of any defenses
or privileges asserted by appellant or the Executive Branch.
(Section 104 (a) (5 ).,(7)).
The SG argues that presidential materials are a proper
subject of legislation, since they are affected by a public
interest from their creation, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Gas.
342 (No. 4, 901) (C.C.D. Mass. 184l)(Story, J.); and that
Congress can provide for their acquisition under the eminent
domain power, and for their disposition under the Property
Clause (Article IV, Section 3) power to "make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting . . . Property belonging to the
United States."
The SG adds that the Act would be open to question if it
so threw open the process of decision-making in the Executive
Branch that it became difficult for the President to obtain
candid advice, or for Executive Branch officials to speak frankly
to each other; but thaj-~e Act does not create this kind of
hazard.
3.

~ ~
Discussion.

..

.

Appellant does not meet the DC's point

that his separation of powers argument adds nothing to his
claim of executive privilege.

In Nixon the Court spoke of the

presumptive privilege for Presidential communications as

11.

"fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."
418 U.S. at 708.

r

I

Although appellant insists on presenting

the two arguments separately, they really present different

di~ensions o~

ame claim, and should be considered together.

But to the extent that resort to the underlying principle is
necessary,

I think the SG is right that this Act is consistent

with the separation of powers.
B.

Presidential privilege

1.

Holding:

7 ?

'

The DC held that there was no violation

presidential privilege because the public interests served
the Act far outweighed the need to prevent the very limited
~ ~ intrusion on whatever interest in presidential confidentiality -

VV~y
,,,,.,_ IN" ~.

if any - appellant was entitled to assert.

(J.S. App. 35a-67a).

The court declined to hold that appellant, as a former
President, could not claim executive privilege.

Instead,

assuming that appellant could assert the privilege, the court

-

observed that a claim by a former President carried much less

-

weight than a claim asserted by the incumbent:

~

the incumbent

alone is subject to the restraints of office in asserting the
privilege; he alone has the requisite knowledge of all facets
of the p:-oblem and the unique perspective necessary to a decision;
and he alone has a continuing, vital interest in encouraging
candid presentation of views by his advisers and in protecting
them from burdensome requests for information.

Moreover,

appellant could only assert this weakened privilege with respect

1·1, ..,...

·.-."-~-

__

12.
to some of the materials; i.e., communications related to the
discharge of presidential duties for which appellant had not
himself waived the privilege by prior disclosure.

\

-

The court found appellant's privilege, so defined, to be
outweighed by the publi.c interests served by the Act.

The

court considered the two most important of these interests to
be (1) maintaining a complete and accurate historical record,
and (2) assuring the availability of the materials potentially
needed for continuity in executive policymaking.

The court also

pointed to the need to inform the public about Watergate and to
insure the availability of materials that might be relevant to

•

overbroad
The Act contemplates initial
of the materials by trained archivists, and authorizes
only of those materials having historical significance.
court found screening by archivists to be both necessary,
given the intermingling of materials and the need for disinterestedness and expertise, and minimally intrusive, given
the use of discreet and disinterested archivists for this

--------- -- ---------·

purpose by every President since Hoover.

JI

The court declined to consider the possible effect on its

analysis of public access to the materials after processing.
The court believed such consideration to be premature, since

•t

regulations within the authority of the Act might well restrict
public access for a period of years or until the death of

13.
appellant and others participating in the communications
(J.S. App. 18a-3la).
2.

Contentions:

Appellant claims that the Act is

contrary to the principles set down in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S.

at 705-708, 713-714, because it involves a greater

intrusion, is not confined in scope to "a limited number of
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on.
pending criminal cases," and has the effect of shifting the
burden to appellant to defend Presidential confidentiality.
Appellant suggests that the Act will have a chilling effect
on the candor of advice given by a Presidential adviser (1) by
requiring screening by archivists who, unlike prosecutors and
grand juries, are not sworn to secrecy, and (2) by holding open
the possibility that the public may be given future access
after the President has left office.
Appellant says it was wrong for the DC to decline to
consider the impact of public access on grounds of ripeness,
since the mere possibility of such access is detrimental, and
since it is unrealistic to expect appellant to challenge and
litigate possible public disclosures on a piecemeal basis.
He relies on Buckl~ v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612, 666 n. 113
(Question 7(a)), 693 n. 177 (Questions 8(c), 8(d), 8(e)) (1976).

-

The SG believes that a former President's materials
concerning the communications essential to the conduct of his

-

office are p..E__esump~ly privileged, and that the privilege
is one that the former President can assert.

~.J-

.o1/1

~y

But he argues that

7
~ . -~

'14.

the business of government requires tha1 /
~
/ the President and executive officials have access to the papers
of a former President and submits that no claim of privilege
can hinder this access.
The SG claims that public access is not imminent; only
appellant, officials of the Executive Branch, and archivists
whom the Act contemplates will perform the screening
access.

,

will have

He suggests that screening by archivists is not

meaningfully different from screening by a court in camera, and
asserts that in any event only a small portion of the materials
could be subject to a legitimate claim of privilege by appellant.
The SG contends that questions concerning particular
screening techniques and eventual public access are premature,
and finds no support for appellant's apparent belief that his
legitimate interests will be overlooked when he seeks judicial
review of the regulations that ultimately become effective.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al,
adds the contention that under the rule of United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953), the fact that the executive
branch has not only refused to endorse appellant's "separation
of powers" and "executive privilege" claims, but is actively
opposing them as well, precludes him from advancing such
contentions as a private citizen.
3.

Discussion:

The DC ruled narrowly, insisting that

the question be resolved by analyzing with particularity the
• extent to which the Act prevents the Executive Branch from
performing its assigned functions and whether such impact
on the executive as exists is justified by the need to pursue

?

..,...,,...

'.-.,•,:;.---

-

'

complete historical record seems sound.

In asking this Court to reverse, appellant ignores the

I

DC's observations that he is the former President and that the
incumbent supports this Act.

But the values he urges upon the

Court, particularly the value of candid and even blunt discussion within the executive branch, are values that the present
administration has a continuing interest in asserting .

In the

course of reiterating its duty to "say what the law is," the
Court in Nixon said:

"In the performance of assigned

constitutional duties each branch of the Government must
initially interpret the Constitution and the interpretation of
its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others."
418 UoS. at 703.

That principle seems especially appropriate

here, where no clash between branches of government is involved.
The asserted problem here is that the incumbent President is
being too generous with Congress in the disposition of his
predecessor's papers; appellant is in the position 0f asking
the Court to save the President from himself.

There might be

circumstances, as the SG suggests, where the Court would be
persuaded that the President was giving away too much to
Congress, but I doubt that this is the case for drawing such
'a line.

16.
The DC addressed the ripeness for consideration of public
access to the materials in a lengthy introduction to its
discussion of appellant's claims (J.S. App. 18a-31a), but
appellant raises it primarily within the context of his claim
of executive privilege.

The DC rested its refusal to consider

the effect of public access on two grounds:

(1) that appellant's

objections might well be mooted by regulations within the
authority of the Administrator; and (2) that judicial review
was available under§ 105(a) of the Act in the event that a
particular regulation or an entire set of regulations might be
constitutionally defective.

This approach seems valid, and is

in one way favorable to appellant, since it effectively invites
regulations more solicitous of his interests.

It is entirely

consistent with Buckley, see 96 S.Ct. at 665, 680-81.
C.

Privacy

1.

Holding:

--

The DC held that the Act does not on its

face violate appellant's constitutional right of privacy.

The

court viewed that right as one governed by the Fourth Amend-

.

~

ment (J.S. App. 67a-89a).

It found that intermingled in the

~rials were so".1" - incl ·1ding correspondence between

r ~ ~ppellant and his family, physician, lawyer, clergyman and
~
close friends - with respect to which appellant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy, but held that the intrusion into those
materials that was authorized by the Act was reasonable.
Considering the warrant requirement inapplicable, the court

17.
tested reasonableness by balancing the need for the intrusion
against the invasion which the intrusion entails.

See Camara

v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
The court found that while precise estimates were impossible,
. appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a very
large percentage of the materials, and the public interests
served by the Act affected a very large percentage of the nonprivate materials.

The court compared the Act's imposition on

the private documents and conversations that are interspersed
among the materials to the imposition on privacy caused by
wiretapping under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act.

Conceding that the Omnibus Act requires a

warrant detailed with some specificity, the court nonetheless
cited statistics to show that the "percentage of total intrusions
related to statutory objectives" was strikingly higher under
the Omnibus Act than under the Act before the court.
The court observed that the infringement of privacy caused
by review by archivists was less wide-ranging than that resulting
from ordinary criminal investigation, and that use of information
derived from archival processing in criminal prosecutions might
well be prohibited, either by the "public access" regulations
or by judicial construction of those regulations, "were it
thought constitutionally compelled".

~

on-2:z

r----

The court reiterated, however, that it was considering

~
-------

t~2:_;:;,!:_on~- qu;_st.!;,'.'._ns raised w7th ~spect

the

process by which the screening would be performed, since any

-

l.O •

I

claim of infringement of privacy by possible public access
was premature.
2.

(J.S. App. 68a-69a).

Contentions:

Appellant claims that it was wrong to

limit the measure of the Act's invasion of privacy to
"reasonableness."

He cites such decisions as Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), to demonstrate that even where the warrant requirement
is inapplicable the Constitution protects privacy from infringement by legislative enactment.

He cites Berger v. New York,

388 U.S. 41 (1967), to demonstrate that the wiretapping analogy
relied on by the DC is in fact favorable to him; Berger struck
down a New York statute for failure to impose "precise and
discriminate" standards, standards which appellant contends
pervade the Safe Streets Act but are missing from the
Act he contests here.
Appellant claims that the DC undervalued the privacy
interest at stake.

He notes that the materials encompass "all

the papers and effects of [his] life covering a five-and-onehalf year period" embodying his "entire personal, political
and official life."

Focusing on the recorded conversations,

he argues that he reasonably expected all of them to be private.
Citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 708, he complains
that the court unfairly distinguished between "official" and
"personal and family" conversations in defining the ratio of
private to nonprivate conversations.
Appellant claims that the DC also underestimated the
intrusion on privacy worked by the Act.

He argues that the

19.
court's reliance on the professionalism and discretion of
government archivists is unwarranted both by Fourth Amendment
principles and by practical realities; the commitment of government archivists to public access, demonstrated by their member. ship in the organizations contesting appellant's claims,

s

is
signj_ficar).ce.
such that they cannot be neutral in deciding what has historical I
The SG expresses doubt whether any constitutionally

generated or protected privacy interest

exists in the materials.

Cf. Paul v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1.167 (1976).

Even assuming

such an interest, the SG goes beyond the DC in minimizing it.
He contends that the President is the quintessential "public
figure" and has no privacy interest in the way he conducted
his office, see Unifor:lsanitation Men v. Sanitation Commissioner,
392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968).

Any privacy interest he might have

would pertain to only a few of the materials in issue, and
would be outweighed by the strong public interest in preserving
the others,

which Congress reasonably perceived might be

jeopardized if appellant had the sole right to screen out the
"private" from the "public."
The SG claims that Congress took pains to mitigate the
problems raised by appellant:

it recognized the need to return

to him all materials not related to theabuses of power known
as Watergate and not of general historical significance
(§ 104(a)(7)), and contemplated screening by disinterested

, 6. The American Historical Association was among the intervenors
in the DC proceedings.

20.
archivists that would be no more intrusive than in camera
inspection by a court, see Department of the Air Force v. Rose,
No. 74-489 (April 21, 1976).
Finally the SG agrees with the court that more particularized
claims can be made once the regulations have become effective.
3.

Discussion: The DC found this to be the most trouble-

some aspect of the case, but it is hard to see how it could have
done otherwise than reject appellant's contentions.

Appellant

probably has a legitimate privacy interest in many of the
materials, but I think the DC is right that, at least so far as
screening requires, appellant's privacy must yield to the public
interests in preserving historically significant materials.
There is a danger that government archivists will err on the
side of historical preservation in deciding what materials are
deserving of continuing public custody.

But the danger that

appellant would, if entrusted with the screening, err the other
way is at least as great.

y

Appellant can still challenge any

over-expansive definition of "historical significance" when
regulations become final, and particular classifications when
t~~

screening occurs.
D.

Free Speech and Association

1.

Holding:

The DC found no basis whatsoever for

upholding appellant's challenge to the Act on First Amendment
grounds (J.S. App. 89a-93a).

The court took the gravamen of

appellent's challenge to be the harm to appellant's associational privacy caused by disclosure of the materials.

.

,\ ..,....

~--~, ........

-~-
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21.

Using analysis similar to that with which it has approached
the privacy claim, the court reasoned that although the great
bulk of the materials appeared to be unrelated to appellant's
constitutional interests, he probably had a legitimate
expectation that he would be able to remove some of the
sensitive political documents before government screening took
place.

Again refusing to explore the effect of possible public

access, the court held that any burden to appellant's right of
free association arising solely from archival screening was not
significant, and certainly not significant enough to ou~weigh
the countervailing government interests.
2.

Contentions: Appellant says that the DC holding

establishes the principle that Congress, for the sake of
preserving the historical record and informing Congress and
the public about "abuses of power", may seize all records
of the President's political activities and communications,
have them reviewed and classified by government personnel, and
place upon the individual the burden of contesting, as to each
and every document or recording, whether it shall be made public.
He relies on Buckley v. Valeo, 96 Sup. Ct. at 656, for the
proposition that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by
the First Amendment", and argues that the governmental interests
that the DC relied on cannot survive the "exacting scrutiny"
,
\,.__,/

required by Buckley.

22.

The SG also cites Buckley - for its recognition that
"particularly when the 'free functioning of our national
institutions' is involved," the need for disclosure may outweigh
the First Amendment interests.

Id. at 657.

He agrees with

the court that the initial screening of the materials by government archivists will not prevent other individuals from associating
with appellant or deter him from expressing himself on public
issues.

He adds that the Act will only allow public access to

materials related to Watergate or having general historical
significance.
The brief for Lillian Hellman,

il

aL, appellees, characterizes

the First Amendment claim as "bizarre," and argues that an
ex-President has no First Amendment right to hide his conduct
in office from the people; rather, the people have a First
Amendment right to an accounting from him, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
3.

Discussion:

Appellant. has not made it clear how his

rights of association are burdened by the Act.

But the fact

that appellan~'s privacy interest in some of the materials may
have its roots in the First as well as the Fourth Amendment
does not tip the balance in his favor.

Whatever its source,

the privacy interest is limited to materials with which appellant
had personal contact, and among those, to materials which do not
pertain to appellant's use or abuse of his public trusts.

The

intrusion on the privacy of those materials seems fully justified
by the public interest in preserving all the rest.

23.
E. Equal protection
1.

Holding:

The DC held that the Act does not deny

appellant equal protection by singling out the papers of his
presidency for its coverage (J.S. App. 93a-97a).

The court

believed that appellant's unique status as the only President
who had terminated his service but had not established a
presidential library justified treating his papers differently.
2.

Contentions: Appellant claims that whatever legitimate

interests apply to appellant's papers apply equally to his
predecessors' and to the incumbent's, and that by singling
appellant out by name for different treatment Congress has
violated the longstanding rule that "all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."

Royster Guano Co. v.

Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
The SG says there is nothing tothis claim:

because

appellant is the only President to resign, and the only one
whose papers pose an immediate problem with which Congress can
grapple, the classification is rational and responds to the
nature of the problem presented.

He relies on City of New

Orleans v. Dukes, No. 74-775 (June 25, 1976).
3.

Discussion: The DC and the SG are right.

Appellant's

equal protection claim is frivolous.
F.

Pains and penalties

1.

Holding:

The DC found no evidence in the legislative

record or in the provisions of the Act to support the claim that
the Act was designed to impose, or constitutes, punishment

24.
within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause.
App. 97a-103a).

(J.S.

The court found instead ample evidence that

Congress cared about regulating how the materials would be
treated in the future in order to assure that such treatment would
be consistent with the congressional perception of the public
interests.

The court considered this conclusion to be reinforced

by sections of the Act creating or taking into consideration
the right of appellant to contest legal process directed at the
materials, to obtain eventual custody of all materials unnecessary
to further legislative ends, to have interim access to all the
. materials, to have expedited judicial review of any claimed
infringement of rights, and to receive full compensation for
any deprivation of private property.

(§§ 102(a),(c), 104(a),

105 (a)/c))
2.

Contentions: Appellant argues that the Act was plainly

devised to impose unique disabilities on a single individual
as the culmination of an extraordinary series of events.

By

limiting coverage of the Act to the period of appellant's
term of office and by naming appellant specifically, appellant
claims, the Act violates the rule of United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965), that Congress can enact "a generally
applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain
acts or possesses certain characteristics" is subject to the
statute, but cannot "designat[e] the persons who possess the
feared characteristics."

25.

The SG agrees with the DC that there is no evidence of
punitive intent, and that the Act's protection of appellant's
right to purely personal materials and its assurance of just
compensation negate the claim that the Act is a bill of pains
and penalties.
The SG finds support for this position in Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960), and United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
at 441-446.

3.

Discussion:

The Act is plainly not punitive.

Appellant's reliance on United States v. Brown, which involved
an Act making it a crime for a Communist to serve as an officer
or employee of a labor union, is misplaced.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I think this Court should affirm summarily, for the
following reasons:

(1)

As the above comments indicate, I think

the DC was correct in each of its holdings.

(2)

The issues

involved in the case are, despite appellant's efforts to state
them in sweeping terms, limited to a unique enactment designed

.

to meet a unique problem; they are unlikely to recur again.

,,

(3)

~

,'-

The DC has given appellant royal treatment and has all

but promised him a similar reception once the "public access"
regulations become effective.

(4)

A summary affirmance here

does not foreclose plenary review by this Court of many of
appellant's contentions in a more concrete controversy after
regulations become effective.

~ blt-Ul-~ ~ ~(Pv#W-~ ~ )
~ . J . o ~ 1-j'~o/'~~.e~?

·
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There are motions to affirm from the SG and from the

motions to dismiss or affirm fro
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 16, 1977

Re:

75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator, GSA

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
When the "returns" are all in, I will be making some
changes. Among others will be an insert along the
following lines:
"Assuming, arguendo, that Congress by statute
can assume control of Presidential work papers,
over objection, without trespassing separation of
powers principles, that can be done only by
legislation consistent with this Court's holdings
in Cummings, Garland, Lovett and Brown, especially
the latter two cases. The National Study Commission
on Records and Documents of Federal Officials
proposes such legislation under Title II of the Act.
I can see no rational accommodation between what
the Court holds today and what Justice Black stated
for the Court in Lovett and what Chief Justice Warren
stated in Brown.
"That some members of the Court disagree
with Lovett and Brown does not render those
holdings less binding on us if we pay more than
lip service to stare decisis.
If a majority
disagrees with the Black-Warren view of the Bill
of Attainder issue, we should frankly overrule
those cases, not brush them 'under the rug.'
What the Court does today is analogous to what the
Court said Congress could not constitutionally
do in Lovett and Brown. Perhaps this is holding
a 'ticket' good for one day and one way only -and for but one man. Here the Court elects to
join Congress to 'punish' one man by a
legislative judgment for misdeeds, without notice,
without hearing, or without trial."

-

2 -

Depending on how the tension between Bill's view
and Byron's is resolved, I may wind up concurring in
part and in the judgment -- that is on a sharply
narrowing construction of the privacy protection.

,,

Regards,

,,

·'·

,,.

' '

f.
,;.,

.

To: The Chier Justice
Ur. Justice Brenn~
l!r. Justice Stew-ar
Hr. Justice Whit0
Mr. Ju:,tice Marshall
Mr. Just1ce Blaokraun
Mr. Justice PoweH/
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

..
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The statute before the Court does not .apply to all
" '

Presidents or former Presidents.
name, for special treatment.

It singl~s out one, by

Unlike all other former

Presidents in our history, he is denied custody of his
own Presidential papers; he is subjected to the burden of
,,

,.

prolonged litigation over the administration of the statute;

t"•"

and his most private papers and conversations are to be
scrutinizeo. .by government_archivists.

The statute implicitly
t'

condemns him as an unreliable custodian of his papers.

..
'
{,

'

Legislation which subjects a named individual to this
humiliating treatment must raise serious questions under
the Bill of Attainder Clause.
Bills of Attainder were typically directed at once
powerful leaders of government.

By special legislative acts,

Parliament deprived one statesman after another of his reputation, his property, and his potential for future leadership.
The motivation for such bills was as much political as it

.

'

was punitive--and often the victims were those who had been
the most relentless in attacking their political enemies at

,"

•·
.,.,.
/.I

''

·.

y
the height of their own power.

In light of this history,

legislation like that before us must be scrutinized with
great care.
Our cases "stand for the proposition that legislative
acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution."
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314.

The concept of

punishment involves not only the character of the deprivation,
but also the manner in which that deprivation is imposed.

It

has been held permissible for Congress to deprive Communist
deportees, as a group, of their social security benefits,
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, but it would surely be a
bill of attainder for· Congress--to deprive a single, named
individual of the same benefit.

Id., at 614.

The very

specificity of the statute would~mark it as punishment, for

1/ At the debate on the impeachment of the Earl of Danby, the Earl
of Carnarvon recounted this history:

,

I

My Lords, I understand but little of Latin, but a good deal
of English, and not a little of the English history, from which
I have' learnt the mischiefs of such kind of prosecutions as
these, and the ill fate of the prosecutors. I shall go no farther
back than the latter end of Quern Elizabeth's reign: At which
time the Earl of Essex was run down by Sir Walter R:ilcigh,
and your Lordships very well know what became of Sir Walter
Raleigh. My Lord Bacon, he ran down Sir Walter Raleigh,
and your Lordships know what became of my Lord Bacon.
The Duke of Buckingh:im, 29 he ran down my Lord Bacon,
and your Lordships know what happened to the Duke of
· Buckingham. Sir Thomas Wentworth, afterwards Earl of
Strafford, ran down the Duke of Buckingh:im, and you all
know what became of him. Sir Harry Vane, he ran down the
Earl of Strafford, and your Lordships know what became of
Sir Harry Vane. Chancellor Hyde, he ran down Sir Harry
Vane, and your Lordships know what became of the Chancellor. Sir Thomas Osborne, now E:irl of Danby, r:in down Ch:incellor Hyde; but wh:it will become of the Earl of Danby, your
Lordships best can tell. But let me sec that man that d:irc run
the Earl of Danby down, and wc shall soon sec what will become of him.

Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution 127 (1956).

-

")

-
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there is rarely any valid reason for such narrow legislation;
and normally, the Constitution requires Congress to proceed
by general rulemaking rather than by deciding individual
cases.

United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-445.

Like the Court, however, I am persuaded that "appellant
constituted a legitimate class of one.

II

Ante, at 44.

The opinion of the Court leaves unmentioned, the two facts

.... ,

which I consider decisive in this regard.

Appellant resigned
2/
his office under unique circumstances and accepted a pardonfor his offenses committed while in office.

/'

,

By doing so, he

(.

placed himself in a class different from all other Presidents.
Cf. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90-91.

Even though un-

mentioned, it would be unrealistic to assume that historic
facts of this consequence did n ot affect the legislative
3/
decision.-

..

If I did not consider it appropriate to take judicial
notice of those facts, I would be unwilling to uphold the
power of Congress to enact special legislation directed only
at one former President at a time when his popularity was at
its nadir.

For even when it deals with Presidents or former

'!:._/

See Burdick v. United Stat es, 236 U.S. 79, 94.

i/

Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390:

,.

"That Charles 1st. king of England, was beheaded;
that Oliver Cromwell was Protecter of England; that
Louis 16th, late King of France was guillotined; are
all facts, that have happened; but it would be non~
sense to suppose, that the States were prohibited
from making any law after either of these events,
and with reference thereto."
-

3 -

75-1605

Presidents, the legislative focus should be upon "the calling"
rather than "the person."
277, 320.

Cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.

In short, in my view, this case will not be a pre~

cedent for future legislation which relates; not to the Office
of President, but just to one of its occupants.
Without imputing a similar reservation to the Court, I
join its opinion with the qualification th~t these unmentioned
facts have had a critical influence on my vote to affirm.

'

... 4 -
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

/

June 17, 1977

Re:

75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator, GSA

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
To amplify the last point of my memorandum of
June 16 I may concur on the privacy issue, depending
on how the tension between Bill's view and Byron's
is resolved over the immediate return of appellant's
personal materials -- selected out by him or his
representatives. Even if the Act is not
unconstitutional on its face, as I believe it is,
it is so as applied -- if we are to give heed to all
the things we have been saying about privacy. In
short, I would join that part of a Court opinion to the
effect that the purely personal papers must be returned
to the former President without the "censorship" of
government agents.
Regards,

Im{)

,.

,.
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CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 17, 1977,

Re: No. 75-1605, Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services
Dear Bill,
The changes that you propose to make in
response to Byron's suggestions are all acceptable to me.

'

'

f

••

'

Sincerely yours,

·. i e
II •

..,,)

Mr o Justice Brennan

';

,

'

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

...

:

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

,,,

.

~

June 17, 1977
·.r
~·

Re:

...

75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator

Dear Bill:
Although I am not yet completely at rest in
this case, the enclosed draft represents what I
presently contemplate filing.
Respectfully,·

•'

t., . .....

'

Enclosure

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.

''

.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 17, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 76-1605
Services

Nixon v. Administrator of General

I have sent to the printer the attached footnote,
which will appear at the end of the first sentence of
the first full paragraph on page 2.
Sincerely,
iJl,n,v/

.......

No. 75-1605

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services

Footnote to appear at the end of the first sentence
of the first full paragraph on page 2.

I am not unmindful of the excesses of Watergate, and
of the impetus it gave to this legislation. However, the
Court's opinion does not set forth a principled distinction
that would limit the constitutionality of an Act such as
this to President Nixon's papers. Absent such a distinction:
"The emotional aspects of a case make it
difficult to decide dispassionately, but
do not qualify our obligation to apply the
law with an eye to the future as well as
with concern for the result in a particular
case before us." Brewer v. Williams,
U.S. _ __ ,
(Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring.)

•',
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'

I concur in the judgment and, except for Part VII,
in the Court's opinion.

With respect to the bill of attainder
'·

issue, I concur iq the result reached in Part VII; the statute
does not impose "punishment" and is not, therefore, a bill of
attainder.

See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1 965)

(WHITE, J., dissenting).

I also append the following observa-

tions with respect to one of the many issues in this case.
It is conceded by all concerned that a very small portion
of the vast collection of presidential materials now in posses s i on
of the Administra t or consists of purely private materials, s uch as
diaries, recordings of family conversations, private cor respon dence -- "personal prop e rty of any kind not involving the actua l
transaction of government business."

Tr. Oral Arg. 55.

It is als o

conceded by the United States and the other respondents that t hese
private materials, once identified, must be returned to Mr. Nixon .
Tr. Oral Arg. 38-40, 57-59.

The Court now declares that "the

.~

Nixon
- 2 -

Government, without awaiting a court order, should promptly
disclaim any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's
purely private communications and deliver them to him."
at 31-32 n. 22.

Ante,

I agree that the separation and return of these

materials should proceed without delay.

Furthermore, even if

under the Act this process can occur only after the issuance of
regulations under§ 104 that are subject to congressional approval, surely regulations covering this narrow subject matter
need not take long to effectuate.
Also, § 104(a)(7) suggests the private materials to be
returned to Mr. Nixon are limited to those that "are not otherwise
of general historical significance.''

But, as I see it, the

validity of the Act would be questionable if mere historical significance sufficed to withhold purely private letters or diaries;
and in view of the other provisions of the Act, particularly
§ 104(a)(5), it need not be so construed.

Purely private materials,

whether or not of historical interest, are to be delivered to
Mr. Nixon.

The United States and the other respondents conceded as

much at oral argument.

*I

Similarly, although the Court relies to some extent on the
statutory recognition of the constitutional right to compensation
in the event it is determined that the Government has confiscated
,

Mr. Nixon's property, I would question whether a mere historical

Nixon

- 3 interest in purely private communications would be a sufficient
predicate for taking them for public use.

Historical consider-

ations are normally sufficient grounds for condemning property,
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896);
Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 (1929); but whatever may be true of
the great bulk of the materials in the event they are declared to
be Mr. Nixon's property, I doubt that the Government is entitled
to his purely private communications merely because it wants to
preserve them and offers compensation.

No. 75-1605 -
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FOOTNOTE

·k/
"QUESTION: Well now, suppose Mr. Nixon
has prepared a diary every day and put down
what, exactly what he did, and let's suppose
someone thought that was a purely personal
account. Now, I can just imagine that someone
might think that it nevertheless is of general
historical significance.

•J>

"MR. McCREE: May I refer the Court to need
No. 5? 'The need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally
based right or privilege which would prevent or
otherwise limit access to such recordings and materials' .
"And I submit that this Act affords Richard
M. Nixon the opportunity to assert the contention
that this ~iary of his is personal and has not the
kind of general historical significance that will
permit his deprivation; and that would then have
to be adjudicated in a court.
"QUESTION:

Well, do-

"MR. McCREE: And ultimately this Court will
answer that question.
"QUESTION: Well, how do you-so you would
agree, then, that 104 must be construed-must be
construed to sooner or later return to Mr. Nixon
what we might call purely private papers?
"MR. McCREE:

Indeed I do.

"QUESTION: Can you imagine any diary-thinking
of Mr. Truman's diary, which, it is reported, was a
result of being dictated every evening, after the
day's work-can you conceive of any such material
that would not be of general historical interest?

Nixon
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fn. page 2
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fn. continued/
"MR. McCREE: I must concede, being acquainted
with some historians, that it's difficult to conceive of anything that might not be of historical
interest. But" [Laughter. ]
"QUESTION: Yes.
like journalists,-

''MR. McCREE:

Archivists and historians,

Indeed they are.
.• r

•:,

"QUESTION:

-think that everything is.

"[Laughter.]
"MR. McCREE: But this legislation recognizes
that a claim of privacy, a claim of privilege must
be protected, and if the regulations are insufficient
to do that, again a court wi ll have an opportunity
to address itself to a particular item such as the
diary before it can be turned over.
"And for that reason, we suggest that the attack
at this time is premature because the statute, in
recognizing the right of privacy, is facially adequate.
And the attack that was made the day after it became
effective brought to this Court a marvelous opportunity
to speculate about what might happen, but the re gulations haven't even been promulgated and acquiesced in
so that they have become effective." Tr. 38-40.
"[Mr. HERZSTEIN, for the private respondents:]
"But there's just no question about the return of
personal diaries, Dictabelts, so long as they are not
the materials involved in the transaction of government
business.
"Now, the statute, I agree, could have been drafted
a little more clearly, but we think there are several
points which make it quite clear that his personal materials are to be returned to him.

Nixon
fn. page 3
fn. continued/
"One is the fact that statute refers to the
presidential historical materials of Richard Nixon,
not to the person [sic] or private materials.
"The second is that, as Judge McCree mentioned,
criterion 7 calls for a return of materials to him,
and if you read those two in conjunction with the
legislative history, there are statements on the
Floor of the Senate, on the Floor of the House, and
in the Committee Reports, indicating the expectation
that Nixon's personal records would be returned to
h im.
"QUESTION: Could you give us a capsule summary
o f the difference between what you have just referred
t o as Nixon's personal records, which will be returned , and the matter which will not be returned?
"MR. HERZSTEIN: Well, yes. Certainly any personal
letters, among his family or friends, certainly a diary
made at the end of the day, as it were, after the event"QUESTION: Even though the Dictabelt was paid for
out of White House appropriations?

''MR. HERZSTEIN:

That's right.
us. I think it's incidental now.
different view on the tapes, which
transaction of government business
on government time and so on. The
heard so much about.

That doesn't bother
But we do have a
actually recorded the
by government employees
normal tapes that we've

"The Dictabelts, Mr. Nixon has said, are his personal
diary . Instead of writing it down, in other words, he
dictated it at the end of the day. And we think that's"QUESTION: I want to be sure about that concession,
because this certainly is of historical interest.
"MR . HERZSTEIN: That ' s right, it is, but we do not
f eel it ' s covered by the statute. We have acknowledged
t hat from the start.

.,

Nixon
fn. page 4
fn. continued/
"QUESTION: Is this concession shared by the
Solicitor General, do you think?
"MR. HERZSTEIN:
"QUESTION:

We believe it is.

What about that?

"MR. McCREE: About the fact that the paper
belongs to the government and so forth, we don't
believe that makes a docun1ent a government documents [sic]. We certainly agree with that.
"Beyond that, if the Court please"QUESTION: What about the Dictabelts representing
his daily diary?
"MR. McCREE: I would think that's a personal
matter that would be-should be returned to him once
it was identified.
"QUESTION: Well, is there any problem about,
right this very minute, of picking those up and giving
them back to Mr. Nixon?
"MR. McCREE: I know of no problem. Whether it
would have to await the adoption of the regulation,
which has been stymied by Mr. Nixon's lawsuit, which has
been delayed for three years,"QUESTION: How has that stymied the issuance of
regulations, Mr. Solicitor General?
"MR. McCREE: One of the dispositions of the
district court was to stay the effectiveness of regulations.
Now, I think it held up principally the regulations for
public access. The other regulations are not part of this
record, and I cannot speak to the Court with any knowledge
about them." Tr. 57-58.
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CHAM BER S O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 20, 1977

.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

'

No. 76-1605 Nixon v. GSA

I plan to make fairly substantial revisions in my
present dissenting opinion in this case in response to
John's separate opinion, circulated on Friday, and Lewis'
separate opinion, which I saw for the first time today.
I will attempt to have the entire revised draft circulated, at least in xerox form, by late Wednesday.

."

.
.

Sincerely,

.~
\,

..,
......

,··

•• 1-

.,

,,

'

June 22, 1977

~·· .

No. 75-1605

Nixon v. GSA

Dear Bill:
In accordance with our telephone conversation, I was
happy to review your fine opinion again, and compare it with
what I have written.
As you now have a Court for all of your substantive
parts, I hope you will not mind my not joining you in Parts
IV and V. While I agree with most of what you have written,
there are some points of minor tension when compared with
what I have written with respect to privilege and privacy.
A second draft of my opinion is being circulated today.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

.

.

Rider, p. 13 , n. 5, before Youngstown citation:

__J__)'

In a proper case under Article III this

Court has recognized its obligation to decide
whether Congressional actions comply with the
specific limitations of Articles I and II regardless
of the position taken by the Executive Branch. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

It is another

matter for this Court to enforce Bresidential
privileges not specified in the text of the
Constitution when the President evidently believes
that the interests of the Executive Branch lie
elsewhere.

Had President Nixon, for example, voluntarily

surrendered the tapes at issue in Nixon I, I doubt
that it seriously could have been argued that the
Judicial Branch was without power to accept them.
The same would be true of voluntary Presidential
<?foe vwit ,,dr f

compliance with a Congressional demand for privi1@80~
IHa.terials,,
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lfp/ss 09/07/82
Moore v. City of East Cleveland and Nixon Tapes Case
The attached draft of a letter of January 7, 1980,
to Justice Brennan was never sent.

It was written when he

was commenting on what was said in The Brethren about these
two cases.

Bill apparently writes a summary each Term of

what happened in cases considered to be most important.

I

have n e ver seen his current "memoirs", but his letter of
January 3 - though substantially accurate with respect to my
role in Moore - was inaccurate in several particulars with
respect to the Tapes Case.

-L~P

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

~

~/-

4

~~

- ~ ~ - ~ 4 ' ~~
~ ~ - ~'~Jl/1J~~,. ✓/

~

~

January 7, 1980

-·

~
Moore-v;·eitv · of·East-eleveland
~ ~ ~1- ~ ~-----~----------~
Dear Bi 11:
~
T~ ~
~1-s~

A---/:

,._,,/ /-h..t_ j

~//

/_A

~

.

~---:

;1A../

1-v ~ -

;(___ r. r/.

Thank you for your full letter of January 3, that

contains a complete record of how the opinions in t h e ~

~
case were

.I

developed.

I\

I

I
j

Although the caTe is hardly important enouqh to be

I

of any interest to future historians who write about the
Court, I think it is just as well that our respective files
document the facts.

\
I am also glad that you included in your letter the
final two or three paragraphs.

Although they were quite

I
unnecessary so far as I am concerned, again it is prudent -

i ..

·,-, r .

..~ ......

~

~

.,. .. I
'

1
2.

M,~..

..

"'·----·
-

..

•!

for the benefit of whoever may look into these matters in the
distant future - ' for youf to record the facts.jrncidentally,
Woodward's description of my role in the T5pes~ease,
including his account of what transpired between you and me,
also is far from the truth.

~

, 1

.

You were entirely supportive of

the memorandum I circulated except we did differ as to how to

,'

s~
describe the qualified privilege of a President.

Memoranda
I\

that I pr~?ared well before the argument (~e-ed, I had

-I
-1

commenced worked on the case the preceding summer following

~
Johnny Sirica's decision), make clear ~

- in my view~t-h~

presidential privilege could not defeat the need for evidence
in a trial such as the Tapes~ease.frndeed, we were all of
one mind about the result, and the precise language adopted
in describing the privilege - though not ideal from my
viewpoint - reflected a reasonable accommodation of the views
of all of us.

✓- _·;e

-·- - .-. '

3.

I was proud of the way the Court ' functioned in the
Tapes-ease, and thought then - and still do - that each
member of the Court participated responsibly and
constructively in resolving accordinq to law a serious
constitutional crisis.

Sincerely,

,~·'

.;'it

j

75-1605

NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR

Argued 4/20/77

~ -f
~

1--L(_

IA--~-:;4~-c.__~ ~ Lf L ,4

~.,_,,~.,,_...:..,A,o"'->-Cf

../-o ,e,-,c c::; ~Ao.(.,

--;

tCC,,..

a-~

¥- ~ ~ - • •• « c.l

4

Wa.d.-t..., 11 cc;, eA.

- (S

6-- - 1./.....v ~~
-- ~ ~

&,,.,_~.,.'-Y--

cJ-~,.i-R

~L

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ .

~~..
-

/

W-0

1.

~

"'f ·~

a-,__~ ~. ~

>

d J

<...

.
a~c~<A&-i-.,

'-~.
2.

&--r..-.,4;~~.

~s.&--t~~
~~~~.(~ltJ(/,)

!&ts -

,

,

a....r~~ ~ C l ~ ~ ~ ,

H-<J faA-

1 ~-/.

c,J) -

d -''-

~

~IA-4...J.

/:i;

C,/,J

f"/(~

~~~~,£.a

~ ~~
~ . d- ~ ~ 44-

,
.
'
\
"
'
I~~~~ -

ut

~,.,,,.,...

/~~~-

~ ~ ~ ,,cr'J'?C~~t ; ,Lo
<Jfe.... -1,..,._ 'I \1

~-Is, - ,
75-1605

NIXON v . ADMINISTRATOR

(71?)
~

.

.

Con£. 4/20/77

- ------ --.
.......

Mr. Justice Brennan ~

~u---~
~ ~·
Al~~ d.,~.,..._1~~-A-c-, •~~

.
...

I!).~ ~

... ~ ~

c=:

~ - - IL

~

'

~Jl-4.tA.,A

Ill.. L._, w-,...,-1".~
':::>

,-,L....

u. r:

J_,j_ ....... Al!t! .rt,.. \I

-

._._,~,.tliEt .P(-·~~,......

~

,

~"4.,1,,i/

c,._.~

n . ,.._,.......,_,_ ~~
-

,M-(I

~ , . . , (A,4J ~ • • ._.

..,.., I~.~,.,,
L -

d...;,,,.,,.,AJ LL-

•

,L,. __..,,,. ~-- • ,.,t,JL C

l,,c,J

.,.,;r.

-s~,,1--~,.,~---,
,-- .:t-·
-,-...-;1

. 'k..e, .,,..,.~'l,A/J.......J_£441~..,,~~

~ . ~-.., ~•1...-(;.

Mr. Justi6,t,~::~:~~.:,-~.
~

I-

-4-rC-II.,. , _

,u...

I

A,

Jc. .

I , .s I-'~ r s " •• Ca-)
J
.
I - "''-I- t<--,.,.eu .J... I?~ ,

· UA1aiY

~

c .. .;.....,.

72.~H.

~

"a.u. ':t ~•. ~;..., l,,) Al~

hv ...,

£J.,1wz.., ~

~ B ~ • ~ , ~•"-J

JI'., .., ~ - ~

~~ u~...~~ -!9/,KJ-

~~ ~~4,.,-....,J., ) ......... ~ '4-t., ~A,--44c,c'41
~,11..,~• fJ.,f- ~ .t..•1' 1: C _,, ..e.-,,44.- ... , A-IJ uaL ~fl teu, S • /. • ~-......
1

~ ~ 4 . . ' 4 . Q . . , ~ .... .s~-tl.V-1 ~~ ~~◄
UAAJcf ~ ,C(_ - ~ Mt1.~ &.,U,.• 1 ._ ~ . - t ! c..1 <..

,I

W- ( ti,,,,-•,)

I<

M~
-

3 ~( ~ ) .
a-....k s/t-1~'-'-.. ,A-: U - 1 : , ~ ~
~J:i:i•,h ~ ,,_¢ ~~ (4,t • 4u-t- ~
t:t..--(-µ,, .. J.J-

kl,~-<..

~

; , . • -c.,,

~ , ~ « __,

~~ ~ ~

~ • c._ ~ e...., ~

~f'- ~
l'r1--e.H/j,._,tl-.
~

~

~ ~~

• -,..,-.~"-cJ d-t«'-f
~~/~# ..,,{.~Gee •I~

~t:z,~i-s .
&_ ,,,..,,._.• • v ~,

~ ,_..,_•-,. ~

&,• _,~ •~

4 - e ~ ~ .........
,

# ii

U..,.~ ~ ~

,1._.....,~ •
As

,,(_ ~

,,4-,c~,...eA.r.,(...

'-11,-

..,.,_

$

~~,lltA,,J"r

tlli'- 4;1. : J - ~

c.....,., '4fJ -;I-:

tflt.t_ ~ & ...~ 1 ¢ . ~~--~. . .~ , 4 . . , ~
~ •~✓
4l&oc... ~ J-t~ca• ./l ~ ~.-1..,_L,. ~
J
•

"2,-.{.,.1a;1_,._. ,

-,

,.

'

...

~r;J(~ J

.

~l-i• ., l.. )o--,1 •• "/2, ..JT ~,,..._, ~ ~

~~~~~~~

~

~ a+« 'I 42~, ~~ ~ ~

~~

Qt.

~

2. ()

~'

.

..

~~~- ~~

~ ~~·~ ~ ~·. Ai/ 7°>.11, ~~.llc •

~.

Jc-,

cZ,,_;f-"'-'~~A.-<...,~
~~ ~ 7-.-t-4# • 12.1.•·

.r.

/

Mr. Justice White ~

tk. -1-o ~:..,+-1.-~, ~
~4-·hJ .

~-,4:;;,

ct-:

• u....l~

~ ........ ~,,,,.~'I•~~,} ~ ~

-1-.- ~ , ... t l 1 , . , ~

•

&-,~

~~-u...,,~

cs-A""""Ln:.IM'-&IIIJI\

~ tl'A~'""" ~ U, 4 -4 £. ct ,t,, <.&.~ ~ t,1..C........-C,:Kc."""
a..._, ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ « • Af ~ , , 4 e ~

~,t,~tc ; ..~ . p ~ ~ {-'.'f · ~~)
~ t.~ IA,.-..,✓ Ir.~~..., • ...,. .J., N~~ ~/.:-4.
~ ~

"

~. ,--.-.•c.. ~ s Cr
~S

~~ ~ tW..• .,,t, ~
~ ~~ ~ , 11-.,,..,::1-!"L,Ua;t,µ-,u,::,/ k~,.t~

~f,t~.

~~~,...,~...,~~

= - - - - - - - - -~~~~~..L.e!~~•!'.'!"~':~~
-------~-----Mr. Justice Marshal ~ . . ;~

- ~-- - ~ - - - - -,-

~ /)-G 41•'-' .--iy_.a:..Z, ~ ~
~ rf._.#fa,~e.--c.-~ , . , ~ ~ u.J-f4. -..l&-__y ~ ~-,I

•

~ ~ a.,--i-L

~ - - Au~e
w-t.y .~

fa-1t ic,,- ,'-V

A

'""f

~

T:M, ~~ ~

~ ,4~ ~ ~

Mr. Justice Black.mun

II-(

~te~--~

•

-P~d-f p.~-:;:r.- ]A ;_.z-~

n..,,,;,,,._,..._:. ._,.,_,.,-_ ,,,<_.. ~!J--~• C ~ •

;lo'"~°!?·--w
a,._r/~~~•'°v

~ I)..~ ~ -./&-:4/-.C,_~ ~ ~ ~

~.

(~~~~)

CA

4/21/77

No. 75-1605 2 Nixon v. Administrator, General Services
1. Separation of Powers/Privilege:
For Unconstitutionality:

The Act works an

unprecedented invasion on the autonomy of the Executive
Branch.

By throwing open the papers of a past president

to any agency of the Executive Branch, (§l02(d)), the
Act effectively assures release to the public of precisely
those kinds of communications that the Presidential Privilege
is designed to keep confidential.

It endangers the

free working of government by making clear to those
who speak with the president or his close advisors that
what they say may in the future be released to the press.
The precedent may not be confined to the case of Richard
Nixon's papers, but may reach

the papers of any

former pr esident, congressman, or Justice.
Against Unconstitutionality:

(1) Such intrusion

on Executive Branch autonomy as is worked by the Act is
no more than the Executive could accomplish by executive
order.

As the President signed this Act,

defended

it in the District Court, and defends :it in this Court,
the effect of this Act of Congress is no more an invasion
of executive autonomy than would be an equivalent executive
order.

The President may have a privilege that would

defeat a similar provision if he chose to assert it, but
in this case any privilege has been waived.

This Court,

while it may doubt the wisdom of the President's actions,
is in no position to save the president from himself.
(2)

The prec e ~ent is exceedingly narrow. Based as it is

on a waiver principle, and on the inability of this Court
to declare the joint efforts of the other branches
violative of presidential privilege, this decision will
not bind the Court in a case where a president asserts
the privilege against Congress or a court.

Also, the Court

passes now only on the facial validity of the Act, and not
on any instance of its application or administration.

2.

2. Privacy:
For Unconstitutionality:

This Act is a

quantum leap from any previous privacy case we have
encountered in the degree of intrusion it works both
into the liie of the individual focused on (Nixon) and
into the lives of perfectly innocent people, including
foreign diplomats, memb~es of congress, and advisors
of government both official and private.

While the

Act may be aimed at legitimate goals, i t sweeps far
too broadly in virtually assuring the release to the
public of any information that has broad public interest.
The Act's failure to assure the preservation of confidentiality
makes it invalid.
UnAgai nst/constitutionality:

The vast majority

of the papers do not involve confidential communications.
The Act provides for screening by archivists whose
reputation

for cmfidentiality is impeccable,

and it provides for regulations to further assure
the protection of privacy interests.

Private documents

of the former president are to be returned to him.
If confidentiality is not maintained there will be time
enough to strike down the Act as it is administered.
If the standards generally applicable to privacy intrusions
are applied, the intrusion on Nixon's privacy -- like
the intrusion worked by an extensive grand jury investigation
is clearly permissible in light of its legitimate goals, i.e.,
to preserve important papers for the executive; and to
preserve the historical record on Watergate.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN,.JR.

RE:

-~

May 5, 1977

No. 75-1605, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services

·'

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your note of May 3 regarding the
assignment of the above.

I have decided to assign it

to myself.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

', .•

..

'"'·.,
~·

~u:p-umt Qiourt of tqt ~nittb ~tattg
~aslp:ngton. ~ . QI. 20~J!.~
CHAMBERS O F

JU S TI C E WM . J . BRENNAN , JR .

June 3, 1977
Re: No. 75-1605

-

Nixon v. GSA

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEREN'CE
I am circulating this draft "hot off the presses" so that
you may have it for the weekend. It has not yet been proofread. In addition, I have just acquired a copy of the recentlyreleased Report of the National Study Commi _s sion on Records and
Documents of Federal Officials, the body created by Title II
of the Act before us to study the general problem of the disposition of federal documents. Because this Report is largely
supportive of the conclusions reached in my opinion, I may wish
to refer to it and therefore anticipate making some minor changes.

W. J.B. Jr.

'-,/

<!Jcnrl af tltt ~t~ ~taftg
~asfyittgfott, J. ~- 2IlffeJ!J .

.:§ttprttttt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

.
,'

·,·

June 6, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1605 - Nixon v. GSA

Dear Bill:

l

In the parlance of the shop, "in due course" I
will circulate a separate dissent addressing only the
separation of powers and the just compensation clause
as affected by the delay in the promulgation of the
regulations. I will circulate it in Xerox form to speed
things up.

,
Sincerely,

.
...
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Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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to:

Justice Powell

date: June 6, 1977

from: Charlie
Nixon
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I have written extensive notes in the
margins of the attached opinions by Justice
Brennan and the Chief Justice.

~~
.

This memo w i l l ~ .

add a capsule summary of the positions taken
by each of those opinions, and by the DC, on
each of the major issues.
I

SEPARATION OF POWERS
The first issue is whether the Act
violates the separation of powers as a coercive
intrusion by Congress on Presidential autonomy
or independence.

This question has essentially

two parts: (i) whether the Act represents a
forbidden intrusion by Congress into a field in
which only the President can act under the
Constitution; (ii) whether the Act represents
a violation by Congress of the Presidential
privilege to withhold confidential information
from the other Branches.
A. Presidential Independence.
1. The DC:

c~
k~

The DC held that the

degree of presidential independence required by
the Constitution, where the only claim of

2.

interference related to the disclosure of
communi_cations, was to be measured by the
doctrine of Presidential privilege.

It

held that if the Act did not violate the privilege,
which was inextricably bound up in the separation
of powers, it would not be invalid as a violation
of Presidential independence.
2. Justice Brennan:

Justice Brennan takes

a different approach, which suggests that the
•

Act might violate separation of powers even if
it did not violate Presidential privilege.

I

'

The

test, in Brennan's view, is whether the Act threatens
to disrupt the Executive Branch by interfering
with Executive functions and, if so, whether the
,.

disruption is justified by an overriding need to
promote legitimate Congressional objectives.

P.

15.
Applying this test Justice Brennan holds
that the Act is not unduly disruptive of Executive
Branch functions on its face, for two reasons:
(i) The Act represents a joint effort by Congress
and the Executive, having been signed by President
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Ford and defended by both President Ford and
President Carter; it is

thus a product of cooperation
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' rather t ~ .'.::.;'~ercion in any sense.

(ii)

The

,

Act places the Executive Branch in full control; )
it makes no papers available to Congress, as opposed
to the Executive, and constitutes no assumption of
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3.
executive power by Congress.

The opinion

leaves open the possibility that the public
access regulations may violate separation of
powers principles.
3.

P. 16.

The Chief Justice:

The Chief

Justice holds that the Act violates separation
of powers because it compromises the "constitutional
autonomy of the Executive Branch" through the
exercise of Congressional compulsion.

He views

the case as presenting issues no different than
if the Act had been passed over a Presidential
veto. P. 8.

In his view the separation of

powers is an absolute principle when it comes to
a President's papers.

The only exception is

"narrowly limited" and relates to judicial inspection
of particular documents when a constitutional
need to inspect those documents arises.

The

Chief Justice views it as irrelevant that the
Act is supported by the present incumbent and
bears the signature of his immediate predecessor.
He evidently believes that with respect to the

~

)

papers of past Administrations the former President )
continues to ho~d the power to speak for the
Executive Branch.

P. 14 & n. 17.

Nor does it
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matter that the papers, so far as the Act's faci~l l,v,validity is concerned, remain in the Executive
Branch,

since the inferior departments of that

("'YwJ..ti

4.
Branch are "legislatively created".

p. 7.

4. Comment:

The Chief is way off base.
accept his
Regardless of whether you/absolutist view of
separation of powers, his view that cooperation
between the Executive and the Legislative Branches
can be enjoined by the Judicial Branch at the
bequest of a former President is nonsense, so
far

a,

separation of powers principles are conHis logic would also invalidate a

cerned.

Presidential order or directive transferring Nixon's
White House papers to GSA.
Justice Brennan's opinion is limited to
the situation where a former President qposes
cooperation between the Presidency and Congress
whose effect is to retain control by the Executive
Branch over the former President I s papers, /

_7-
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Separation of powers does not call for Judie al ~ ~
interference

in this situation.
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B.

Presidential Privilege.

-

1. The DC:

-

~ivv"~-~ ·~
/?

The DC held tra t there wa s ~

~

no violation of the qualified Presidential
privilege

because the public interests served

-

by the Act outweighed the limited intrusion

9 b

~
If,

on whatever interest in Presidential confidentiality
a former President was entitled to assert.

•

~ ~

5.

2. Justice Brennan:

Justice Brennan's

opinion follows the DC's holding and reasoning.
It assumes, without deciding, that a former
President may assert Presididential privilege
after he leaves office, but states that the
assertion is severely undercut when the incumbent
opposes it as in this case.

P. 19.

1 :4-
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Following

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 706-707,
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~1~
the opinion states that the test is whether the . ~

cost to Presidential confidentiality is outweighed
by the impediment that recognition of the privilege
would place in the way of legitimate constitutional
duties of Congress.

Because the Act keeps

the documents within the Executive Branch, so far
as the screening process is aoncerned,

and because

the incumbent and his immediate predecessor support
the Act, the cost to Presidential confidentiality
must be viewed as minimal, and is justified by
the legitimate interests of Congress in preserving
'.

the materials for historic and investigative
purposes.

The opinion presumes that the archivists

charged with the screening function will

carry

out their duties and preserve the confidentiality

6.

3. The Chief Justice:

The Chief rejects

the view that the needs of Congress should be ba
against an assertion of Presidential privilege.
In his view Presidential privilege is absolute,
subject only to the exception recognized
Nixon for narrow judicial inquiries.

In

view the former President is "the holder of the
privilege" with respect to the papers of his
own administration. P. 12.

Thus Congress can

no more enact this legislation than i t could
force a former President to testify over his objection
at a Congressional hearing.

4.
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Comment:

P. 15, & n. 18.

The critical point, in my

..
...

view, is tl:It: Ford and Carter have signed and
defended the Act.

I do not see how Nixon, under

~~,_.

the banner of Presidential privilege, can stop

I.,.~

his successors from following a policy o~i~h

L.___,

Nixon disapproves ~

t
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Nixon is in the position of ~ ~
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an attorney who asserts the attorney-client privil~

~

after his client has waived the privilege.
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It

would be a different case if the Act had passed
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over a Presidential veto, or even if the President ~ ~~~~i(,
had signed the Act but expressed the view that
-see, ~.c;,, l3ut'k
it was a violation of Presidential privilege. J_ It

r." v. V"'(eo

would also be a different case if Nixon, being called

~ ( ~ ~• _..,,., upon by Congress to testify to the contents .o f the
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papers (or to produce them), refused on the ground
that disclosure would violate the privilege.

I
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would think that in that situation the
former President would be presumed to speak

for the Executive Branch, absent an explicit
waiver by the incumbent.

-------

But since it is the

3

interest of incumbent and future Presidents that

is at stake, I think it is clear that the incumbent,
not the former President,
should be regarded
expressing
aslthe views of the Executive Branch where the
two diverge as in this case.

And where the

President and Congress agree on a joint course
of action as in this case, I think this Court is
without authority to intervene because the former
President disapproves.
What Justice Brennan has written is
wholly consistent with these views, but he goes
fu:ther and says that to the extent that the former
Presidmt can assert the privilege in this situation,
the claim is weak and the intrusion justified by
valid interests.

This has the effect of leaving
a less rational
open the possibility that/amcaxkxxxaxJ plan for
disclosure of a past President's papers might
be struck down even if the incumbent supported
it.

The precedent is thus limited not only

-

by the fact that Nixon is at odds with his two
immediate successors, but by the historical cJi'hcu~stance ~
of a President resigning under the charge tha
he improperly withheld knowledge of crimes.

ft~N:;t:

~~
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8.

II
PRIVACY

1. The DC: The DC held that the Act
on its face does not violate Nixon's right to
privacy under the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.

Considering only the screening

process, the Court held that the intrusion on
was
privacy worked by screening the materials/outweighed
by the need.
2. Justice Brennan:
takes the same approach.

Justice Brennan

Noting that only a

fraction of the materials are truly private given
Nixon's status as a public figure, he holds that
the screening of t he materials is necessary to
serve ·overriding governmental interests.

He

...,_

repeats that the archivists must be presumed to
stresses
perform their duty in a discrete manner and/that
the Act -- as he construes it for the Court
requires the return to Nixon of his private materials.
P. 32.

(lljJw-~-
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3. The Chief Justice:

~

y

~~~-)

The Chief views this

as a case of compelled disclosure, like Buckley,
and would hold that the government interests are
not of overriding importance.

He also analogizes

the screening by archivists to a criminal search
and states that the Act is invalid as a general warrant.

,.,..

9.

4. Comments:

I do not expect you will

have any trouble with this aspect of the case.
The Chief's arguments are, in my view, silly.
Compelled disclosure is not at issue here any
more than it was in Whalen v. Roe, where the
Court similarly presumed that public officials
would perform the ir duty in a discreet manner.
If the regulations provide for public disclosure
of any private materials there will be time enough
to decide their consitutionality on that basis.
Since the purpose of the screening is to return
private materials to Nixon that he left in the
government's custody, the analogy to a general
criminal warrant is inapplicable.
III
BILL OF ATTAINDER
1. The DC:

The DC found that the Act

did not constitute punishment and therefore held
that it was not an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder.
2. Justice Brennan goes into this issue
in greater depth.

Like the DC, he holds that

the test is whether the Act constitutes the legislative
imposition of punishment.

He rejects the argument

,~~½-

that legislation is a Bill of Attainder~ if its
effect is limited to an individual or class of

10.
identifiable individuals, a view that ''would
cripple the very process of legislating."

P. 42.

Specificity of legislation is not in itself
unconstitutional, and in this case "appellant
constituted a legitimate class of one."

P. 44.

Turning to the punishment issue, Justice Brennan
either
finds that the Act is not within/the historic
or the functional definitions of punishment.
He says that historically the Bill of Attainder
clause has been applied only to executions, imprisonment,
banishment,

confiscation of property, and

exclusion from certain types of employment.

Since

the Act provides for "just compensation" for any
deprivation of property it is not within the historic
meaning of punishment under the Bill of Attainder
Functionally, the Clause has been limited

Clause.

to legislative impositions that serve

exclusively

punitive purposes, i.e., deterrence, retribution
and prevention or to impositions intended as punishment .
Since the Act serves the independent purpose of
preserving the historical record, and was not designed
or intended to punish Nixon, it is not within the
functional definition of punishment.
3.

The Chief Justice:

The Chief Justice

holds that the Act is a Bill of Attainder because
it applies to Nixon alone among Presidents and
deprives him of the ownership of his papers.

The

Chie f says that by tradition, President's attain

•,

11.

private ownership of their papers accumulated
while in office.

The deprivation of that

ownership interest, out of fear that Nixon
would destroy incriminating documents, is in the
Chief's view enough to make the Act a Bill
of Attainder. P. 31.
4. Comment:

I agree with Justice Brennan

and the DC that the Act is not "punitive" in any
established sense.
"'

Legislation may legitimately

single out a class of one, see New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, overruling Morey v. Dowd , as long
as the classification is permissible and serves reasonable
nonpunitive goals.

That test is plainly met here.

The Chief gains some support from language in
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, where the
Court held that it was a Exi:mexxa Bill of Attainder
for Congress to punish communists by eisqualifying
them, on pain of criminal penalties, from holding
union office.

But Brown's holding is consistent

with Justice Brennan's approach, see his p. 47 n.39,
and the case should not be read as dispensing with
the requirement of punishment under the Clause.

IV
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Chief holds that the Act violates
Due P~ocess because it does

SR

not on its face

provide for Nixon's participation in the screening

12.
process.

This issue was not discussed by the DC,

was not presented in the Jurisdictional Statement,
and is not addressed by Justice Brennan.

Since

only the facial validity of the Act is presently
before the Court, I believe the Chief's discussion
of this issue is premature.

If Nixon chooses to

assert a right to participate in ·the screening
process, there will be time enough for judicial
consideration of that claim in the DC.

********
For the reasons stated, I recorrnnend
you join Justice Br ennan's opinion.
C.A.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

June 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 75-1605

Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services

I propose to add the following footnotes at appropriate
places as a response to the dissent of the Chief Justice.
1.

The dissent's view of the separation of powers

doctrine as an absolute prohibition against exercise of
"coercive influence" by one branch over another, and against
any interference with Presidential papers, see post at 7-10,was
explicitly rejected in United States v. Nixon, supra, 418
U.S., at 707, where it was said thai "In designing the
structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the
sovereign power among the three co-equal branches, the Framers
of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system,
but the separate powers were not intended to operate with
absolute independence."

(emphasis supplied). Accordingly,

United States v. Nixon recognized only a qualified executive

~-

-

2 -

privilege in Presidential papers, which negates the dissent's

view of an absolute Presidential privilege with a "narrowly
limited exception."

Post, at 9.

In any event the dissent

offers no explanation why the "narrowly limited exception"
permits "coercion" of the Executive by the Judicial Branch
but not "coercion" of the Executive Branch by the Legislative
Branch, however slight and however subject to stringent judicial
safeguards.

In addition, in recognizing that Congress has

exercised in numerous ways a conceded authority to limit, define, and deal with the activities and papers of the Executive
Branch, the dissent offers no explanation for its proffered
constitutional distinction between such regulations affecting
Presidential papers and similar regulations affecting the
papers of other Executive Branch agencies or officials, post
at 4, a distinction at odds with the very cases on which the
dissent relies.

See,~-, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.

52, 117 (1926).

Finally, virtually all of the dissent's argu-

ments are now premature, for it essentially ignores the fact
that the §104 public access regulations designed to effectuate
the Act while preserving appellant's privileges have yet to
be promulgated.

-

2.

3 -

The dissent's understandable concern for appellant's privacy

interests nonetheless rests on a faulty premise and on facts
that are refuted by the record.

The dissent acknowledges that

the overwhelming majority of the materials in issue are entitled
to no privacy protection.

The dissent argues, however, that be-

cause archival screening entails interference, however minimal,
with materials that are undeniably private, the Act therefore
is subject to the "most searching kind of judicial scrutiny,
post, at 17.

11

This argument, of course, was expressly rejected

by a unanimous Court earlier this Term, at least in the absence
of likely public dissemination of such private information.
See Whalen v. Rose, supra.
"no one knows

11

The dissent therefore argues that

if the government archivists will be

11

reliably

discreet," post, at 24, although it offers no basis for disagreement with the factual finding of the District Court that
the archivists have

11

an unblemished record for discretion."

408 F. Supp., at 365.

Finally, the dissent fails to recognize

that, unlike the computerized information network

upheld in

Whalen v. Roe, the Government will not retain long-term possession over appellant's private information, but must return all
such papers and records to him or his family following archival

screening. §104 (a) (7).

- 4 -

3.

The dissent's bill of attainder argument rests on the

view that appellant is being punished because he "owns" his
papers and the Act constitutes their confiscation by the
Government.

This is without merit.

Our cases establish that

whatever property interest inheres in appellant is nonpunitively taken when provision is made for the payment of "just compensation."

United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).

Appellant's corollary interest in preserving access to the
materials is expressly assured under the Act~ §102(c).

For

similar reasons, the dissent's procedural due process argument has no merit.

Appellant's rights of ownership can be

procedurally and judicially vindicated simply by commencing
an action for "just compensation."

Indeed his rights and

privileges receive far more.procedural protection than in any
previous case, for the Act expressly provides for complete and
expedited judicial consideration of all such claims.

W.J.B.Jr.

§l0S(a).

"'
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MEMO FOR FILE
No. 75-1605

Nixon v. GSA

Having read the Court opinion circulated by WJB and
the dissent of the CJ, and also Charlie's memo, I record these
preliminary reactions.

I am not inclined to join either of

the circulated opinions.

While I agree with a good deal of

what is said in both, I would not go as far as WJB in one
direction and the CJ in the other.
My primary concern focuses on presidential privilege,
although the privacy issue is not frivolous - especially in
view of the intermingling of concededly private papers that
will be reviewed by scores of archivists with a high likelihood
that the "juciest" items will end up in the media.

At the

moment I view my options broadly as follows (subjecs, o f ~
course, to further thought, discussion and consideration):
1.

Join in the judgment. If so, I would write to express

certain reservations.

Without attempting here to identify

all of these, I would certainly say that the precedent should
be limited (as Charlie suggests) to the situations where (i)
the incumbent President has approved the Act, and (ii) there
is a public interest, rooted in some extraordinary circumstances (~.g., Watergate) strongly supportive of the drastic
step of impoundment.

'.

2,
2.

Dissent in part.

I could hold the Act invalid as

failing adequately to protect the privilege of a former
Presidento
I now voice some of my concerns that tend to support
the second option.

But I am not thinking in terms of

"absolutes" as even an incumbent President's privilege is
not absolute.

Nixon I made this clear, although the presumption

in favor of it is strong.

Nixon I involved the right to a

fair trial - a constitutional right without a counterpart in
this case.
The CJ states correctly (p. 15) that the SG agrees "the
privilege survives the individual President's tenure".

I had

not previously seen the quotation from Truman (p. 15, CJ's
dissent), but it is supportive and sensible.~
A former President's interest is twofold:

(i) though

out of office, one (even a Nixon) who has held the highest
office in our country must be presumed to have a continuing
concern for the public interest in the confidentiality of
presidential conversations and papers emphasized in Nixon I;

·'

and (ii) there also is a personal interest and duty which I
now elaborate upon briefly.
In a strictly private sense, a President - based on the
history of the Republic - has the right to assume that his
conversations and papers with respect to certain matters are
confidential.

Proceeding on this assumption - and it is an

*w.- ~
u~,,..{...c,,
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3.
assumption necessary to the adequate fulfilling of presidential
duties - it is a certainty that Nixon said and wrote things
that would not have been said or written absent this assumption.
As a Justice of this Court, I frequently write and say things sometimes frivolously but usually pursuant to my duties - that
I would not dream of saying publicly or recording for the
curiosity of others.

As a matter of ordinary fai rness and

decency, I view it as little short of outrageous to allow persons over whom Nixon has no control or supervision to examine
his most private papers & thoughts and make their own subjective
judgments (at least initially) as to what ought to be classified
as "personal" and what may "go public".
The interest of a former President also includes a duty
of the highest order to protect the confidences of those who
talked and wrote to him about certain matters.
actual example illustrates this point:

A simple and

I have a friend - a

well-known lawyer - who was consulted frequently by Nixon
with respect to judicial and other appointments.

The friend

told me early in the Watergate affair that he spoke with the
utmost candor, detailing - as he saw them - the strengths
and weaknesses of the persons under consideration.

Usually

these were persons whom my friend knew fairly well; occasionally
they were good friends.

Nixon has an obligation to protect

the confidentiality that was implicit in every such
conversation.

4.
The same obligation exists with respect to what was said
and written by staff personnel and others who thought they
were serving their country in speaking freely to the President
of the United States.

No successor in office should be

allowed to waive this obligation.
Although I have been speaking in terms of the impact on
individuals, the ultimate concern is for the public interest.
WJB answers that if Ford and Carter aren't concerned about the
public interest, why should Nixon be.

My answer is that we

are talking about Nixon's conversations and papers; not Ford's
or Carter's.

At least they will be on notice (if this Act

is upheld) not to tape the White House and to be cautious
and discreet in what they write.

Also, with the benefit of

forewarning, they can do what Nixon should have done:

destroy

the most sensitive and confidential papers as they go along,
or in any event before Congress can impound them.*
Moreover, although Ford was of the same political party,
and a friend of Nixon's, he was under the heaviest political
pressure - in light of his experience with the pardon - to
approve this Act.

And as Carter campaigned against Watergate

and the pardon, it would not have been politically feasible
for him to oppose the Act.

History is replete with examples

of disagreements and discord between incoming and outgoing
Presidents.

What if Eisenhower (who, I believe, had the

*But if Congress impound, I suppose it could make it a crime
to destroy papers pertaining to official duties.

5.
only Republican majority in the Congress since 1930) had
decided to confiscate Truman's papers?
speaking when Ike took office.

The two were not

And what about Johnson and

Grant, to pick another random example.

If Grant had failed

to veto an act of Congress seizing Johnson's papers, would
WJB argue that the Act was the combined product of the
Executive and Legislative branches and that therefore Johnson
had no interest?
The other justification is that Nixon was a rascal, and
that the public interest in being sure it knew the full extent
of his rascality justified this unprecedented intrusion into
presidential confidentiality.
to this point.

I do think there is something

Although I personally have reservations as to

whether this justification is one of public interest substance
rather than a combination of curiosity and vindictiveness.
We must assume that the Congress acted in good faith and
according to its perception of the public interest.
Thus, if I decide to dissent on this issue I would reach as Brennan does - a balancing of interests.
subjective judgments are inescapable.
by using familiar termso

I suppose largely

One can set the stage

If the state interest is viewed as

"overriding" this answers the question.
difficulty accepting this view.

But I would have

I suspect that relatively

little remains undisclosed that would have any practical
utility to the Congress or to historians in avoiding future

6.
Watergates.

The . litigation in this area already has been

extensive; the impeachment proceedings before the House Judicial
Committee were televised nationally; large segments of the
tapes and the documents deemed most relevant by the courts
and the Committee have been disclosed.

But I am willing to

assume that some public interest justifies an impoundment
statute, although in view of the history of presidential
privilege upon which Nixon and countless others relied, the
privacy interests of Nixon and others that are implicated,
and the general public interest mentioned above, I would
think that nothing less than a compelling or overriding interest
would justify an Act as intrusive as this one. Again, I
recognize that if I adhere to this view, the answer is
foreordained.
WJB's opinion refers, as I recall, frequently to the
Act providing "the least intrusive" means of screening
presidential papers.

See, ~.g., p. 28, 39.

would be difficult to support.

This conclusion

If we assume that impoundment

is justified, the method of screening becomes of vital
importance.

What seems to me to be a serious defect in the

prescribed method is the failure to afford Nixon an opportunity
participate in it at the critical time. It would have been
r easonable and fair - as well as protective of the interest of
all concerned - to provide that Nixon's representatives could

7.
participate on a joint basis with the screening by the
archivists, with appropriate provision for resolving
disagreements.

L.F.P o, Jr.
ss

P.S.

I should have referred above to WJB's argument that,

in effect, Congress really did not impound or seize Nixon's

papers:

Congress concededly took the tapes and papers away

from Nixon, but rather than retain possession itself, Congress
directed that the papers be placed in the custody of GSA -

anf agency

of the Executive Branch.

It is argued that since

we are talking about "executive" (presidential) privilege,
tiR'l!K the papers really have not been removed from one branch

of government to the other.

Although this argument has some

surface plausibility, it has little substance.
branch took the critical action:

The legislative

it effected a legislative

seizure of the papers sufficiently to deprive Nixon of
control, and to prescribe elaborate provisions for the screening
and ultimate public release of many of the papers.
said that GSA is subject to presidential control.
two answers to this:

It is
There are

if the incumbent President is hostile

to the former President or succumbs to political pressures,
the fact that the papers are lodged with an executive agency

8.

is little comfort to the one claiming both a privilege and a
privacy interest in them.
In a more practical, realistic sense, the GSA cannot be
controlled by the incumbent President except within the framework of the Act - which prescribes broadly exactly what the
GSA must do, subject to regulations that also must be approved
(i.e., not vetoed)by Congress .

In any event, GSA is an

amorphous agency with hundreds - if not thousands - of
personnel.

If my papers were turned over to it, I would not

be surprised to see them in public print - if anyone were
that interested - in due course of time.
Having said all of the foregoing, and despite my personal
conviction that the Act is a regressive step in terms of
enabling a President (or, for that matter, any responsible
official in government) to function effectively, I recognize
that at this time we have before us only the facial validity
of the Act.

I therefore am especially interested in the extent

to which genuine safeguards can be provided that would assure
Nixon a contemporaneous opportunity to participate in the
screening process.

If that opportunity were provided, together

with appropriate procedure for resolving differences of opinion
as to what papers come within presidential privilege and personal
privacy, I may be able to join an affirmance.t>j ~
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to: Justice Powell

June 8, 1977

from: Charlie
Nixon
As I begin to read the cases relied on
CJ and WJB, I have in mind these tentative
draft opinion:
1.

Bill of Attainder:

On this issue

join WJB.
2.

Privacy:

I would propose to write

in a way that would be designed to assure
the screening process and the disclosure
ontemplated by the Act are carried out in a
ranner that meets your concerns for confidentiality

~~in communications with the President.

~

The

Act is valid on its face, because as written it

' nly

calls for the return of private materials

Nixon and for the disclosure of other materials
t the earliest reasonable date.

It would be

premature to pass on either the mode of screening

-S \

· J~
~

:--......

}

i

'

the timing of disclosure.

Nonetheless, it is appropriate

ro ~ te the importance of the privacy interests

~ "'h.~

~

ake -- not just to Nixon, ?ut to those Ji!lio

communicated with him in his official capacit); and
ultimately to the Nation -- and to suggest the
kinds of safeguards that might reconcile the perceived interests in retention of materials in

government custody and in eventual disclosure
with the privacy interests that may be asserted.
Such safeguards might include provisions for

{f) Nixon's

participation in the screening process

subje<}.:---;o judicial review of any disputes
and f"b-Pa e1.ay of public disclosure of any
confidential communications until, say, Nixon's
death.

It is because the Act on its face

may be read to authorize such safeguards that
you can vote to uphold its constitutionality
in this case.
3.

Separation of Powers:

I would

w'I'"B

propose to agree with Ninef\ 1 s conclusions on
this aspect of the case, but would seek to
narrow the precedential effect of approving
the facial validity of the Act.
-

I would stress

=--

that Presidential privilege survives a President's
term in office, and that a former President may
be presumed to speak for the Executive Branch
when he invokes the Privilege to resist requests
by the other branches for information concerning
his term of office.

But I would reiterate that

the Privilege derives from the principle of
Separation of Powers and point out that under the
Constitution the incumbent President ultimately
must speak for the Executive Branch.

Where as

in this case two incumbent Presidents have taken

affirmative steps to support such intrusion on
Executive prerogatives as is worked by the Act,
and where the present incumbent opposes the
former President's assertion of privilege, this
Court should not sustain the former President's
claim.
C.A.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

"

'

June 8, 1977

75-1605, Nixon v . GSA
Dear Bill,
Upon the understanding that you are
willing to give favorable consideration to the
stylistic changes I have suggested, and perhaps additional ones to come, I am glad to
join your Ol)inion in this case .
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

•I\

,j1tpum.e Q}ourt of tfr.e ~tilth $5taf:cg
'llasfringto1t, ~. Q}. 20bP1~
CHAMBERS OF

June 9, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

/

Re: No. 75-1605, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

-::/11A •

I/ .

T. M.
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

'•

>

'

<

June 10, 1977

No. 75-1605

Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services

Dear Bill:

,,,

'

I write to say that I am not yet at rest in this
troublesome case.
Although you and the Chief have both writteJine
opinions (and seemingly have left little for anyone to
add), I am trying to write something as aabeans of
formulating my own conclusion.
, In view of the unprecedented volume - by number and
pages - of opinions that have circulated recently, together
with some other writing that I have undertaken, I am running
somewhat behind with my work. It may be about a week before
I circulate anything in Nixony if indeed this is my final
decision.
Sincerely,

f,,.i.··

;,

,

.

,'..

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Charlie, Dave, Gene
and Tyler

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 14, 1977

Status Report
After taking stock as to where we are "at", the situation
is as follows:
1.

Uncirculated opinions:

Concurrences in Bradley and

Nixon; dissents in Arizona Bar and Zacchini.

These are our

priority concerns, and our schedule is rather tight.
2.

Court opinions that are ready.

Morris v. Gressette.

All votes are in, and our responsive

footnotes have been added.
syllabi and line-ups.
3.

Brown v. Ohio and

Also, I think we have cleared the

Both may come down on Thursday.

Court opinions requiring responsive footnotes.

abortion "trilogy" - Maher, Beal and Poelker.

The

Although the

votes are in and all writing circulated, I think two - perhaps
three - additional footnotes are indicated.

We should circulate

these no later than midday on Wednesday, so that these cases
can be cleared at Thursday's Conference.
4.

Continental TV v. GTE.

We have a Court, and Tyler

is doing the final review for stylistic polishing and cite
checking.
circulated.

But Justice White's concurring opinion has not been

_.,..

2.
4.

Other opinions.

If my count is correct, our only

remaining opinions are the dissents we have circulated in
McDonald and Coker.
in McDonald.

We have joins from White and the Chief

I do not recall whether Rehnquist participated.

If not, I believe all votes are in, and the case possibly could
be ready for announcement on Thursday.

Tyler should do the

cite checking and final polishing with this possibility in
mind.

I believe we are all set with our little dissent in

Coker, but Dave should keep an eye on this.

***
As a general observation, it is especially important to
follow promptly all circulations and recirculations.

We don't

want anything to "slip by us".
Also, in view of the unprecedented backlog in the print
shop, it is more important than usual to double check opinions
and changes therein.
Wednesday, June 22, remains the final target date for

I

all circulations, with the hope to bring down the final

I·

opinions on Monday, the 27th.

I

In cases where our opinions

will be lengthy (Bates, perhaps Nixon and Bradley) circulations should be made no later than Monday, June 20.
Finally, as a proxy for the CJ, I am scheduled to leave
for the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference at about 1:00 p.m.

.~
,

✓

~

~

3.

on Wednesday, the 22nd.

I am to participate in the judges'

I '
i·.,,

conference on the 23rd and make a brief appearance on the
morning of the 24th, returning to Washington that afternoon.

I will leave my votes with one of the other Justices for the
Conference on Thursday, June 23, if I am able to get awayo

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

•

l
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 15, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1605 - Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services

Dear Bill:
As I have already indicated, I Join the judgment and
most of your opinion, my reservations being indicated in the
following connnents.
Page 11: You say that we need not resolve questions
of standing with respect to separation of powers and presidential privilege (I note that your first circulation said
we need not resolve "all" of these questions). But on page
21 you appear to resolve the major issue of standing--that
with respect to presidential privilege. It seems to me that
if there is otherwise any substantial doubt about standing, we
should resolve it to avoid the possibility that much of what
you say will be a series of extended and unwarranted dicta on
important constitutional issues.
Page 14, fn. 5: I would not purport to draw support
for this opinion by reference to the British system, which is
hardly a model for anyone interested in separating executive
and legislative powers.
Page 16: You take comfort from the fact that i · l s
the executive branch itself that has possession of and LS in
control of the pap~rs. But it is not the President n ot t he
presidency that is in charge. The Administrator is carr ying
out legislatively-imposed duties and his regulations are subject to rejection by either House of Congress. What is
challenged here is the very existence of and the content of
the restraints and duties placed on the presidency by this
legislation. Because this thought appears more than once,
you may not be interested in modifying your opinion, in
which event I would indicate that you overemphasize what is
at best a make-weight argument.

-2Page 17, fn. 8: You infer the irrelevance of the
title issue--at least you say that you see no reason to
engage in the title debate but later in the footnote you
indicate that if the Government has title to the materials
now in the custody of the Administrator, the property clause
would justify most if not all of what is done here. Thus,
if the title question were decided for the Government, a
great deal of the opinion would apparently be beside the
point.
Page 17, also fn. 8, page 53: I do not see how the
compensation clause provides any support with respect to the
purely private papers and tapes that may be involved in this
case. They surely do not belong to the Government and their
retention is not necessary to the public business. I would
not think the compensation clause would authorize the Government to seize a private diary as long as it was willing to
pay for it. Even if the diary were of "historical interest,"
I doubt that this section would furnish the necessary
public purpose for the seizure of the diary.
As long as I am on the subject, I should say that if
return of the purely private materials to the former President must await and is subject to the issuance of regulations under§ 104, as the reference to these materials in
§ 104(a)(7) would indicate, then I think the act, while not
unconstitutional on its face, is being unconstitutionally
applied at this point since there is no excuse whatsoever,
other than obstinacy, for not having identified and returned
at least some of the private materials. Even if the return
of the papers may be effected independently of§ 104 regulations--and if this is the case, the opinion should be very .
clear on the point--! suggest that the opinion should also
say that the mere fact that private materials may be of
historical interest does not warrant their retmti.on. As I
recall it, the Solicitor General himself indicated that even
if private materials, once identified, were thought to be
of historical interest, they could not be retained but should
be returned.

Page 31: You say that purely private materials will
be returned to the former President. But again is this
subject to the condition that they not be of historical
interest, as§ 104(a)(7) would indicate?
Page 31: I do not subscribe to the statement, as a
general proposition, that once something has been published,

-3there can be no longer any privacy interest in preventing
its further dissemination.
Pages 38-39: The screening process permits archivists to read even private papers even though they might be
identified as private without reading them line by line.
Page 46: I was in dissent in Brown and still think
it was a disaster. I doubt that I shall join this part of
your opinion although I shall join the result. In any
event, doesn't it go pretty far to say as you do at the
bottom of pages 46-47 that bills of attainder include "any
legislative enactment that bars specified individuals or
groups from participation in certain types of employment or
vocations, a mode of punishment corrnnonly employed against
those legislatively branded as disloyal"? (Emphasis added.)
If this is true we have been spinning our wheels in the
alien cases.
Page 53: You indicate that the former President has
ready access to the materials. But as you indicate on
page 6, his right of access under§ 102(c) is "su~sequent
and subject to the regulations" issued by the Administrator.
I take it these access regulations have already been issued.
Should not there be said that the regulations themselves are
unexceptionable, if they are?
It is likely that I shall write briefly in concurrence.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference

§uµumt

QJ.onrl llf tqt 'Jlnitth ~fates

JD'a.s !rutgfon. g). <!J. 21lgiJ.l.~
CH A MBER S O F

JU ST I CE WM. J . B RE NNAN, JR.

June 15, 1977

RE: No. 75-1605 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
Dear Byron:
I am pleased that you can join the judgment and most of my opinion.
I find your remaining suggestions helpful and am willing to make the following changes to meet your concerns.
Page 11.
etc.
11

I will delete the sentence beginning 11 As shall be seen 11

In its place I will substitute something along the following lines:

We reject the argument that only an incumbent President may assert such

claims and hold that appellant, as a former President,may also be heard
to assert them.

We further hold, however, that neither his separation of

powers claim nor his claim of breach of constitutional privilege has merit. 11
Page 14.

I'll delete the reference to the British system.

Page 16.

I have not made clear the purpose of my argument.

I do

not mean to imply that merely placing the function ir. the Executive Branch
by itself answers the separation of powers argument.

The core of the

separation of powers inquiry is the extent of interference with the function
of the Executive Branch.

In this light it is clearly less intrusive to

place custody of the materials within the Executive Branch itself rather

- 2 -

than having Congress or some outside agency perform the screening function.
I would be happy to add a footnote to make this clarification if you think
it would be useful.
Page 17 n. 8.

I will substitute in line 4 for "private property is

taken" the words "economic interests are invaded.

11

last paragraph of that footnote and substitute:

0n the other hand, even

11

I will then delete the

if legal title rests in the government appellant is not thereby foreclosed
from asserting under Sec. 105(a) a claim for return of private materials
retained by the Administrator in contravention of appellant's rights and
privileges as specified in Sec. 104(a)(5):
As for your concern for government obstinancy, this no doubt is
attributed to the fact that the district court enjoined the government
from processing, disclosing, inspecting, transferring, or otherwise dis11

posing of any materials
the Act • . • .

11

which might fall within the coverage of . . .

408 F. Supp. 375.

I have tried to correct this deficiency

in footnote 22.
Page 31.

Concerning your questi~n as to construction of Sec. 104(a)(7).

It seems to me to be unwise to attempt to resolve this issue in the abstract.
It is sufficient for me that the Act qualifies the general requirement that
the Administrator retain materials of general historical significance with
the provision that any constitutional or other privacy interests of Nixon
must be safeguarded.

Section 104(a)(5); see footnote 23.

Obviously there

- 3-

may be disagreement over the precise contents of those privacy interests
as they will be asserted in subsequent litigation concerning particular
materials claimed to have general histori cal significance. See, for example,
the possible area for dispute discussed below as to pages 38-39.
think there's no merit whatever in the privacy claims.
considerable merit in them.

Therefore I

0 t tempted

Some may

Obviously you see

{and still think it is

wise) not to anticipate prematurely quest ions that may arise from actual
application of the regulations.
Page 31.

I do not fully understa nd you r argument with respect to prior

publication since I had thought that Katz s~ttled this.

However, if it will

meet your concern I'd be glad to change t e ~entence preceding the Katz cite
to limit it to materials appellant discl osed to the public.
Page 38-39.

Your concern here is

t s~bject to easy solution. Some

might say that the privacy interests at ~c es to the content of materials.
ecessitate screening.

Detection ofthesematerials would of c

I under-

stand that you believe that privacy prot

tion relates to the form {i.e.,

diaries, personal letters, etc.) irres

1\'e

contained therein.
we should avoid.

I've already sugges

of the content of the materials

tat this is the kind of problem

Isn't it wise to avo1 r . ~l ving these matters until a

concrete dispute arises under Sec. 105

T c- 0p inion already states that

materia 1s that are concededly private

~ •· ~ ;y definition should be im-

mediately returned.

See footnote 22 .

- 4 -

Page 46.

I find your reaction surprising since I had thought that my

Bill of Attainder section undercuts a broad reading of Brown and indeed embraces many points found in your dissent.
I will happily redraft it.
Page 53.

As for the objectionable sentence

Would substituting "a" for "any" suffice?

I will certainly mention that the regulations under Sec. l02(c)

guaranteeing appellant's unrestricted access to the materials have been
promulgated and have not been challenged.

See 41 C.F.R. 105-63.3.
Sincerely,
1

/7) c l
Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
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No. 75-1605
Richard M. Nixon,
Appellant, On Appeal from the United
v
. .
·
States District Court for the
. t nc
Adm11nstrator
of
General
. t of Co1umb'1a.
.
al
0 1s
Serv1ces et .
[June - , 1977]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Title I of Pub. L. 92-526 (1974), 44 U.S. C. §2107, the
"Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,"
directs the Administrator of General Services, an official of the
Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers
and tape recordings of appellant, former President Richard M. 11
,
Nixon. and P.!}?ffiU,lgate regulations that ( 1) provide for the .,,o~dterlyf processintg ~alna fscretehnmg by Exefcutitve ~rantch arch i- ~
~
vis s o sue11 ma en s or e purpose o re urmng o appe1"lant such of them as are personal and private iu nature, and /:J _ -I- ~- . J(2) determiue the terms and conditions upon which public ~ ~
access may eventually be had to those materials that are
retained. The question for decision is whether Title I is un- .I. -.
•
constitutional .Q!l its face as a v10lat10n of (IJ m\\para£10trof rt-,
powers; (2) :ri;;{dentiiil privilege doctrines; (3) appellant's/1 ~ .L L .. • ~
privacy interests; (4) appellant's First Amendment associa-{_
~
tional rights; or ( 5) the Bill of Attainder Clause.
~ A
IJ
On December 19, 1974, four months after appellant resigned
as President of the United States, his successor, President
Gerald R. Ford, signed Pub. L. 93-526 into law. 88 Stat. 4,LH . . -,.~1
1965 (1974). The next day, December 20, 1974, appellant
~ ~
filed this action in the District Court for the District of Columbia which under § 105 (a) of the Act has exclusive juris~
•
diction to entertain complaints challenging the Act's consti•

l/'1j,e, J..,it
~ f-

J ~
~
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~ ~
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NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

tutional validity. Appellant's complaint challenged the Act's
constitutionality on a number of grounds and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforcement. A threejudge District CoJJrt was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2282, 2284. 1 Because regulations required by § 104 of the
Act ~overning -~publicJ ccess to the materials are not yet
effective, "the District Court held that questions going to the
possibit'ity of future public release under regulations yet to be
published were not ripe for review: that there was " ... no
ueed and no justification for this court now to reach constit utional claims directed at . .. regulations ... the promulga1t10u of I whichJ might eliminate. limit or cast [the constitutional claimsJ rn a different light, " 408 F. Supp. 321, 336
(1976) . Accordingly, the District Court limited review "to
consideration of the pro wiet - of 111 unctive relief agai; st
th
e ed cia unconstitution ·ty of t e statute." Id., at
335, and. holding that the challenges to the facial constitutionality of the Act were without merit, dismissed the complaint. Id. , at 374-375. We noted probable jurisdiction, - F . ~, ( Hl76) . vVe affirm.

I
The Backyruund
The materials at 1sSU(' cousist of some 42 million pages of
documents and some 850 tape recordings of conversations.
Upo n his resignation. appellant directed government archivists·
to pack and sh ip the materials to him in California. This
.shipment was delayed when the Watergate Special Prosecutor
dvised of his continuing need for the materials. At the same
time, President Ford requested that the Attorney General
give his opinion respecting ownership of the materials. The
Attorney General advised that the historical practice of former ·
' For procC'C'd1n:z:~ prior to convC'11t1on of the three-judge court, see
Nixon v. Richey, 51:{ F 2d 427 (1975), on reconsideration 513 F . 2d.
-1:10 ( Hl7!,) , SrC' :d1m N1xon v. Sampson, :{89 F . Supp. 107 (1975) •.

'f 5-1605,--OPINION

IXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

3

;Presidents and the absence of any governing statute to the
contrary supported ownership in the appellant, with a possible
limited exception. 43 Op. Attorney General No. 1 (Sept.
6, 1974). l App., at 220-230. 2 The Attorney General's opinion
emphasized, however, that
"[h] istorically, there has been consistent acknowledgement that Presidential materials are peculiarly affected
by a public interest which may justify subjecting the
absolute ownership rights of the ex-President to certain
limitations directly related to the character of the documei1ts as records of government activity."

I

On September 8, Hl74, after issuance of the Atton
eral 's opinion, the Administrator of General Services, A ur
F . Sampson, announced that he had signed a d~pository agre
went 'tith a12p¥lla_.2 t under the authority of 44 U: S. C. § 2107.
10 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1104 (1974). We shall refer
to the agreement as the Nixon-Sampson a reement. The
agreement recited that appe ant retaine "all legal and equitable title to the Materials, including all literary property
rights, " and that the materials accordingly were to be "deposited temorarily" near appellant's California home in an
" existing facility belonging to the United States." The agreement stated further that appellant's purpose was "to donate"
t he materials to the United States "with appropriate restrictions." It was provided that all of the materials "shall be
placed within secure storage areas to which access can be
gained only by use of two keys," one in appellant's possession
and the other in the possession of the Archivist of the United
tates or members of his staff. With exceptions not material
here, appellant agreed "not to withdraw from deposit any
~ No opmion was given respecting ownership of certain permane;;.t
files retained by the Chief Executive Clerk of the White House Trom
iulmini8t ration °to administration . The Attorney General was unable
definitively to determine theJr 1,tatus on the basis of then available
lr1forn:~i.t1on. Appendix '228,
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originals of the materials'' for a period of three years, but
rcservf'd the right to "make reproductions" and to authorize
othf'r persons to have access on conditions prescribed by him.
Aflgr., three _y_,£,ars, appellant might exercise the "right to withdraw from dt>posit without formality any or all of the Material. ... and to retain . . . Lthem] for any purpose ... " determined by h11n .
The ~ixon-Sampson agreement treated the tape recordings
~<'paratcly. They were donated to the United States "effect,1vP Sept<>rnbcr 1. 1979" and meanwhile "shall remain ou
il<'J>O'-'it . ·· lt "as provided howevPr that "subsequeut to Septc•1nber 1, J!l7~l the admi nistrator shall destroy such tapPs as
I .\fr :\"ixon I ,;hall direct" and in any event the tapes "shall
lw destroyNI at the time of lhis 1 death or 011 September 1,
1DR4. whwhevc'r event shall first occur.' ' Otherwise the tapes
WPr<' not to he> withdrawn and reproductions would be made
0 1ily b~· "nn1tual agreement." Access until September 1. 1979.
wa8 expressly reserved to appellant, except as he might aut,boriz<> acccHs by others on terms prescribed by him.
Puhlie a111iou11ceme nt of th<' agrcemellt was followed 10
dayi- ltHPr , ;-;pptember 18, by the introduction of S. 4016 by
t:3 ;-;<,nator1:- 11i the United States Senate, The bill. \\"hich
hc•canH' PulJ. L. \)3-526 and was designed . inter alia, to abrogal<' th<· \1xon Sampson agreenlf) nt. passed the Senate on
d('tol><'r 4.- 1D74".'""' It was awaiting action in the House of
Hc'Jm'scntat1\<'1- when on October 17, 1974. appellant filed
~utt 1n tlH· District Court seeking specific e nforcement of the
:\1xon-~amp~o11 agreement. That action was consolidated
\nth otlwr ~mts seeking access to Presidential materials pursuuut lo th<' Frc>edom of Information .\.ct, 5 U. S. C. 552
1 ;-;upp. Y). a 1Hl also seeking injunctive rC'lief agai11st enforce111cnt of tlw al!;r('ement. ,V ixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107
\ I!)?.) J .' TIH' Hou~e pa8sed its version of the Senate bill 011
;1

· Till• <'011r1 ot Appeab tor the D1stnct of Columbia Circuit ~ht~·pd
m onlc-r dlt•<· I u:11 m~ the d_rr1~ion m Ni.ro11 , 8cun p l!Oll pPnding deci~ioo.
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Dt'<'<•111h<'r :1, Hl74. J;'ollowing eonf<,r<'llCC committee actjon,
both I I ousc,s of C'o11grPss passed the confc>n•ncP vf'rsion of S.
40Hi 011 l)pec•111lwr !l. HJ74. and , as stal<'d, President Ford
:-;1g11c·d it illt() la\\ \.)JI Dec0mber

rn.

LI

The Act
P11b. L. ~l'.2 ;->2(-i has t\\'o Titles. Title l. the challe11ged
· Prc•sidPnt ial Jfreordi11gs aud Materials Prcservatio11 Act" con~bt~ or ~~ 101 through 106. Title I I, the "Puhlic Docurne11ts
.\ <·t. " at1H·1nl~ ('hapter :-ri of Ti11<' 44. l'n it<'d ~tates Code. to
add ~~ :t-n.-) through :-1:f24 tlw•·etu. a1HI <'Rtablish the ~atio11al
-;t 11rly ( '1n1lll1issirn1 011 Hc•<·ords and I )oeu11H•11t8 of Ferlc•ral
< >tfic·1,tl~
•"<'<'I io11 l(Jl ( n I of Tit]p I dirPets tlu-11 thlc' Adn1inistrator of
r ;c•11,•ra l :-,c•n·1c·< •,.;. 1101 \\ it hsta11di1ig nil)' othN law or agrcerne>11l
,,, 1111 d<·l'~ta111li11u.. 1 c y., tli<· :'\ixu11-:-;ampso11 agn'<'llH·ut) ''1:,hall
1'1'<'<'1 \'t'. ohtai11. or r<'tai11. eompl<'t<' possession a11d co11trol of
all oriµ:111al lnJH' n•cordi11µ:,.; of conw,rsations \\·hich wPr<' r<'1•11rdPd or c·a 11--<•d to lw n '<·ord(•d by any officpr or c•111ployc'<' of
Ill' F1·d<•ral < ;()\'1•r1111 1P11t 1ltld ,\'hieh ..
· 1 I I I 11voh·(• formN Pn~sid<'11t Richard .\f. :\"ixo11 OJ'
nll11·1 11l(li\·id11als \\ho . at tlw tinw of tlw c·o11v<'l'satiou
11c•1p 1·mpl<>Yl'd b~ tli(' Frderal Uoverrnncnt :
1:..! 1 1, vr1• rt•co rrl<'cl 111 tlw Whit<' UouSl' or i11 tlw offite
of ril(• P1t •s1dP11t in the· Exc'cutiv<> Office Buildings located
11 1 \ \ a"lii11µ_t(l11. l)is1r1c·.t of Columbia; Camp David,
1li1· 1li n ·•·-,111clg1· t·o•1 r1 \\]H·ilH•r 11J1dn ~105 \:\) tlw in~tm1I c:i.,P w:1,.; to
·1i,1 "' pt11>l'l1, 011 I hf' do<·kc•t of I !lw Disnict ·1 court OV<'I' otlwr <•:,,;p,.;,''
\',.,,,,, , /?,r/u • "'/'/'II . .'iJ:·l ~- :2d , :it 4:31, -i:~5. -l-W--l4S. Thr 1hn·<•-judg<•
, ,111r1 wa, of tll!' 1u•11 th:11 "tlw c·1·11tral purpo,.:c• of C'ongrr~,.;. in rrlation
1,1 ·d i 1w1Hli11!!. lt11g:i 11on . 1, 10 haYr au l'arl~· 1111d prior ,dc•tc•rmi11:i1iou
ol llw \,·t '- 1·011~111111>01111 li 1~·· :ind thrrf'fon· did not rrqu<•:-:1 di~,._o]ution
!(I
F "llPP :11 :t:·J:{. :{34, 1l 10 The• , tny 1h11~ n·maiu ·
" ilu -1.11
,, ,,fl,-1•1.
•>I

~-
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Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, Cal~
ifornia; and
" (3) were recorded during the period beginning January
20, 1969 and ending August 9, 1974."
Sect1011 101 (b) prnvides that notwithstanding any such
agreei'-i1e 1lt " or u11derstaudillg. the Administrator also "shall
receive, retarn, or make reasollable efforts to obtain complete
possession and control of all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts. and other objects and materials which con-;t1tute the Presidential hi::;torical materials las defined by 44
..., (' \ ~ 2101 1 uf Ri,·hard M. Xixon. coveriug the period
begmmng January 20, 1969. and e11di11g August 9, l\:l74."
-,f'{;tion 102 ( a) prohibits destructiou of the tapes or materials except as may be provided by law, a11d § 102 (~ ~11akes
them available ( giving priority of access to the Othce of
:\ atergate Special Prosecutor) in response to court subpoena
,r other legal process, or for use in judicial proceedings. This
\\as made subJect howrver, "to auy rights, defe11ses or privileges which tlw Federal Government or any person may
111voke. 1 Sect10n 102 ( c) affords appellant. or any person
de::;1gnated h,Yh un 111 writ111g, access to the recordings and matenals tor auy purpose cousistent with the Act "subsequent
,rnd subJect to the regulations'' issued by the Administrator
u11<ler ~ 103. ~<•ct10n 102 (d) provides for access according to
~ 103 rcgulatio11s by any agency or department in the Executive Branch for lawful government use. Section 103 requires
custody of the tape recordings and materiafs' to be maintained
111 Washington except as may otherwise be necessary to carry
out the Act. and directs that the Administrator promulgate
regulations uccessary to assure their protection from loss or
lestruct1on and to prt'vent access to them by unauthorized
persons.
:-i<•ct10n 104. 111 pertrncnt part, directs the Administrator to
prornulgat(' regulations governing public access to the tape
l'('('ordings ;:ind lllHter.ials. Scct1011 nfi'"ta) requires sub111is~
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sion of proposed regulations to each House of Congress, the
regulations to take effect under § 104 (b)(l) at the end of 90
legislative days unless either House or Senate adopts a resolution disapproving them. The regulations must take into
ccount seven factors specified in ~ 104 (a), namely :
" ( 1) the need to provide the public with the full truth,
at the earliest reasonable date. of the abuses of governmental power popularly identified under the generic term
" Watergate .. ,
' , ~) the need to makf• such recordings and material.
available for use 111 judicial proceedings;
·• ( 3) the need to prevent 15eneral ac~~ss except in accord.wee with appropriate proct>dures established for use in
Judicial proceedings, to infonnatio11 relating to the Nat1011 's security;
•
h l 4)
the need to protect every individual's right to a
lair tnal,
"(oJ the need to prot(•ct auy party's opportunity to assert
a11y legally or constitutionally based right or privilegewhich would prevent 01 otherwise limit access to such
recordings and matenals;
' ( 6) the need to provide public access to those materials ~
\\hich haw g<'tH'ral hii,torical sig11i:ffoa11ce, and which are
11ot likely to lw related to the 11eed described in paragraph ( 1), a11d
·• ( 7) the 11ccd to g1 ve H ichard M. Nixou, or his heirs,
for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other
materials which arr• not likely to be related to the need
descnbed m paragraph ( 1) alld are not otherwise of
general histoncal sigllificance."

Sect10n 105 ( a) vest:- LIH• District Court for the District
<1t' Columbia not only with exclusive Jurisdiction to hear
co11st1tutio11a1 challPllf.!;('s t,o the Act, but also to hear chal!P11g<'R to the validity of any regulation, and to decide actions

~S4M-.~

~
a,.,4.-'.....,
~·J.k

~61
H,... ...

1-4-J.ws
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involvrng quest1011s of title, ow1w1·ship. custody. posscs~ion 01·
rontrol of any tape' or materials. or i11volvi11g pay11w11t of any
award of just compensation re(JuirPd by ~ 105 (c) when a
clPciswn of that court holds that any individual has beP11 deprived by th<' .'\ct of private property without just compC'n:atio11. 'c•d ion 105 (b) is a SC'\·c-rabilitv
12,rovision providing
l
that any decisio11 invalidating a provision of tlw Act or a
n•gttlat1011 shall not affrct tlH' validity or pnfor('PllH'nt oi
irny othpr provision or rC'g-ulation. Section 106 authorizes
approp riatiu11 uf sucl1 sums as may be 11cccssary to curry out
l1P pro,·1s11111s of thC' Titl<'

CU
The ~rnpe of lite ll! Q'uiry
1lw District Court ('Orreetly noted that, the• Act requires
IH· .\d111i11istrator uf GcnC'ral :-iPrvicPs to admi11istPr the tape
1•(·01 clrngs and matPrials plac<•d in hii- custody 011ly under·
n•µ;ttlati o11~ promulgated by hi111 "that would provide for thP
1Jl'<krl)· proC('Ssi11g- of such mat1•rials for the purpose of retm11 11 1g to lnpp!•lla11t I such of them as are pcrso11al a11d
prind(• i11 11alllt'{'. and of dctc-rniini11g the terms and conditions
11po11 1rl11rh public a<'C<'SS 111ay eventually be had to those
rt• 1n;1111111g 111 clw Gov<•r11111e11t's posscs:siou.'' Tlw Districl
< nurt, a !so 11ot<·d that ''Ii I II dPsi~11i 11g till th regulatio11s the
.\d111i111strntor 1nu~t consider the 11ced tu protect the con,t 1ttt t 1011a] riµ;h ts of I appella11 tJ and other individual::; against
11 1fri11g<'llH·11t h:v th(' procrssing itself or. ultimately. l>y public
,1< r·C'ss to th1• 1naLcrials r<'lai11Pd." 408 .F. ~upp., at --. This
,·o nstrn<"tio11 1::- plainly rcquirc'd hy the wording of ~~ 103 and
0

I

{)4 '

w

,Ji,.

'l'h1, 11111·11,n·l:11 1011 ha~ t1,11ncl;1n t "liJlport in the legi~latin· h1,-tory
\ ,·1 ~t·n;11 or .l;n 11 .,. 11111 or t lw :-;pon,-or:- of S. 401!1 .,;ta t<'cl thaL

Ii,,,

ITlll •J'l:t

nl

~

10-l 1,11

·1 11d<·:1 • 1 11 1, ·01 1·1· 11•1< pru1•p,,~ lor mdl\·1d11aJ,- who nia~· l1P llHlll<'d
111 11l1 1•a 111 •r,- ·1- wl')J a:- :1 11_, jlt'J\" il<·~<' that may be 111yo[n•d in tbe
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~s.~

l{,q1;ulatio11s imple111enting §§ 102 and 103, which did not reqmre submission to Congress. and which regulate access and /-. /() 2 •103
scrC'C'nin by
vernment archivists. have been promulgated,
k
4 J ied. Reg. 266 ( 975);
FR§ 105-63 (1976). Public
Hccess regulations that must be submitted to Congress ~ 104
"!/,~Wk--•-~
~
( a) have not. however. become effective. The initial set proposC'cl by the Administrator was disapproved pursuant to § 104
( h) ( 1) by Senate Resolution. S. Res. 244. 94th Co11g., 1st
f;('ss. ( 1975) . 121 Cong. Rec. S. 15803-S. 15808 (Sept. 11,
I!J7!'i). The SC'natC' also disapproved seven provisio11s of a
propos<:>d second set. although that S<'t had b<:>Pll withdrawn,
.. Res. 428. 94th C'ong .. 2d Sess. (1976); 122 Co11g. Rec.
S 5200-S. 5291 (April 8. 1976). The House disapproved six
pt·ov1s1011s of a third sC't. II. R , Res. 1505, 94th Co11g .. 2d
Sess. ( 1976). The Administrator is of the view that regulat10 11s cannot become effectivf' except as a package and conS<'que11tly is prepari11g a fourth Sf't for submission to Congress.
Bncf for Federal appellel s.
11. 4.
The District Court therefore conclu<led that as no regulations ui1der ~ 104 had yet. tak<'ll effect, and as such regula-

(ar.-...

a.e.cA••
1

~~

~..,kJ
{~~'70

/"f)~~u-t).

~f.~k,

~

at r-'9.

pap(• r,; , and ol cour~c tlw 1wce:s:sary a(•c(•~~ or the form(•r Prci;ident
f11m:sdf
·Jn ,;hor t, the arizumeut that tlw bill a11thorize~ t111rp,;(rictPd Jmulic
11·(·1•:-:,; doC',; 11of ,;t,rnd up 111 tlw fat<:' of the ('l'iteria and thC' rpquirrmenL
,lor th<' regul,1tion:s whi('h W<' !1;1,·p m:-:Prtrd III th<' bill today,'' 120 Cong.
Ht•<· S 18244 (dail~· ed Oet 3, 1974)
Sc•11atot \'eborr , tlH' lllll',; draft,:;man. ,tgrred that th(• primar.,· 1n1rpo,;e
lo provide• for th<' Anwncan pPople an hi:storical r0cord of tlw Watergate
e,·(•11t,.: '':should nor ov0rridP all rPgard for thC' right,-: of tlw indiYidual
10
pnvaey and a fan· trial. " Id .. at S. 18236. SPnator Ervin, also a
,pon:sor a11d Hoor manager of tllP l,ill, :statc•d .
' Xohody':-: nght ,:; arP affc•c·ted h~· th1:s bill, bC'eatt:sl' 1t pro\'ldes, a:s fnr
a,- pr1var~· i,- co11rPl'IIPd, that the r(•gttlat1011:s of th(' Admini:;trator shall
_ta k(• 111tu account
. the oppurt un1ty to a:;:-;0rt an~· Jpgnlly or ron,11t11ttonally ba:sed nght wh1C'h wonld prrvpnt or otherwi::<c limit accei;s
to till' tap<' n·cordmg>< and othrr matPnals ," Id ,, at S. 18029 (d.nily
·d. Orf. 4 Hl7 4)

75-1605-OPINlO.

10

L O

i,. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL RERYICES

tions ouce effective were explicitly made subject to judicial
review under ~ 105 the court could consider only the injury
to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly
worked by the taking of his Presidential materials into custody for screening by government archivists. 408 F. Supp., at
335-340. Citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387. 402 (1941),
Judge McGowan, ,vriting for the District Court, 408 F. Supp.,
at '338, stafea:
"No one can foresee the varying applications of these
SP para tr provisions which conceivably might be made. A
hi" wh1rh JH co11~titutio11al aH applied in one manner may
still contravene the Constitution as applied in another.
~inc<~ all con tingenciPs of attempted enforcement can not
be e11visio11ed in advance of those applications, courts have
w the main found it wiser to delay passing upon the
constitutionality of all the separate phases of a complicated statute until faced with cases involving particular
provisions as specifically applied to persons who claim to
Le Ill.I ure<l. Passrng upon the possible significa1Jce of
the manifold provisiolls of a broad statute in adva11cc of
efforts to apply the separate provisions is analogous to
ren<lenng an advisory opinion upon a statuu, or a de.~
claratory .l udgrnent upou hypothetical case."
Ouly tl11s Term we applied tlus principle in an analogous
situatwu w declining to adjudicate the constitutionality of
regulatwns of the A<lnrnnstrator of the Environmental Protection Act that were rn process of revision, stating, "For I the
CourtJ to review regulations not yet promulgated, the final
form of which has been only hinted at, would be wholly
novel. ' EPA v. Browu, G. S. - -. - - (May 2, 1977).
, 'ce also Rusenbery v. Fleute, 374 U. S. 449. 451 ( 1963);
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 L'. S. ,579 (1!)58); 'l'hor'}Je v. Housh1g

,1uthority, 393 r. ~- 268. 283-284 (1969); United States v.
Rames, :102 l" . .-,, 17, 20- 22 (1!:l60).
\,Vp too therPfore. limn vur considcrat,ion of the merits of

~~·f~
r>v~$

~Li)

~~~.

~~
'4-.~

~·•,<..,.
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appellants scven'al constitutioual claims to those addressed
to tlw f~ al y aliclity of the provisions of the Act that require
the Administrator to take the recordings and materials into
the Government's custody subject to screening by Government
arrhivists.
The CO!,.§.,t ituJj_onal q uestions to be decided are, of course.
of considerable importance. They touch the relationship
between two of the three coordinate branches of the Federal
Governuwnt, the Executive and the Legislative, and the relationship of appellant to his Goverunwnt. They arise in a
c·o11t<'xl uniqu<' iu thr lustory of thP J->n,sirlP11cy which this
('c~1rt !ms !iu71 110 oc·easiou heretofore, to adch·pss. Judge
.\ifrGowau. speaking. for the District Court. cornpr<'hensively
tall\'ai:'srd all tlw claims. and in a thorough opinion, concluded
that 11011<· had 111Prit. Our ind<"p<'nd<'nt examination of the
issues brings us to tbr same co11clusio11, although our analysi~
may diffrr so11H'wh::1t 011 >'0lll<' qurstious

I\'

Clmrns C'oMemwg t:he ,I nlu11omy of the Executive Bm11ch
l'lw .\('t \\'US tll<' product of ,1oi11t action by the Congrc-ss
,111d Presidc' 11t Ford, who signed thr bill into law. It is
tlwrdtir<' urged by 111terv<'11or-appellees that. rn this circumstance, the case does uot truly present a controversy concernrng the separation of powers. or a controversy concerning the
Prcsirlrntial privilege of confidentiality. because. it is argued,
such claims may be asserted only by incumbents who are
prPsently responsible- to the American people for their actiou .
.\s shall 1><' f'C'n, we need not resolve all of these contentions,
for eveu assuming that appellant, as a former President. may
IH' heard to assert that Joint artion by the Congress and the
i11cumbent President will upset the constitutional balance of
,go\wnmc'n tal po\\'ers. we hold that neither his separation of
- privile_ge
po~ 'rs elaun 1101· his rla~ ~ lireach of constitutional

..........._

!tu~ merit

-

-

•

f.l.•~

)$..•'4•t-«..v...J ~ Uu- ~

&r;:;;:;/-- ~~L ~ ~ ~ ~
~ .. ~ ~ . . , ? ~..,~.J ~
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Appellant argues broadly that the Act encroaches upon
Presidential prerogative to control iuternal operations of the
Presideutial office a11d therefore offends the autonomy of the
Executive Branch. The argument is divided into separate
but interrelated parts.
First. appellant contends that Congress is without power to
delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the
decision whether to disclose Presidential materials and to
prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure. To do so,
appellant contends. constitutes. without more, a11 impennissibl<' interference by the Legislntive Branch i11to matter
inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch.
i econclly,
appellant· co11tcnds. somc\\'hut more narrowly,
t hatbyauthorizing the Administrator to take custody of all
Presidential materials in a "broad, undiffere11tiated'' manner,
and in authorizing future publication except where a privilege
L afTfrmatively established. the Act offends the presum ptive
confidentialit of P csid ntial comrnu11 ications recoO'nized in
Unite tates v. 1\"ixo11, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). He argues t at
th~
t • Court erred in two respects i11 re,iecti11g this
contention. First, he contends that District Court erred in
distinguishing incumbent from former Presidents in evaluating
appellant's claim of confidentiality. enlike the very specific
privilege protecting against disclosure of state 8Pcrcts alld
sensitive information that concern military or diplomatic
matters, which appellant concedes may be asserted only by an
illcumbent President, Brief for Appellant 81-90, appella11t
asserts that the more generalized Presid ntial privTie e survi\Yt"s ~ ern1111a IOU o t 1r res1 e isor relations 1ip
n uc 1 as t 1e attorney-client pnv1le e survives the relatwns 1ip
ti~
1 •
ecoud. appe ant argues t at the District
Court erred in applying a balancing test to his claim of
PrPsidential privilege and in concluding that. notwithstanding
the fact that some of the materials might legitimately be
r.9v~re(l, with.in ~ cl{lill1 of Pre:5iclrntial confidentiality, sub.,.
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stantial public interests outweighed and justified the limited
inroads on Presidential confidentiality necessitated by the
Act's provision for government custody and screening of the
materials. Finally, appellant contends that the Act's authorization of the process of screening the materials itself violates .
the privilege and ~ chill the future exercise of constitu- 1
tionall )rotected executive f uiictions. thereby inhibiting the
ability of future resi euts to obtain the candid advice necessary to the conduct of his constitutionally imposed duties.

Separatio1~of Powers

~/..,..,_t ,a.,,/-~ (

b ttl1e

We reject at the outset appella11t's argurne_n_t
Act's
regulation of the function of the Executive Branch in the
control of the disposition of Presidential rnaterials constitutes
without more a violation of the priuciple of separation of
powers. Neither President Ford 110r President Carter support
this claim. The Executive Branch became a party to the
Act's regulation when President Ford sig11e<l the Act into law,
and the administration of President Carter, acting through the
Solicitor General. vigorously supports affirmance of the District Court's judgment sustaining its constitutionality. Moreover, the function remains in the Executive Branch. The
Administra.tor of the General Services Administration , who
must promulgate and administer the regulations that are the
keystone of the sta.tutory scheme. is an official of the Executive
Branch. appointed by the Presidellt. The career archivists
appointed to do the initial screening for the purpose of selecting out and returning to appellaut his private and personal
papers similarly are Executive Branch employees.
The argument is in any event based on an interpretation of
the separation of powers doctrine inconsistent with the origins
of that doctrine, receJ1t decisions of the Court. and the contemporary realities of our political system. 'I'rue, it has been
St¼id that "each of the three general departments of govern-

l

l

1

'\l\t>\'

1·
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ll1<'11t I 111ust n•mai111 <•11tm,ly frre from the control or coercive
J11fhw1H·<·. dirl'<'t 01 111din•et. of either of the others . . . . "
II Ulllplirf!y·8 8.rffulor \'. t ·mted Stales, 29.5 F S. 602, 629- 630
1 Hn.1,. aud that "l t Ilw sound application of a principle that
nrnkes u1H• 111aster in his own house precludes him from
1mpof-i11g his <'ontrol i1, tlw housr of another who is mastrr
tlH'1·t•." Id .. at 0;10: :-;e(' ali'o UDonoghuf' v. U11ited Stales,
.2'"'\J l·. ~- ,11G ( HJ3;3); Springer v. Government of lhe Philip1ii11e ls/011cls, 'J.Ti l ". ~- 189,201 ( 1028).
But tlw 111orc pragmatic. JiC'xihl<' approach of Madison and
:VI 1 .J 11st1<·<· ~tur.v · \HI." <•x pn•ssl~· affirnwd liy tlw C'OUrt only
thn·<· y•·:11· ago 111 ( ' 111/<'rl 8foiP-8 ,· . .\'i.ro11. 418 C'. f-;. 683
i l\li•+l
Tlic•n• tit<· :-au,c• hroad nrgulll<'llt concerning the
•wpt-11,111011 of JHl\\c•r:- 11as 1J111d<' l.1· appellant in the context of
uppo,-1l l(>t1 to :1 -.,1il>poc•nn <lures /;ecu111 of th<· \Yatergate :-:ipecial
Pro:--(•c·11lor 1(1, c·c•rta111 Pn·Hid<'11tial tiqws and docunwnt.<;
\lad1,,,11, 111 Tl11· F1·d<·rnl1st \u -17, n·, t(•11·111g Ilic· origiu of the• ,.;('Jmra"Io Ill th<· ,.;fit?;h Il-'~t vip11· of t lw
1; :t1sl1 1·(HH111111011 \\'1' mu.,1 Jl<'l'(\'IH'. th.ii tlH' lt•gi,latil'l•, ('X,c· 111i\'f• and
111d•1·1;11.1 <il'p: rtt1H •111, ar(' l,1 110 m1•:111, 101;111>· ,,c•para l(' and di,.;till('(
" l'()tn 1·:1,·h 1th<•1'
Till' F1•d 1•rnl1,1 :J:.!.i (.J. ('ool,,· C'd. 1!:HH) . Ile· 1·on1111111•d 1:·111,, rk :1,g ,h:11 \lont1•,q111, •1 1. tlw "oraC'lc•·· al11a>·" coustdt(•d c111
I h, ,111 IJ('('i, 1rl . ;II :l:.!4
lilll o[ poll'( r., doc-I rtll('. c·umnH•ni,,d !lull

·,1111 not 1111·:111 111:11 1IH•s<' d1'1,.11t1u1•111~ ough1 lo h111(' 110 partial ay1•11c.1r
111. ,11 110 1,11.lrol o,1•r tli1· ;u·t, 01 l'aC'h oth, ·r
!)1,- mc·:111i11g, :1~ hts O\\'ll
1111nl, 1 1q»•rl
,·1111 :1m,H11H IP tJ(> mon · th:111 thi,. 1lwt wlwn· tlw
11 ho/,
111 ,11, r of 1111 · ,J,·partlll('llt 1, r·,r·n°1S1•d h>· 1IH• :-;anH· h;tl)(I, wh1c·h
pus. ,, llH ,,.J,o/,• 11r,11Tr of aJ1oth1•r ,t,•pa rt111('lll , tlw i't1J1cl,1m1•nt:1l pri11•·1pl1·- 01 :1 Irr••· ('(lll,t1t11t1011 nn• ~llhY<·rtPd .. Id .. nt ;'!2S- :QG (cmpha:;itj
'II 11rig111:1I I
"llllil::rl> .l11s111·1· -"lc1r> 111011·
'I \\ !h,· 11 11,• ,,1w;1k of :1 .,c•par:it11>J1 (J[ th1· thn•P gn·:tf d1•part1n<•nt,.
·1 J1d 11 1:11 111:1111 th: 11 tlw ,,·par:iiio ll 1., ind1,p1·11:-ah!P lo p11hlic· lilwrt)· , 11·c•
:• n· 1,, 1111d1•r,t11 11d th,~ m:1x1m 111 ;1 limitr•d ,.;1•u,-,c·. [t 1;; 1101 nH•;11Jt lo
itlinn li:i1 1,11·.1· 1111 1~1 IH • k1·p1 11!1011.1 :111d 1•J1t1r0h· ,-,,•p:irat(' :111d di,.;iim·f,
tlHI lt:11 •' llo l'OIJltl](11l 1111k
{'()lllll'('I IC,11 or dc•p('IHIC'll('('. l I:,• Oil(' llJ)OII tlw
,tl1<•1. 111 1IH .,ligh 11 •, 1 ckgn•1·
I .J . ;-i1ory, ('omtnl'tari(•, on tlw Co11:-;titu•.
11111 ~ .-,·2:; I \l l',1g,•lcl\\ "'I. l!-lfl.~I

ur
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of valll(' to a P<'t1d1ng cr1111inal i11vPstigation. AHhougli
a1·knuw1t,<1µ,i 11g that <•iwh lmwrh of th <' Uo,·('l'lltnc11t ha1:; the
dttt)' i111tially to intPrpr<'t tlw ( ·011stitutiou for itsC'lf. and that
it:- i11t<'rprrl atio11 of it::; pow<'r8 is duC' great res1wct fron1 the
othN branclw~. 418 £' . S., at 70:3. the Court squarely rejected
1h(• argu11w11t that tli<' Constitution contemplates a compkte
rlivisioll of authority between the three branches. Rather,
11·<· <•tnhra<:Nl Justic<' Jackson's view expressed in his concurr1•1H'<• 111 You11gstow11 ShePl & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.
) -)iq. 6% ( l!J,521
· I 11 des1g11i11g. t.he structure of our Government and
d1v1d1ug and allocating the sovereign power among the
thn'P <'(H'qttal branches. the Framers of the Constitution
,.;011µ,ht to provide a comprehensive system, but the separrlll:' po11•e1-.~ iuere not utf Pnded to operate wit/1 absolute
111rleJJe11de111·e." 4IX r. ,-;., at 707 (emphasis supplied).

L,kt- tlH• Dist rn·t ( ·oun. wr thrrefore find that appellant's
argu11H'11t n-'st~ upon a11 "archaic view of the separation of
pu\1·1•rs a:- n•qt1iri11g three airtight departments of government,"
•.HJ~ F. :-iupp .. at M:2. Rather, in determining whether the Act
d1:-ruptR tl1<' proper balance between the coordinate branches
t lie· iuquiry requir<>s analysis of the extent to which it prevents
tlw Ex0eutiv0 Brauch fro111 accomplishing its constitutionally
nss111,n<>d fu11ctio11s. l mted &ates v. Xfro11, 1:,--upra, 418 'C. S.,
at 711 71:!. Only when• the potential for disruption is pres\'lll. 111111:;t. we• thell df'tcrmine whether that impact is justified
I\)' nn ove1-ridmg llf'ecl to promote objectives within the
<·1>11:-titut101ial authority of Congress to promote. Ibid.
It 1s. tli<'rdorc. highly relevant t,hat the Act provides for
<·t1-;tody of th<' materials by officials of the Executive Brauch,
:1111I t I1at ('mploy00s of the E~ xccutive Brancl 1 sha 11 h ave access
1<1 t lw n1aknals only ''for lawful Government use, subject to
tlH' I Ad111i111~trator's I regulatiolls:' ~ 102 ( d); 41 CFR

l
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rials may be made available for USE' iu judicial proceedings,
this provision is expressly qualified by any right, defenses. or
privileges that any person may invoke including. of course, a
valid calim of executive privilege. United States v. Nixvn,
.~'upra Similarly, althQugJ! s~me of the materials l]}ay eventuall y be rnac!f.. avail~horv uTtri"c access. the Act expressly
r0cognizes
nee'tr"6otf("to p/:t'tect any party's opportunity to
assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege,"
\i 104 ( a)( 5), and to return purely private materials to appellant. ~ 104 (a)(7). Tlwse provisions plaillly guard against
hsclusun•s hatTl'd hy any dPfr118e:-- or privlieges available
to app<>llant or thP Executiv0 Branch !
And appellant hin1·elf conct•dcs that the \et "do<>s 11ot make the preside11tial
materials available to tlw Congress-except insofar as Congressnl<'n are '.nenib~rs.. of tl~e, 1~ublic and entitled to access
when the pubh<" has 1t.
Bnef for AppPlla11t 119. · Thus the
Exe~ t1ve Branch rernai11s 111 full control of the Presidential
materials, and the Act facially is designed to ensure that the
n1atenals can be re>leased only when release is not barred· by
~ome applicable pnvilegc• that inheres in that branch .
Thus, whatever are tlw future possibilities for constitutional
1•011flict 111 the promulgation of n'gulations respecting public
·1c·cc•ss to particular docunwnt~. nothing contained in the Act
rp11dcrs it unduly d1srupt1vt• of the Exl'cutivc Branch and,
therefon•. u11coust1tut10nal 011 its face. Aud, of course. there
1s abundant statutory prpcedent for the regulation aud maudatory disclosurp of documents in the possession of the Executive

tt;

"St'P abo, e y., I K Davi~, Admim:st rativc L1\1' Tr!'ati:sr § 1.09 (1958) ;
, GuntlH'r, Con:stitu11onnl Law: Ca~e;; und \fa1enaJ;; -100 (9th eel. 19i5) ;
L. .Jaff<•, ,Jud1cial Control of Admini~trativc Action 28-:m (1965); Cox,
Ex<•e11t1v<' Privilcµ;(•, 122 ( i or l'a L. Hcv . 1:38:3, nt 13~i-l::l91; Ratner,
Ext'cutiv(• Pri\'IIC'µ;r, S<>lf l1H'nmina1ion, and thr SPpnration of Powers
lllu~ion, 22 l ' C L. A L. l{py \!2-92 (Hli4)
ThP D1~1 nrt Court eorr1•c·tlr intrrprrt <>d the Act to reqmre meaningful
1101ic(· 10 np1wll:111t or areh1val ci<'ri.•1011~ 1hat might bnng into play
riµ;ht~ ~Pt'\lrP<l. ll\· § 104 (;1) (5)

HIS F ~llpp,;34() IL

1:3.

J
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Branch. See, e. g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C.
: 552 (Supp. V); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S. C. § 552 (a)
~~ __1£
(Supp. V); the Federal Records Act. 44 .e. S. C. § 2101 et seq.;
~
1
and a variety of other statutes, e.g., 13 U.S. C. §§ 8-9 (ceusus
.,.~ ~
data); 26 U. S. C. § 6103 (tax returns). Such regulation of
~,material geuerate<l in the Executive Branch has uever been -:,J
~
4
considered invalid as an invasion of the autonomy of the
~..._..
Executive Branch. Cf. Environmental Protection Agency v. /l'V - , '-"~ Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S.
U~
.J ... r,,., t:,c.A..
255 (197-). 8 Similar congressional power to regulate Execu- J1"11
t1ve Branch docu11H•11t~ <•xist~ i11 this instance, a power that is A- ~
augmented by the important interests that the Act se<'ks to
-, _ 1 Q.,, ~L .
attain. Seein/ra,at-,
;\/ ~ • , ~

J.o

-~

A.,.r

of,

' Wr :,;re 110 rru~on to euf(ag<.· 111 th(' debate• wlwtlwr appellant has
!Pg11l titlr tn thr matrriab. 8<><' Brief for Appellant 90. Sueh an inquir~·
,_ irrr!r,·ant for prrsent p11rpo,.;rs berau:;c• § 105 (c) as,,urr:,; nppellant
of 1m;t romprnsation 1f his private propert~· i:s taken, and, rven if lrgal
t1tlt• is hi,.;, thr materials an• not thereby immtme from regulation.
Tt ha:; lwen nrc<'pted ,once nt lra:;t Mr. ,Ju:;t icr Story':; opinion i11 Folsom
v Marsh, 9 Fed. Cm;. ;{4:!, 347 (1841) that rpgardle:.'8 of wherr legal
titl<• lie~. " from tlw naturr of tllf' public :srrvirP, or th~ rhararler of
tloc11mt'11t,;, rmbrnring hi4orir:d. milit,1ry , or diplomatic information,
1t may b<' tlw right, and rvt'll tlw duty, of tlw g;ovC'rnment, to give them
public1t.\', C'ven :1gni11st thP will of thC' writns .., Appellant':; ~ugge~tion
that the Folsom prim·iplr doC';; not go br~·oncl' matl'riab concerning 1m1wual src•11rity and r11rrent govrmmrnt bu:,;ine;;;; 1::. nrgared by Mr ..Ju:,;tice
:4tory',; l'lllphas1:,; that ii also extended to materiaf:; ·'embrneing historinl • . . 111form:1tion.'' Id., al a47 . (Emphasi:; ndded .) Significantly,
no l11111tat1011 wa, ,;ugge:;ted in thr Attorney -Grneral ',.: opinion to President
.Ford . J\Jtho11gh indiC'a.ting :i viC'w tlrnt legal title to the materinls belollgl•cl to appellant. the opi11io11 :lcknowlrdged that '·Presidrntial matenal-.." without q11:1lilil'ation .. are peculiar!~- atfrcted by a public interest"
11hirh ma~ j11,.;tif., ,.,111Jjrrling .. 1he nb:solute owner,;hip right:;" to certain
·]11n11at10n, din·c-tl~· n•latrd to th(• r haracter of tlw documents a:; rrcord,;
ol gtW(' riltTH' lll :IC•l f\ 11~- ''
1)f •·011N· if I1lil' ,,., fo1111rl lo he in !hi:' go,·rrnnwnt rnther than
:ipp<•lla111, t IH'n ( 'o ngrp,-,,.. ant hority to !Pgi~latr 11ndrr the J>ropcrty Clause,
h rl<'ar
Thnt dau:<c• ha, eou,.;i~tr11tl~· been given an ·"ex\ 1·1 I,·,

*;;

_,:111-1 \f

l'l':ttl.i ng .

l{ fr JJ(}(' ' ·

s,,,,,

\fc.r,ro, 121i

r

H. 529, 536 (197(),) ..
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/Jre:,identfr1l JJnvileyl!
.\.t tlw c1ub.<l. w<• <:011sid<'r tlw i:;eope of Presidential privilege
111 tlii~ co11t<-"xt. \\' <' turn now to llw rc,lated considcrntio11 of
tlH' c·o1ll<'ntio11 1nad<· by nonfPd<·ral appC'llPPS that only a11 inc·urnlH·nt Prcsidc'11t ca11 aF",Prt th<> privilege of the Presidency.
\cccptanee of that proposition would, of course. encl this inquiry. The ront<'llt:011 draws on United States v. Rey·11olds.
;l-1i1 l". ~- I, 7- P.. ( I\J;);j). when' it was said that the pnv1 i'ege
"lic-101 1 µ:., tu the Uo\·c,rnment nncl must IK' asserted hy it: it.
1·:u1 IH'lthcr lw daJillt'd 11or wuivl'cl l>y n private party.·· l'lw
I >1-.;tri<·t ( '011r1. IH'liPvPd that thi:-- stateme11t was strong; support for the co11tention. hut, found r<'solution of the issue un11<'t<'ssa1.r. 408 F. ~upp. :-34:~-:34,1. It sufti.ccd. said th<' Dis11i<'t <'ourt. that tlw privil<"~t•. if availahlP tu a fonlH:'r Prei"idl'llt. \\ a:-- at lC'ast Oli<' that "earri<'S much IPss \\'C'igh t thirn u
l' IHi111 a:--::-ertl'd by tlw i11eurnhent hi1nself." Id., at 34i'>.
lt is tl'II(' that 011ly the i11cumb<'11t is charged with perfurinane< ' of th<· ('X<'cutivc duty under the Constitution. And
dH'n' an•. of course. i11c('11tives t.111:1(, inhil>it a11 incurnbclll from
1fowlosinµ: conti(!Pnees of a J)l'('<IPCt'srnr when he h<'li<'V<'S that
tiw t'flPct may ii<' to discouragl' candid preiae11tation of \·icws
liy Ins advisor:--. :.Vlorcov<'r. to thl' extellt that the privilegc"
'-('rvt•s "" ~l shi1•Jd tor <'XN'.utiv(' otfirials against burdC'11som0
n•quPsts [or i11forn111tio11 . :::e<> ['nited 8tnles v. i\'ixo11, supra ,
0

41X l'. ~ .. al 71-1: d '. Eastland v. C11ited Stales Servicemen's
Fund , 421 l ' :-,, 4!H. ,101- 5m ( 1~!75); Dombrowski v. h,'ristlrl'lld,
~~87 l ' . ~- 82, 84- 8,S ( 1967) (per curi:arn), a fornwr Pre~icknL
1s 111 !C'ss 11c'<'d of it tlHrn an incu1nlwnt. In addition. there
Hn' ohvio11s politi<·al cltc>cks agai11st an incumb<'nt's abuse of

1IH· pnvilPµ;(' .
.\' "' c'rt he'.<•ss. WP th ink that th<' Solicitor General's Brief for
l '1·dc 'ral App1•ll1'<'" :3:3 _ "tat(':-- tlw sotlllckr view, and we adopt
11
" Thi~ ( '011r1 ht•lcl in [ ' wiled 8.tntes v. Yixon, I 4L 1~. , '
1

-

?
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fi83 (HJ74J I that t,lw privih'gP is 11ecei:;sary to provide the
<"onfidcntiality rt>quired for the President's conduct of
offic<•. i:~11lPs:-, lw can givp his advisers some assurance of
1·011fidentiality. a PresidPnt could not ('Xpect t,o receive
thP full and frank i<Ubmis.-io11s of facts and opinio11s upon
~, hich effrcti vr discharg(' of his duties depends. The confidc'ntiality 1H•c·c'ssary to this exchange carnwt be rneaimrecl
by the frw months or y('ars between tlw submission of
the information and the C'lld of the PresidPnt's teuure;
tlH· privilc•g<· is not for tlw lwnefit of tlw President as an
i11diviclual. llllt for the b(•nefit of the Republic. Therefon• th1· privilege stirv1vc,s the indivi<lual PrC'sident's

-

1!' II lire

the· !-.anw t1111P. l10W('VN. the fad that 11(•ither Prc•sicknt
Ford nor Pn,sidc'11t ( 'art.<'r supports apJ.Jellant\; clairn argues
aga111st lus cont1•11ticrn t!rnt the• .\ct impermissihly intrnde~
111tu tlic· c•x1•e·utive· fu11c-tio11 ,111<1 the' 1weds of tlw Executive
Bnrnch. This follows for it must, b(' presumed that the in1:tu11lw11t Pn•sid<'t1t is vitally co11cer1wd with and i11 Uw best
po:-itio11 to assl'i"S th<' prP:-(•nt and future lH.'('ds of tlw Ex1•cutive
Brn11<'h
The' J )i-.trict ( 'ourt abo c·ouclude<l that appellant's clai1n
could apply at most to tlw :200.000 items of the estimated 4:2
m illio11 JHigi•s
~ )('11111P11ts
880 tape recordings with
whil'h hv wa,- pnsonaJly involwd. 408 F. Supp. 345; Xixon
de•pu1-i11011. at l."'i rn. ,\t this stag;e. howev('I', we need not be
coneernt'd 1, ith \\'hat precii:;c materials 81'(-' covered by theprivileg;c·. It 11- sufiicient t(' re1ni11d that 1·nited States v.
.\'i.r<)II, Kupra, lwld that th<' privilege is limited to communica11ous "ii! 1wrfon11anec' of I a President's I responsibilities.'''
-llb l· . :-i. at 711, "of lus office,·· id., at 71:~. a11d comrnunicarion!-. ''i11 tlw proePss uf i:;hnpi11g policies and making decisions,··

f

. \1

of

==:u'J'

1~

u/.,ut70~.
~
The' qll(~stw11 or th(• pnvilC'ge is thus narrowed to whether
·
t!hl' ap1wll,u1t . a former Presid('llt. may asflcrt t,hat thC' privilege~ , ~ - - '
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bars the Congress from directi11j the incumbent Presiden~
career archivists of the Executive Branch to screen, pursuant
to regulations subject to judicial review, appellant's Presidential materials, and from later delivering to appellant the
private and personal materials among them. We agree with
the District Court that he may not.
The privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon is a
quali~iYil~e.v Appellant argued in that case that in
District Court inspection of Presidential
camera
ocuments and materials subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutm wuuld itsrlf violate' tlH' privilege without regard to whether
th<' documents were protected from public disclosure. The
Court chsagreed. stating that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of
high-level communications. without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege .... " 10 418 U. S., at
706. The Court recognized that the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications derives from the supremacy of the Executive Branch withiu its assigned area of con)Stitutioual responsibilities, 11 but distinguished a President's

yltie

11 L1kP tlw Di;;trid Court, W<' do not cli:stinguish between the qualified
'l'X<·c·11t1H'" prl\ 1lc•g(• rr>c•ogrnzPd Ill Unitl'd .States v. Nixon and the
·· l'1<•:-;1dc•nt1al '' pnvil<'g<· 1o which a pprllant refer:s, except to note that
nppt>llant doP::: not argu,, that the privilege he claim:, extends beyond
he pnvilrgc• n•r·og111zrd 111 that case. Ser 408 F . Supp. 343 n. 24.
10 l'nit1•d States v. Nixou r<'cognizrd that therr is a legitimate governm<•nt a I 1111 Nr,-t m the conticlPnfotlit~· of communications between high
governmP111 offiei;1l::;, e. g ., those who advise the President, and that
' Jh Juma11 rxpr nr11r<' teaches tlw t thosr who expect public dissemination
or tllC'II' rrmark:s ma~· wrll trmprr eandor with concem for apprarances
·111d for Ilwir own intere,it" to the detriment of the decisionmaking
]ll'o('<':<::;." Id., at 705.
11
lnclPecl, thr opirnon notrd, 418 U. S., at 705 n. 15, that government
:·onfidrnt iality ha :- bern a con1·c•rn from the time of the Constitutional
l '011,·p111ion Ill 17:--i , thr m<·rtmg,- of which wrn' ronducted in private,
I \I F:1na11d. Thr Heeord~ of thr FC'dernl Com·rntiou of 1787, pp. xi-xxv,
·11Id I lw n•<·onl:,: of which were sraled for more than 30 ycar:s after

~J
~-

~

~ 11
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·'broad, u11<lifferentiatc<l claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such [communications]" from the more particularized and less qualified privilege relating to the need "to
protcct. military. diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets . .. .'' Ibid. Tlw Court held that in the case of the
general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential conunuuications, its importance must be balanced against the inroads
of the privilege upon the effective functioning of the Judicial
Branch. This balance was struck against the claim of privilcg<' in that C'.ase becausc tlw Court determined that the
rntrw,io11 i11to Uu• c·o11fidC'11tiality of Presidcntial communicatio11~ r<•::;tilti11g from w <"amera inspectio11 by the District
Court. ''" ith all th,· protection that a District Court will be
obliged tu provide," would be minimal and therefore that
the claim was outweighed by "I. t] he impediment that an
nbsolut<'. u11qualified privilege would place in the way of the
primnry co11stitutio11al duty of the Judicial Branch . . . ."
Id., at 706- 707.
Tlw only specific claim of impairment of the Presideut's
11bilit:v to perform his duties made by appellant is that the
pot<'11t1al disclosure of communications given to the President,
rn co11ficknc<' \\'oulcl adversely affcct the ability of future Presidents to ohtai11 thc candid aclvic(' necessary for effective decisio11rnaking. But any eventual public access to these material~ must lw U11der regulations not yet prornu1gated. Our
only pr<'H<•11t inquiry. thrrdore. need he whether tbe guidelines
of ~ 104 fnc-ially an• in suffi<'i<'nt to protect appellant's clann
of p7i,~l<·g<'. s·o phrased th(' question is readily resolved.
Future rpgulations must, take into account the need "to
protect. a11y party's. opportunity to assert a constitutionally
bmwd rig;ht ur privilege."' ~ 104 (a)(5), and the need to
rd,urn pun•!~· private materials to appellant. ~ 104 ( a)(7) .
It is. of cours.<> possible' that a particular interpretation of
1hr Co n,·t,11t 1nt1 . :4P<' :{ Stat. 475, 1.5th Con~ .• 1st Srss., H<'~.
(Un , ) .
gc'n<'r:ill;- C , WarrPn. Thr .vfakin~ of the Con~titution 134-rn9 (1937) ,

$<'<'
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the guidelines incorporated into the regulations could give
rise to future claims challenging application of the Act. But
the guidelines of ~ 104 ( a) are plainly sufficiently broad
to require regulatio11s that prevent disclosure of materials to
persons outside the Executive Branch where such disclosure
would violate a valid claim of privilege asserted by appellant
or by the Executive Branch. An absolute barrier to all outside disclosure is not practically or constitutionally necessary.
AE: the careful research by the District Court clearly demon:'ltrntes, there has never been an expectation that the confidc1H:(':-' of tlH· c•xN·11 t1\ P offi<·P arc absolute a11d unyielding. All
fornwr Pn•s1el0n ts si ncc• Pres id en t Hoover have deposited their
papen, rn Presidential libraries ( an example appellant has
said he• in tended to follow) for governmental preservation
am! rve11tual disclosure. 1~ The screening processes for sorting
materials for lodgment in these libraries also involved compre~
hensive rrvi0w by archivists, often involving materials upon
which access rnstnrtions ultimately have been imposed. 408
F. Supp .. at 347. The expectation of the confidentiality of
(•Xe<'.Utivc commu11ications thus has always been limited alld
sub,il'et to l'l'o:--io11 over time after a11 administration leaves
officr .
Agarn~t tl11~ background. wr agree with the District Court
n Th<" op1111011 of thr· Dist riet Comt find:,: that , in the Hoover Librar~·,
I lwrr :tr(• no n ·sl riet 10n~ on Presidential papers, although 80tne restriction:;
,•xist w11h 1•<',;pret to prr~on:il and privatp material, and in the Roosevrlt
L1hntr)· , I<•,;, t ha11 0.,5 ':f, of ·thr matPriab are restricted. There is no
1·v1d011('(• 111 th<' l'('OC'l'd a,; to the p<·rcPntagP of materials currently under
r,•,1rierio11 iu ilit> Tn11nan or Ei~c·nhower Librnrief'. but in the Kennrclr
Libra r~·, i-.0 o/, of l lw mn1 (•rial ha:,: bee11 procP:,:sPd, and of the processPd
111atPri:1k 0111~· O.filX 1~ u11drr donor (n:,; disting:uishrcl from securit~1n•lat<'d) n•strn·11011. In tlw .fohnsou Library , review of uonclassifiPd
111atl'l'ial i:,; virtually eomplPt(•. and more than 99% of all nonsecurity
,·l:1,,-ifird makri:d:s are 1111restrietrd. In ea<'h of the Presidential Libraries,
p1o\·ision hn:,; h<'<'ll niadP for tlw rc>mcwal of t hP re:;trietion::; with th~
[' H~,:11-!;l' or I 1111('
~OH F . :"'ill[>[)., at ;Hun. 31,

.

.
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that "mere screening of the materials .. . [does not] substantially infringe[ I executive confidentiality, especially in
Iigh t of the practices that might be adopted ... to limit the
intruE-:ivf'ness of revif'w. '' Ibid. Cf. United States v. Nixon,
l';llJ!rCl, at 706.
There is .110 Pvidence that even remotely sugg<•st~ that trai1wd. profPssional archivists will fail to perform
tlic•ir ft111etio11 in a discrete and professional ma1111er. let alone,
ac:; appellant implies. that they will disclose personal or confidential matters.
~\fon,o,·er. adeq uat,c~ justifications are shown for this limited
mtrnsio11 i11to eX('CUtive eo11fide11tiality comparable to those
l1E>ld to justify the w ca111erCt inspectioll of the District Court
s ustai1H'tl i11 ( '11ited State.~ ,· . .\'ixo 11, S'Upru. Collgress' purposrf'. in r11acti11g the Act an• exhaustively trcateu in the
opinion of tlw District Court. Among other purposes. the
kgislatin• history of tlH' Act <'lE'arly rcvc'als that Congn•ss
nctE'cl t o Psta!Jfo,li regular procedures to deal with the 1wrceived
11c>cd to pn's<•rvc• the materials for legitimate h1storical and
go ,·c,r1111wntnl purpos<>s."1 Co ngress could legitimately con11

Fn,ui it,; 1•xh:n1,,tn·r ~urvry of th1· ]<:'f!i><lattw hi~tory, the Di~lrict

( \,u rl ,•oll(•l11d1·d 1h,1t th<' p11hli<· 1nl <'l'<',;h ,;c•rn•d b~· tlw Ar t ,·mlld I)('

nwrf.?;<'d 111id1·r "th,· rn brn· of pn'.-,rn·ation of an :ic·c·ur,11<' ,illcl rornplet l·
h1-,to ri<"a l n·,·ord." .J(),s, F. Rupp. :H8-:H9, "ITJi r><r. :rnd most bro:1dl~·. ...
It, ]'l'f'~<·n Ill)! m:,tr·rial~ 111,on \\'hich hi,,torian:-; mu~t rlra\\' J11 ordrr al'•·11ra1d~· 10 l'l'l'Olllll :ind to 1udgP il l<' pulitil'al hi~lor~ of 0111· tinw . ,('1',
,·. y .. 8 J:,·p . ~o. 9:1--lli-> l . !l::ld Cong., 2d Srti"., ai 1, ;{ \19i4); H . H.
f{,,p. ,\., , D:, l.iOi, 9:~rl Coll/!. 2d SPti~., at 2, 3. 8 (1!:Ji-!) : ,Senate Jfrarings
"" <:5,A R,u11/atw1,s. nt :2.'i(i: 120 Cong. Hrr . S. Hi8'il (cl:1il~· Pei. Srpt. 18,
1!17 I) (n·m:irk, ol' :·kn. ~d:<on): id., at S. 182:15 (dnil~· ed. Oct.:{, 19i4);
ul .. :it S. 11'2-i'- (n•mnrk,-, of S1•11. Ervin) ; id., at ~- 1.-.:259 (n•markti of
-~I'll. Huddh,;1011): i,/.. at S. lS:200 (rrmark- of 8l'n . Hiuicoff); id., at
:-,;, l~<?Gl (n,111:1rb of S<"ll. \Ju~kir): id .. nt S. IK:{25 (dail~· <'cl. Oct. 4,
n17J) (r,·111 :irk~ uf Sr n .• ·rbo n) ; id .. at H . l UOi (dail~· ('{I, DPc. 3,
1\lif) (n•111arh nf H<'p . Brad(•m: 1,; ), Sl'e abo §§ 101 (b) (1), 10-i (a) (i)
1,' tlH' .\rt
' Sc·rondl~·, ilw Act wa~ dc•;-; igtwd "lo rn,rnre tlwir
,1Y:iilabilil~ for ~11r•1•l'~><tVt' admi ni;-;trat ion;; Pngaf!('d in polic·~·making. See
" . Hep '\u '. 1;{ I !SI, 0:k[ Con[! .. '2d ~:b,:;,, :it a, 4, 5 (19i4); H. H. Hep,
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elude that the materials should be entrusted to expert handling
and not left to haphazard review by persons-former Chief
Executives or their families-who are untrained in such matters, particularly when they always have a possible incentive
to select materials that better their standing in history. 14
Other substantial public interests that led Congress to seek to
preserve appellant's materials were the desire to restore public
confidence in our political processes by preserving the materials
a::; a source for facilitating a full airing of the events leading
lo appella11t's resignation. a1ict t o11grcs::;' need to understand
huw those political proc<.>sse::- had in fact operated in order to
guage the necessity for n•medial legislation.rn Thus by pre1· 0 9:3- 150i, !):3d Cong., ~d H1':::s., al:~ (1974); 1:20 Cong. Rec. H. 11211
1d:11l~· rd. IJt•e :{, Hl7-l) (n·tH:irks of Hep Abzug)
Src ril,;o ~<'ction
I0:2(d) or tlw Ad" Id .. :it :H9-:)50
11 Lt i:s mstruc-t1,·r to notr the fate of the paprr~ ncrumulatrd during
,tie Adm1111strntw11 of Warrc•n Harding, who:-;e Prr~idenry was markrd b~·
the• Trapot DollH' .1ffair. n highly publicized politiral scandal which,
at lc•ns! m trrm~ of uotom·t~·, wa~ not unilkr Watergate. Aftrr Harding's
de.1th while III ofl-irt', tlw p:iJH'rs W<'re packrd and store. :Mrs. Harding
11rnlrrtook to rl"movr and l"Xaminr the '·Private Office" matrrial, and
·• 1hJrr ob,1c•et1vr ~<•rm" lo lu1Yr liee11 tlw de:,:tructio11 of anr material
which might haw proY<'ll harmful to the memor~· of her husband."
Shr burned :-01111· papPr" whil<' they were still at the Whitr House .
Aftrr tlw n'maill(kr wpn• :<hipJH'd to Ohio. '.\Ir,:;. Harding ''allwnately
.fp:;ignat I eel] md1ndual H!'tn:< or <•ntire folders for destruction . . . . The
amount I HI<' lof file" dP:<t ro~·pcl b~· ,\lr:;. Harding cannot be accurately
:1:<r(•rtain<'d: 1ho11gh gap,- u1 t II!' Jilr n11mber,:; of the private oflice papers
•do mdicatl' that she ma~· havP burned a~ many or more than half
rllC• 1rn11c•nal avnilablr to her." Lr11tz, Thr Warren G. Harding Papers,
;it '2-:{. nnd n. 3. (Ohio I-fotorical Socirty, Columbu~, Ohio, 1970) ,
Tln· PrPHtdrntrnl pnp<' r~ of Pre:-idr1118 Pierce. Arthur, and Coolidge
111:1_,. h:1v1• :-;uffered from cl<·Ht ruction initiatrd or authorizrcl by these
l're:-;1de11h. ~lcDonough , Who Own,; PrPsidrntial Papers'?, 27 Manu..,c-npt,; '2, ti ( 1975)
1
" PrP:,mlrnt,; 1ll th<· pa:-;t h:wc• had to apply to thr Prrsidential Librarir::i
1f tlH•1r prrdPc1•,;,;or~ for pt>rrni~:-iou to rxaminr records of post govern1111•ntal :1<·11011., n•lntu1g 1·0 <-urrrut govrrnnwntal problems. See 408 F,
-..1,pp •1 1 :{,'J l-:3.'i'2 \!though ,t appears th.it most ~uch requests J1ave
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·erving these materials. tl te Act n 1ay be thought to
le,.islativt' process and Congress' broad congressional investi- ) ~ -- ' ~A~
gati~
wer, sc<'. e.g .. Hci.sllcwd "· nite
tates ervicell/,en's ~ ~..,,,- Fw1d, supra. And. of course. the Congress repeatedly referred
to the importa11ce of the materials to the judiciary in the
event that tlwy shed light upon issues in civil or criminal litigatio11, a social interest that cannot be doubted sec U11ited
J

.States \', si:xon, supra.JU
1n light of t,hese objectives, the screening of the materials
is rompcll<•d bc,cause the· materials are it 1111x, coutarning
1ffl onnut'rtJ11 t·sse11t1al to the future co11duct of the Executive
Offi<·<·. a~ "·ell as confidential co11unu11ications; materials
rPlal ing to military and diplomatic :-;ccrPls, as well as purely
pc-r~o11a I <·011 vPrsa tions bet"veen the former Presicle11 t and his
fn1•11(I~ 01 ltt('mlwrs of his family. Appellant made no attempt
10 "'<'P,T<'g.11l<· j)('l'SOnal, political. or official documents. 40c F.
S11pp .. at a.35. The materials were gathered hastily by his
-;tafi e111ploy<'PS, and little is k11ow11 ns of this date of the
lh•c·n gr:111t<•d Congres:, could leµ;1timn1el~ · eoHclud(-' that llw sit11:1tion
\\':1, 1111'1 :ti ,11· :1 11d npr for change. Ii i,- C'IPH r from the l'H<•P of t lw Art
1h:1t 111:1k111g t IH· n1atenal:; availab!P for tlw on-going comluet of Pl'(••i.f<'nl 1:il poll(·~· \\'a,.; :it lem,t one of th<' obj<'clivl'" of the ..\et. See~ 10:2 (d) .
'•· _\, tn tlw,P -<'veral objective:; of th,, ll'g:i,-latme. ,-pp S. Jfrp .• · o.
'.J:{ 111.; I. n:,d Cong. 2d Sess., at 3-4, ti ( H.174) ; H. R. Hrp. No. 9:{-1507,
H:ld <'onµ;. :!d S<•,.;~ .• at 2, 8; 120 Cong. lfrC' . S. 16Sil (dail~· ed. Sc•pL 18,
11)711 (n·mark,, of Sen. Nebon); id., at S. JS:!::!::! , 1K:n5 (daily ed. Oei.3 ,
l! li'-!) . 1</ .. :11 H 11207 (daily ed. Dec. :3, H)74) (remark,- of l{{•p ,
llrad,·111:1"). ul .. at H . 11211 (n-'marks of Bt>p . .\IcKinm',,·). S<•e 11bo
)( JOI (:1 l ol' th<· Act. See also S. Rep. No. 9;3-1181, !:)::!cl Cong., 2d
.\ ,,. .. al :J
1 (HJ74); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 9:{d Cong., 2d Se,-;,;., at
.! :,. " 0974). 120 Cong. Rec. S. HiS71 (rlail~· rd. Rept. 18, l!-J74)
\ n·m:,rk,; pf S1•n. Nel:,;on) ; id., at S. 182:35 (dail~· <•d. Oct.:\ 1974). Sec
d.,11 S. H, ·p :"l'o 93-1181 , 93d Cong., :2d Se,-~ .. ai 1, 4, G (1974);
II H Hq> . ·o 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Rrss., at 2, 3. 8 (1974): 120
r " ng l{p1• ::\ 16870-16871 (daily ed. Sept lX . 1974) (remark:; of S<·ll.
Plso11l . 1,/ .. :tt S. 18233 (daily ed. Oct . :3, l!:)74); id .. a1 U. IJ:!07
cl:iil~ I'd l>c•<· ,{ , 1974) \remark:-- of Rep. Bradm1a,;). S<'c abo §§ JO:./ (IJ),
11 I , :1 l (:2) of I lie Ad.
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content of many of the boxes in which the material is stored.
Even individual documents and tapes often intermingle communications relating to governmental duties, and of great
historical interest, with private and confidential communicat10n . Ibid.
The Act authorizes retention by the government of only
those materials that have historical significance. See §§ 101
(b)( l) ; 104(a)(7). It authorizes DO immediate public
a.ccess. At present, and for the immediate future, only
appellant. officials of the Executive Branch in the conduct of
their official duties, and the archivists who will screen and
classify the materials, will have access to them. Before any
public acct'ss is provided, the materials will be scrutinized by
govermneut archivists to separate privileged materials, which
under § 104 (a) (5) will notJ >e disclosed, from nonprivileged
matters, which if they are not private and returned to
appellant will be disclosed but only under regulations promulgated by the Administrator, subject to federal review. ·
ts no reason to infer that this screening process will lead to
disclos ur:s= rn violation of appellant's privilege; indeed § 104
~a) ( 5) explicitly preserves it.
lt 1s Urns clear that Congress chose narrow means to accomplish its unportant goals. lt is, of course. true that in sifting
thro ugh the materials all(.I cataloguing them-some to · be
ret urned to appellant, some to be permanently stored. and
some cveutually to be made available to the public-the
archivists will b<> reyuired J.o vie)\;. both purely pi'ivate materials anJ materials which may contain sensitive. confidential ~ 4 - 4 • ~
comm umcat10ns Ge"fa:°ee n tfie "Toifoer P reslaen t and h is fu!uily
closP advisors. Tfut given the safeguards built into the
Acl'"toj')revcnt uisclosure of such mate~ials, this very minimal
~
intrus1011 rnto the co11fidentiality of the Executive Branch is
out\\'e1ghed by the unportance of Congress' purposes in pre- -H.-o~
serving tlw matenals and maintaining access to , them for ~
lawful gowr111nent and historical purposes.

I

-

ThereJ

-n..,,,-c.., '-"'-"
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In short. we conclude that the screening process coutem-s
,jy-./J4"~
plated by the Act will not co1l8t1tu t_e a mn,re sevel'e mt111,5ion
T
~
into exeeuti_ye confidentialitytha11 the in camera. inspection
~
by the =r5fstiTe't Court approved in United States v. 11·ixon,
~
s'upra, 418 (-.~ -,at 700. We must of course presume that the
'""--; -4~~~
Achnini:--trator and tlw career archivists concerned will carry ~ - ; , , ~ 1 oul tile dutie,.., assig11<>d them uy the Act. Thus. there is no
~ '
basis for appella11t'f-' claim that the Act ·'reverses" the pre'-Ull1 ptio11 111_ favor of confidentiality of Presidential papers
_,,,,__
n·<·ognizl'<i i~ r ·111te fl°R tate:::r Y • •\.Lwn. Appellant's right to
11.~s1·rt tlw pr!\·1h~g.1· 1:-- specifi<"a.lly prt'served by the Act. The
~
guHlc•l.in<' pro,·i:--io11~ 011 tlwir foe:<• are as bl'oad alS the privilege
1w,...... ,-.c ~
11:--l'lf
lf thl' lll"uadl~· \\Tittp11 protPction~ of the Act should
nPvc•rtl1dp:,;:,; pro\'(' 11wd<•quate to safeguard appellant's rights A,(A..,rt e..le .,...._,
u1 lo p1<•v<•nt 11:--urpatio11 ot Pxeeutivp powers. there will be
•
t111H• c·1wugh to cu11sider that prol,lc~n1 in a specific factual C., •
t·ontPxt. For (Ii(• pn•s(•nt. \\"l' hold. in agreeme11t with tlw
~
l)i,-trl('l C'uurt. lliat tl11• .\C'I 0.11 its face does 11ot violate the
~
1
l 'n•:--ld('lll ial pr1rill')!(' of tuididt•ul iality.

4

,e..

!:
.,.,_~....,......._rs
(V ,-(.4.,~

V

~ 1-ur.1c 1'

~• •

he

l\ppPllant ('Olll'ed(J:,; lhat whe11
f'lltered public life he
v ol11111 arily ~UIT<'lHlerPd tlw printcy seemed by law for those
\,\,hu Plc•et 11ot to plac<' IIH·111s<'lves i1J the public spotlight.
,'<'<'. E y .. Y, 11· l'ork 'l'i111e8 Co. "· fiullivan, 376 U. S. 254
f I!J(H )

Ht' mgu<'s. liuwcw•r, that he was not thereby
.'.'1ripped ol ail !Pµ:al prutcetion for his privacy, and contends
that the' \c·t ,·1olal,!;::: fuJ1da11w11ta.l rights of express1011 and
p i ·l\1H'j' !!,u'itl'a1 1t 1-•ed to h11u hy the F ll'st, F ourth and Fifth

I

lllt'IH lll('ll I;.

.-

I'll<' J >i:-triel { 'our! lrt·at1·cl appellnnt's argument as adI 11-ot:11

:,-
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dr1'S-il'd only to the process by which the screening of the
tnnt('rials will b<> performed. "Since any claim by [appellant]
Lliat his privacy " ·ill b<> invaded by public access to private
111atcrials must be considered premature when it must actually
be dirc,cted to the regulations once thry become effective. we
11pf•d not consider how the materials will be treated after they
·ire reviewed." 408 F. Supp .. at 358. Although denomi11:1ti11g the privacy claim " [ t l he most troublesome challenge
that plaintiff raises . . . ,'' id., at 357. the District Court
co1H·lrnled that the claim was "vithout merit. Tlw court
n•11srnwd that the proportion of the 42 million pages of docu1•w11t ~ and
80 tap<' recordings implicating appellant's privacy
11it<'rcsts was quite small si 11ce tlie great bulk of the materials
n•lat.c·d to appellant's conduct of his duties as PrPsident, and
we re tliC'reforc n1al<'rials to which great public interest
:1ttached. Tht> touchstone of I he lrgality of the archival
pruccs ing. 111 thP District Court's view. was its reasonableness.
Balancrng the publi(' intC'rest in pres<:'rving the materials
touching appellant's perforrnance of his official duties against
the invasion of appellaut·s privacy that archival screening
tH'C:e~aril:v p11tials. the District Court concluded that the
\<•t wa:- not umPasonabk and hence was not facially
1111runsti tu tiuna I
" Here, we have a processillg scheme without which
uational i11tcrests of overriding importance cannot be
, :;en'Pd
,'' ld., at. al34.
.\.ct "is a reasouable

/J-c 's-

fJ.le,,.....,..,,t_

~"'...,., ... ,t-
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Court that the Act does not unconstitutionally invade appellant's right of privacy.
011(' element of privacy has been characterized as "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matter8.
'' VT'halen v. Roe, 45 U. S. L. W. 4166, 4168
( Fen. 22, 1977). We may agree with appellant that, at least
wlwn government intervention is at stake. public officials,
111duding the President, are not wholly without constitution.ti ly protected privacy rights in matters of personal life that
"have no legitimate relation to or bearing upon any act done
hr I thcrnJ i11 a public ... capacity." Brandeis and Warren,
I'lw Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193. 215-216 (1890).
l'rPsicJents who have established Presidential Libraries have
usually withhdd matters concerned with family or personal
finances, or have deposited such materials with restrictions on
rhei r screening. 408 F . ,' upp., at 360. l ti \\-?e may assume
'' Till' 01,tri('t Court, 408 F Supp., nt 350 11. 54, 1:,1.1rveyed evidence
u1 l h<· n·eord n•spPrting depo,.;Itor~· rrstrict ion,.; for n11 Prrsidrnt;; ;;ince
I 'n ·,1d<·nt lloov<•r. l 1 1:; u 11r!Pa r whet'her Prr~idrnt HooVC'r aet ually
,·i.:<·luckd an.\· of h1,; per~onal aud privntr matrrinls from thr RCOJlP of
h1, gift. although hi:,; offer to d<'po:sit material;; in a Pre,;idr11tinl Librar~·
r,·,<'l'l<·d th<' nght to do so President Roo:;evrlt nbo indicated his
11lt<'n1mn to s<'l<'rt <'<'rtain matPrial:; from hi~ paprr:; to be retained by
li1,.; t':imil)· . B<'<·au~r of hi~ clc•a1h, this function wn:; performed b~· designat<•d i11d1v1duals and b~· h1,.; se<'rrt:u~·. Again the record is unclear as
'" how n1an~· m:itt•nab wrre rrmoved. A number of personnl documents
d<·<·nwd to lw pPr,.;onal f:imil~· <·one,;pondenc(' werr turned over to the
Hoo~l'\'('lt fnmih· librnry III rn4t-:, latrr returnrd to the officinl Library
in 1954-1955. :rnd have· brC'n on Joan to the family since then. It, 'is
unclrnr to wh:1t C'Xtc•nt thr:;e materials were rrviewed by the library
pc•r,onnrl.
PrP,.;1d('nt Trnman withlwld from depo:;it the per:sonal file maintained
ill thr Whit<:" Hou ·c• bY hi,.; wr,.;orIHJ secretar~·- Thi:; file was deposited with
Tilt> library upou his death in 1974, nlthough the terms of his will t'xcludecl
{I .small numbl'I' of 11rms rlet<'rm111hed by the executors of his will to
pPrta m to persmwl or bu,;ine:;:,; affairs of the Trnman family. President
Eu,Pnhowc,r\ offrr to deposit hi:,; Prrsidential m:itrrials excluded material,;
•ldPrmi1w1l bY him or h1H r<'pre;;entative to be personnl or private,
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with the District Court, for the purposes of this case. that this
pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional
acquiescence gives rise to appellant's legitimate expection of
privacy in such materials. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351-353 (1967).rn This expectation is independent of the
question of ownership of the materials. an issue we do not
reach . See supra, at n. 8. But the merit of appellant's claim
of invasion of his privacy must therefore be weighed ag_a inst
the public interest subjecting the Presidential materials of
appellant's administration to archival screening. Camara, v.
vfunicipal Gou.rt , 387 TT. S. 523, 004- 539 (1967); '1.'erry v.
Ulno, 392 U. S. 1. ·21 (1968)."" l'mler this test. the privacy
111tNest asserkd by appella11t is ~-Paker than that found waut1ng in the rece11t decision of Whalen v. Roe, U. S. - ( 1977) . Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New York
~tau, to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of private medical
111formatio11 retained i11 a state computer bank system,
W ha/en reJect,Pd a constitutio11al objection to New York's 0 IJ.
,I_
program u11 privacy grou11cls. Not 011ly does the Act chal- ~--- dd
~ "'J<,D
knp;<•rl her<' mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing G_,.-...,,., ~
undut' clis~l'llllllation of private rnaterials but. unlike Whalen, "'IC,......_."~~
the ( ~overnment will not even retai11 loug-term control over ~ 1
~urh pnvat(-' mformatiou, rather, purely private papers and ~
....,.._..,....,_

.

;0ec·,,.

t

l ' r( •:.:1d P t1f KPIIIJ(•d~·•:.: ma({'l'l:II ,.; d<·po:.:1trd with r.sA did not inrluclP cprtain ; , ,
I
111at Pn :tl ,-, nfati11µ; 10 hi,-, pnv:Ill' :1ff:11r:.:, Hild ,-;0111e recording:,; of rnrrtingti
11,, oh ing l'n•,idenl Kemwd~-. although ph,n,irall~· :storPd in thr I<Pm1rd~·
~
Lil,rnr., ·. h,l\·P 1101 ,\"C'1 bPcn tunwd ovpr to tlw librar~· or revirwrd by - J,'
~0\'('l'JllllPIII archiv1,-;1~.
PrP!:ilU<'lll ,John:;ou':s uffrr to cl<>po::;it mnll•rinls)'&a~al-,,.,./
,· ,('l11dPrl ll <' tll.• IYhi<'h lw dNerrni11Pd to be of :spPcial or prirntp imerc:,;t
,_ ~J'
1u p(•r,-;on:d or fa111il~- affair:.:.
~,C.,
"' h ·1·11 ,r pnor Pn,,-;1dP11t:.: h:id dl•c·linrd to a:.:,,Prt tlwir privar_,· i11tc•rc•::;ts
~ __ _:;f~
11 1 , 11('h 111:i t('l'i:d,-., tlwi r f:1ilm1 • 10 do ,;o IYould 11ot t1(•1•e,.;,mril.1· bincl c;t-,,..,,,..,_ ~ 1pp1·lln11t . for pn1·:1c·~· 1111 1•11 •,b al\· 1101 ,.;old_,· dqwlldl•nt for lhrir con- ~
-11111 11011:1 1 p1·ot<'<'Iion 11po11 1•,1 nbli,;l1pd praet ice of go1·<·nmH·11tal t okra t ion. --1 ""'--"
1
" \Y ,, agn''.' 11·11h 1lw [)1,-;triC'! ('ourt that, tlw Fomth AmP11dnwnt'::; JA •
•
~
11,11-r:1111 n •q11m·11H·nt ,~ i1ol llll'Olv<'d. 40b I• . Supp., at 361- :36:2.
~ v •• - ~ .,,....i<

~J •

/J

~ ~ ..11.~d
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recordings will be returned to appellant under § 104 (a) (7) of
t~e Act.
The overwhelming bulk of the 42 million documents and
the 880 tape recordings pertain, 11ot to appellant's private
communications, but to the official conduct of his Presidency.
/ ~
Most of the 42 million papers were prepared a,nd seen by
otht.•rs and were widely circulated within the government.
Ap wlla11t concedes that he saw no more than 200
, and·
we do 11ot UllC ers am. 1111 to suggest at his privacy claim
f'Xtends to items lw never saw. See United States v. Miller,
• -~ . J,42,-1 C R. 4:1.5 ( IU7(j) . Further. it i:s logical to assume that the } ~
tapc recorcU!,igs made in the Presidential offices primarily
~
r0lat<' to the conduct and business of the Presidency. And, of ~
c·oursc. appellant cannot assert any privacy claim as to the ,
_ •• ~1.. ,
('ountless documents and tape recordings that ha,ve been ac,_. ,'-,J ~.,.._,
disclosed to the public. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. ~
1, 14 (1973); Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U. S.. at 351.
Tl,erefore appellant's privacy claim embracing. for example, ~~
" extrernel:v pftv~te communications between [him] and; u•
among othcrR. h.is wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer ,__ _, ~ ~
and clergyman, and his close friends as well as personal diary / " ~ - •
dictab<'lt:-- a11d hi:s wife's personal files," 408 S. Supp., at 359, ..e.. 'f . ~~
n•lat<'S 011 ly to a very small fraction of the massive volume of
_ ~. __
official materials with which they arc presently comingled. 21
~ .• ,....
.-c.."-,_,
Tlw faet that appellant may assert his privacy claim as to ~ / " ' - ~
u11 ly a small fraction of the materials of his Presidency is ~ J,.,.,.__,,.
plainly r<'lcvant, in judging the reaso11ableness of the screening ...,.. p- .,..

-J-

Jc.·••• M.1

.J

1.-.

q

" .--om, , ~n:if Pnal., :1n· ,•i11ll iJJ :1ppt'lln11I·':,; po::,i;es::!io11, a,; the Adminis1r,1tor ha~ 1wl .1·,,1 att0mpt<'d to aet on his authorit~· under§ 101 (b)(l)
10 lake <'11',tod~· ul' tlwm. Srr Brirf for FE>ck·ral Appellees, at 4 n. 1.

·- 7

~ ~

'""

~

~

,-.,,. _ . - - - -

=~~

:\loreo\'t'r. tlH' Solicitor Gt•11rral concE>ded nt oml argument that there .
:ire <'<'rtn111 purd~· privnk m,1terials whiC'h "::;bould be retunwd to [appell:tnt 1 once .
id<•nlifivd . Tl'. of Oral Arg., nt 590. In our view the
1 ,ov<'rnrne11t . without awaiting n Court order, ::!houlcl promptly disclaim .I~ ~
,1n_1· 111t<'fe~1 111 materiab ro11rt•drcl to be appellnnt'l'< purely private com- ~
1111111ir:itio11., 1111d rkl1n•r thC'llJ to h11n .

I
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process contemplated by the Act, but this of course does not
without more, require rejection of his privacy argument. 408
F . Supp., at 359. Although the Act requires that the regulations promulgated by the Administrator under § 104 (a) take
into account appellant's legally and constitutionally based
rights and privileges, presumably including his privacy rights,
~ 104 (a)(5). and also take into account the need to return to
appellant his private materials, § 104 (a)(7), 22 the identity
and separation of these purely private matters can be achieved,
as all parties concede, only by screenirrg all of the rnateria.ls.
\ppcllant co11t01Hlf: that thP Act is tantamount to a general
warra nt authorizing search and seizure of all of his Presidential "papers, and effects.' Such "blanket authority," appellant contends, 1s precisely the kind of abuse that the Fourth
.\mendmeut was intPnded to prevent, for "the real evil aimed
at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself. that invasion
,,f a man's privaey which consists of rummaging about his
personal effects to secure rvirlence against him.'' Brid for
.\ppellant 148, quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911t
m4 (CA2 H)3O). ·Thus.his Brief continues, w., at 100-131:
''
[h1sj most private thoughts and communications,
both written and spoken. will be exposed to and reviewed
by a host of persons whom he does not know and did not
seh•ct. a11d in whom he has no reason to place his confidence. This group will decide what is personal, to be
returned to [himj. and what is historical, to be opened
for public review ""
"" ThC' Sol iritor GP1wrnl i111pliPd at oral argument that the requirement
ul tlw g1m!Pli11<·~ di1wtin;r tlw Admini8trator to con~ider the need to return·
in :t ppdlant "for his 801<' ru~1ody nnd use . . . materials which are not
:md :irt' not othf'rwise of genenil hi:storical'
I \Y,1tPrg:1tP-r<'latPd I .
::ng11ific·:1 1H'<',·• § 104 (a)(7/, i~ furtlwr qualified by the r<'quirC'rnrnt under
§ ](J:2 (b) and § 104 (a) (5), that th<' regulation:; promulgated by the
\drnmi,;1 rat or ta kC' mto areount the need to prolcrt appellant's rights,
•l<'f Pn~<'~, or privil<'gl',:; Tr of Ontl Arg. :38.
' \ ppPlla11i rt rg11P~ that ~('rrc•nin~ und_er th~ Act Qontrast:s with the,
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Appellant principally relies on Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S.
476, 485 ( 1965). but that reliance is misplaced. Stanford
invalidated a search aimed at obtaining evidence that an individual had violated a "sweeping and many-faceted law
which, among other things, outlaws the Communist Party
and creates various individual criminal offenses, each punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years." Id., at 477. The
search warrant authorized a search of his private home for
books, records, and other materials concerning illegal Communist activities. After spending more than four hours in
talldford's house. police officers seized half of his books which
mclucled works by Sartre, Marx, Pope John XXIII. Justice
Hugo Black, Theodore Draper, and Earl Browder, as well
as private documents including a marriage certificate, insurance policies, household bills and receipts, aud personal
corTespondence. Id., at 479- 480. Stanford held this to be
11 unconstitutio11al general search.
The District Court concluded that the Act's provisions for
custody and screening could not be analogized to a general
earch and that Stanford, therefore, did not require the Act's
111validation. 408 F. Supp., at 366-367, 11. 63. We agree.
Only few documents among the vast quautity of materials
seized in Stanford were related to any legitimate government
intc,m4. This cas(• presents precisely the opposite situation;
'<crPPlllJJI-( pro(·rdun•~ followC'd br rarlier Pm;idents who, "in donating
matPrial~ to l'rP~ictrntial libraries, have been able . . . to participate
111 tlw i;elc>rt1011 of per~on:s who would review the materials for classification pmpose;;.'' Hri<'f for Apprllant 151 n. 68. We are unable to say
that t hr l'l'<'ord ~ubstant iates this a::;sertion. The record is most comJ)ietr with l'<'::iJWCt to Pre~idrnt Johnson, who apprars to have recommended
thr i11d1vid1111l who w:1~ latrr :selected a;; Director of the Johnson Library,
but t<eemi; not to haw played nny role in thr selection of the archivists
act nail~· J)('l'forming the day-to-day p1·oce;;i:;ing. 408 F. Supp., at 365 n. 60.
Moreo,w, W<' agree with the Dit<trict Court that it is difficult to see
how professional :irchiYi~ts performing a i,;creening ta:;k under proper
~tandard~ would lw mramngfully affected in the performance of their
'._{1111r:- h, loval1y to 111di,idw1I,, or irn,titutions. Ibid.
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the vast proportion of appellant's Presidential materials are
official documents or records in which appellant concedes the
public has a recognized interest. Moreover. the Act provides
procedures and orders the promulgation of regulatious expressly for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion into ap.pellant's private and personal materials.
Moreover, the search in Stanford was an intrusion into an
.i ndividual's home to search and seize personal papers in furtherance of a criminal investigation and designed for exposure
in a criminal trial. In contrast, any intrusion by archivists
mto appellant's privatP papers and effects is undertaken with
the sole purpose of separating private materials to be returned
to appellant from nonprivatc materials to be retained and
prcservc'd by the Government as a record of appellant's
Presidency.
Moreover. the screening will be undertaken by government
archivists with. as the District Court noted, "an unblemished
record for discr<'tion,'' 408 F. Supp .. at 365. That review
1•1111 hardly differ matC'rially from that contemplated by apiwllant's wt<'11t1011 to <~stablish a Presidential Library, for
Presidents who have established such libraries have found
that screening by professional archivists was essential. Although the District Court recognized that this contemplation
of archival review would not defeat appellant's expectation
of privacy, the court held that it does indicate that "iu the
special situation of documents accumulated by a President
during his tenure and reviewed by professional government
personnel. pursuant to a practice employe<l by past Presidents,
any intrusion into privacy interests is less substantial than it
n11ght appear at first. '' 408 F. Supp., at 365 (citation
omitted).
The District Court analogized the screening process conte111platPCI by the Act to electronic surveillance conducted
pursuant to Title J1 I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
StreC'ts Act of Hl68, 18 U ~. C. ~ § 2510-2520 ( 1970). 408 F,

?5-1605-sOPINION

NIXON v, AD~tINISTnATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

35

Supp., at 363. We think the analogy is apt. There are ob ..
vious similarities between the two procedures. Both involve
the problem of separating intermingled communications,
( 1) some of which are expected to be related to legitimate
government objectives, ( 2) some of which are not, and
( 3) for which there is no means to segregate the one from
the other except by reviewing them all. Thus the screening
process under the Act. like electronic surveillance, requires
some intrusion into private communications unconnected with
my legitimate governmental objectives. Yet this fact has
not ueP11 thought to rellder surveillance under the Omnibus
ct unco11st1tutional. ('f. e. (!., l'mted States v. Donovan, H)77); Berger V. i\'ew York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
'ee also 408 F . Supp .. at 363-364.
Appellant argues that this analogy is inappropriate because
the electro11ic surveillance procedure was carefully designed to
meet the constitutional requirements enumerated in Berger v.
\iew York, supra, including (1) prior judicial authorization,
(2) specification of particular offenses said to justify the intrusion, (3) s1wcificat10n "with particularity" of the conver:sat10ns sought to br seizPd. ( 4) minimization of the duration
vf t.he wiretap. ( 5) termillation once the conversation sought
1s seized, and ( 6) a showing of exigent circumstances justifymg US<' of the wiretap procedure. Brief for Appellant 157.
Although the parallel is far from perfect. we agree with the
District Court that many considerations supporting the con_st1tut10nahty of the Omnibus Act 11,lso argue for the constitutionality of the Act's materials screening process. For example, the Omnibus Act permits electronic surveillance only
to investigate designated crimes that are serious in llature, 18
P S. C. ~ 2516 ( 1970). and only when normal investigative
techlllques have fail ed or are likely to do so, id.,§ 2518 (3)(c) .
.:51milarly. the archival review procedure is designed to serve
important national rnterests asserted by Congress, and the
_mavailability of less restrictive means necessarily follows from

r :-,
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the comingling of the documents?' Similarly, just as th~
Omnibus Act expressly requires that interception of nourele•
vant communications be minimized, 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (5),
the Act's screening process is designed to minimize any privacy
intrusions, a goal that is further reinforced by regulations
which must take those interests into account.~" The fact
that apparently only a minute portion of the materials implicates appellant's privacy interests/u also negates any concluion that the screening process is an umeasonable solution to
the problem of separating conuni11gled communications.
~• Apprll:tnt argues that, 11nltkc• Plc>ctronic su1Teillance, whrre success
epends upon thr subjrct's 1gnoranct• of its rxi,-:tencc•, appellant could
have been allowed to separate hi,; prr"onal from oJ!icial materials. But
~ ongrriil:i rnaC'trd the Act in part to disphice Ihe Nixon-Sampi:;011 agreement that exprei:;sl~· provided for automatic destruction of the tape
rc•cordiug::i in tlH' rvrnt of appellaut':,; death and that allowed appellant
l'omplete discrrtion in tlw destruction of materiali:; after the initial threewar ;,torage period.
Morl'ovrr, appc>llant',, view of what constitutes official as distingui;,hed
from prr,;onnl and private maleriab might differ from th!' virw of
Conp;rr;;s, the Exrc111 ivr Brn11ch, or a reviPwiug court. Xoi only may
tlw u:-;r of disintrre,.;ted archivist:,; lead to application of uniform standard:,;
111 ,;eparnting prin1tr from nonprivatr communicatiom;, but the Act
providrs for ,1udiewl rc•v1r,,· of their detprmi11ations. Thiti would uot be
the cai:;e as to appdlant':,; cletermi11atio11,-,
"'' Thr D1::;tnct Comt found, 404 F. Supp., at 364 n. 58, am! we agrer,
that rt 1~ 1rrdevnnt that Title III, unlike the Act, require:,; adherence
10 a dC'taift,d warrant requirement, 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (] 970). That
rrquirrmC'ut is innppltcable undPr the Act.
26 The fact that thr ovrrwhelming majority of the materiali:; i:s relevant
t o Congrrs:s' lawful objective:,; is in contrast to the experience under
the Om11ih11s Cnme Al't A rrcent report on tittrveillance conducted
under the Omnibus Act mdicatri:; that for the' cal<>ndar year 197(i more
than onr-h:ilf of all wire intrn·c•pt" authorized by judicial order yielded
11oninrnmim1ting commuuicatiom;. Admini:st rative Office of thr United
'.'.', tate,- Courts, Rt>port on Applic.t tions for Ordrn; Authorizing or Ap1rov111g thl' lntercrption of Wire or Oral Comm11nicationi:;, January 1,
1976 to Dc•reml:ier at, 1976, at XII (Table 4).
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In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his personal communications. But the constitutionality of the
Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of
the screening process, of appellant's status as a public figure,
his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in preservation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of
segregating the small quantity of private materials without
comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's
·ensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, see § 104
1
a) ( 7 ) the unblemished n'cord of thP archivists for discretion,
and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by
the Administrator will further moot appellant's fears that his
materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons," 27 Brief
for Appellant 150. we are compelled to agree with the District
Court that appellant's privacy claim is without merit.
VI
FIRST AMENDMENT
During his Presidency appellant served also as head of
his national political party, and spent a substantial portion of
his working time 011 partisan political matters. Records arisillg from his political activities. like his private and personal
·records, are not segr_egated from the great mass of materials.
He argues that the Act';""archival scree11ing process th{'refore
11ecessarily entails invasion of his coDstitutionally protected
27 Throughout this litigation appellant has claimed that his privacy
•will nPrrs><arily be unco11;:;titutio1rnlly invaded bPcausr the scrrrning requires
a staff of " over one hundred nrchivists, accompanied by lawyer::;, technicians, and ,;ecrrtarir:s I who] will have a right to review word by word
five aud one-half )'ears of a man's lifr ... ." Tr. of Orn! Arg. 16. The
·size of the :;tnff is, of com;;r, 1wc•r;;sarily a function of the e11ormous
qw1nl1iy of materinl;; involvl'd . But clearly not all rngaged in the scrren111g will exnminr each document . The Administrator initially propo:;ed
that onl ., · onr archivitit cxumine mo::;t documents. See 408 F. Supp.,
'."l I. :3(3,') lL fi!-),
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rights of associational privacy and political speech. As sum•
marized by the District Court, "It is alleged that the Act
invades the private formulation of political thought critical
to free speech and association, imposing sanctions upon past
expressive activity, and more significantly, limiting that of
the future because individuals who learn the substance of
certain private communications by lhimJ-especially those
critical of themsC'lves-will refuse to associate with him.
Tlw Act is f urtherrnore said to chill lhis l expression because
lw will be 'saddled· with prior positions communicated in pri~
vate . leaving him u11ablt> to take inconsistent positions in the
future.' 408 F . Supp., at 367- 368.
The District Court, viewing th('se arguments as in essence a
daim that disclosure' of the materials violated appellant's
a~sociatig.11al privacy , and tlwreforc as not significan tly rniferc,11t in sfruct,1re from appellant's privacy claim, again
t reated the argurne11ts as limited to the co11stitutio1Jality of
t hr Act's screening process. Id., at 368. As was true with
rr,:prcl to the more general privacy challenge only a fraction
.o f the materials ca11 be said to raise a First Amendment claim.
~ rwrtheless. the District Court acknowledged that appellant
''would appear to have a legitimate expectation that he would
h ave an opportunity to remove some of the sensitive political
tlocum.ents before any government screening took place."·
l b'ld. The District Court held. however, that since there was
no reason to believe that the mandated regulations when
promulgated would not adequately provide protection against
public access to materials implicating appellant's privacy i11'
political association. and that "any burden arising solely from
review by professional and discreet archivists is 12.2,t si~ ifi~ca11t. " Therefore concluded that the Act does not signifi~ tly interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendmeut
rights. Id., at 36H. We agree with the District Court's·
l'onclusion .
Qf c:ourR.e. it is__ trur that involvPJ.nent. in partisa.11 politics ·is;
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closely protected by the First Amendment, Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. R. 1 (HJ76). and therefore that "compelled disclosure
rn itself can seriously infringe on privacy and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id., at 64. But a compelling
public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way will
override those interests. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 ,
58-59 (1973). United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 376-377
(1968). Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479. 488 (1966). "particularly when the 'free functioning of our national institutions' is involvt>d. " Huckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S .. s11,pra, at 66.
~lllC(' nu less restnct1ve \\ uy than archival screening has been
s11ggl'~tc-d a~ a rneans for identification of materials to be
t'<'tt1rt11•<1 to appellant, the burden of that screening is presently
the nwasun• of his First Amendment claim. Id., at 84. Any
sneh burden, however, 1s speculative in light of the Act's
t('rms protPcting appellant from improper public disclosures
and guaranteeing him full judicial review before any public
access is pcnnitt<'d. ~~ 104 (a)(5). (a)(7), 105 (a)."·~ As
th<' District Court concludc>cl, this First Amendment claim
is clearly outweighed by the compelling governmental interests
promoted by the Act
For the same reasons, we find no merit in a.ppellant's arg,u me11t that the Aet s scheme for custody aud archival screening
".-\ppella111 argm'" that Lov1!ll , . G1iffin, 303 li. . 444, 452-453
'1931'), Shuttlesworth v. Binnmgham, ;{94 U. S. 14,, 150-151 (1969);
Co.r v. Loui.~imia, a'i9 l S. 5:rn (1965); Staub '"· Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,
;{ rn-;tn ( Hl58); and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 538-541 (1945),
-;upport hiH routrntion tlwt "L,1] i;tatntf' which vei;t::; ,mch broad authority
1 with rP;.;p<·ct to Fir,;1 Amruclrnrnt right:;7 is uncoustitutiona\ on its face,
and tlw part~ ,;111>.wet<'d to tt may tn•at H n,; 11 nnllit~· even if its artual
,mple111e1,tatw1, u·uulrl !lot harm him." Hrirf for Appellaitt 169. The
arguuwJtt ha,; no nwrn . Thrnw case:; involved rcg11la tions that permitted
publtc otfi<'wli,; 111 tlw11 arlntntr~· di:;crrtion to impose prior n•::;1raints on
t'XJ >1"p,;;.;1011:tl or a,:.,oe1:1t10nal aetivitir:;. In cont ra:;1, the Act i,; eo11cerned
on!~ wtth tn:11!'rtal~ that n•<·ord pn::;1 activitie::; and with a screening
~1ro<'""" g111drd. In· long,:tandmg nrehival screening .;tandarc!J;.

if
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f tlw matc-nals '·11<•tes:-;anly i11liibits [the I l'r<•Pdom of political
aC'tiY1ty [of futun' Prt'sid011ts I a11rl tlwreby reduct's the 'quantity a11d div<•n;it,v· of tlw pulit.ieal spec'ch a11d associatio11 tlml
lllf' "\'atwn will bP n'<'<•iving from its leadt'rs.'' Bril:'f. p. 16 .
TL is significalll. 1uoreowr. tha.t this c·o11C<'l'll ha:-; nut d<>t< ned
l'n•sHle11t Ford from s1g11ing tli<' .\ci 111to law. or Pn•sident
C arter from urgi11g tln:-; Court's affirrnancc• of the ,i udg1nt•ut oI
the Distnct Cour( .
0

TI

B-ill of A ttoi/l(ler Cfow;f.
F11ially . ~<· addrel:'-s i:lP!Wlla11t s arguniellt 1,hat the Act
co11stituU's a ])Ill ot alta1mlt'r proscribed by .\1-L. 1. ~ ~) of
the Co11st1tut,10 11 .i" His argu111e11t Ji:i that Congress acted on
the prenuse that he had <•11g.aged in ''n1isco11<luct: was an
'unrehabh• custod1a11' of lus ow11 documents. and gcm•rally
was deserving of a "lcg1slat1 n• J udg111e11 t of blameworthiness, '
Brl<'f fur Appella11t 13:2 -1:33. Thus. he argues, the Act ,~
pervaded with LliP key feature6 of a !Jill of attalllder. a la"
that k•gislat1vely determrnes guilt and 111flicts pumshment
upo11 a11 identifiable indl\·idual without provisio11 of the protPct1011s of a Judicial trial. See U11ded States v. Brown, 381
l • . .-i. 437, 44,J. 447 ( HJ65) ; ( '11ded States v. Lovett, 328 V. S.
;10:1. :315-316 ( HJ46), E.t parte Garla11d, 4 Wall. 333. 377
11~66), C-u111,mi11ys v. Misso·u n. 4 Wall. '277. ;t23 (1866) .
Appellants arl-(ument reliC's almost entirely upon U,nted
:,tot<'s v Bro1n11. 8upra, tlw Court's most recent dec1s1011 ad,,, .·\rnd<· l, ~ H. ,1ppliea hlP 10 C'o11µ;H:-::-. proY1d1•:-: " \o Bill of Attainder
11r P'.'i post farto la\\' :-:hall lw p:1,,1•d." :ind ..\rt I. § JO . appli!'ahlt> iu ihe
St:111•,. pro,· 1d< ·~ th:11
o S1:it<· .
,hall pa,, a11.1 Bill of .-\1t :11d1wr. ex
pu,1 f:ielO l: 111
Tlw l111k111g of bill, of att:1rnd1•1· all(! P'.'i post
t:il'to !nll'., 1, 1·xpl:111 H•d h~ tlH' f:ic:t lh:11 a IPg1~la11n• dem111C·1:1(1on
11,1 <"ulld1·mt1at1ot1 ot :Ill 1tl(II\ 1clt1:1I. oft1·11 a et Pd to 1111po,1· n•1 ro:1<:t1vc•
s1•1 Z ('lc:1f1·1•, Th1v, H11111:111 Highh n, tlH· C'o11~1111111on
1 111 111,hml'n•
•J·i-9:, , n1;;1 \ 1_
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dressing the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It is in~
structive, therefore. to sketch the broad outline of that case.
Brown invalidated § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclb~ure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 504, that made it a
crime for , n, Communist Party member to serve as an officer
of a labdr union. After detailing the infamous history of
bills of a~tainder, the Court found that the Bill of Attainder
Clause wM an important ingredient of the organizing principle of ourt system of government: the doctrine of "separation
' ~
of powers.' Id., at 442-443. Just as Art . III confines the
judiciary to tl1e task of adJudicatrng coucrete ''cases or controversiEJs/ so too the Bill of Attainder Clause was found t0
&1·reflect ,
the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch
is not so.l, elf sui ted as politically independent judges and
juries to t e task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and
1evying approprh1te punishment upon, specific persons." Id,,
at 445 . . Brown thus held that § 504 worked a bill of attainder·
by fp¢~~itll!~ upon ea~iiy iden_tifiabl~ me°:bers of a class, mem~bers, of thJ1Commumst Party, and unposmg on them the sane~
tion df maJ1datory forfeiture!of a job or office, long deemed to
be punish~ent within the contemplation of the Bill of At~
tainder Cl~use. See, e. y., United States v. "Lovett, supra, at
316; 'Cur(JX((lings v. Missouri, s·upra, at 320. '
Br<twn; 'Luvett, aud earlier cases un questiouably gave
broad and 'generous meaning to the constitutional protection
agarnst bills of attainder . But aµpellant 's proposed reading
is :f!il-r broa~er still. In essence, he argues that Brown estabhsh~s: th~t' the C011stitution, is offended whenever a law im-poses undesired consequences on an individual or on a class·
that is not defined at a proper level of generality. · The Act
in , questioi\ therefore is fa u\ted for singling out appellant, asorm'osed ~d1 all other Pres1de11 ts or members of the govern~ent,
for disfavored treatment, '
·
Appellant 's characterization of the meaning of a !Jill
·1 1fJ.fd,.1Hdflf. (lPV lJ) ll~Y prcwel'- far t,oo. llltUCh. Ry arguing t nat alll
11
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individual or defined group is attainted whenever it is compelled to bear burdens of which the individual or group
disapproves, appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill
of attainder guarantee to realistic conceptions of classifica"'.'
tion and punishment. For his view would cripple the very
process of legislating : Any individual or group that is made
the subject of adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers could and should have defined the relevant affected
class at a greater level of generality; "0 furthermore, every
person or group made sub,iect to legislation which arouses its
J1sagreenw11t may ~uh wc·tivPlv f't>el and cafi complain. that ,t
1s berng sub.1ected to unwarranted pumshrnent., United State/$
1
v Lovett, supra. at 3:24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ."
How,,__.ver expansive is the prohibition against bills of attainder, it
-urely was Hot llltended to serve as a variant of the Equal
Protection Clause,"i rnvalidating every act by Congress or
•0

ln tlw,

<'a,;1•.

tor example, app<'llant fault:,; th<' Act for taking custody

ut 111:s pa1wr:,; but not those of other Pr!'Hidents. Brirf for Appellant 180.
But ~ven a congr<'~s1onal d<'tinition of the class consisting of all Preisi~lrnt:< would have beru vulnerable to the claim of 1Jemg overly specific,
~mee the definition m1~ht morP generally mclude all members of the
Exrcut1ve Brnn<'h, or all member:- of tlw gov<'rument, or all m possession
of PreH1dentrnl p:qwr:-;, or all Ill possession of government papers.
upon him mith the reqmslte dPgrC'e of ;,;pecific1ty for a bill of attainder,
-;pe mjra, at -·:- , but it demonstrate::, that ,,;1mple reference to the
Tim, doe~ not . dispose of appellaut 's C'ontention that the Aot focuses
breadth ol tlif' Act's focn:,; caunot be determmative of the reach ot:
the Bill ot Attamder <'lausr as a ]1m1t;ttio11 upon legislative act,ion
that chsadvantages a prrson or group.
e. g., United States v. Brown,
~uµm, at 474-475 (Wlil'l'E, ,J ., disr;entmg)'; n - , infra.
11
'
"Tl!(> fact that harm j:, mflictrd by governmental authority doe:s not
make· 1t pum;;hment . F1~uratively Hpeaking all discomforting action may
lw dl'<•med pumshment hecau,;e it deprives of what otherwi:,;e would hi:)
PilJoyrd
But then· may be rea;;ons othn than punitive for i!iUcli
depriv:\t1011
2
• We obserw tlrnt appellant origmally argued m his jurisdictional ;,tale~
ment that " for ,mnila1 rra:sons '' the Act violate;,; both the Bill of Attainder
.ind Eqnnl ProtPct1011 Cl1111:-<e,-, ,fo S 27-28 He ha;, smce abimdoned

See,
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the States that legislatively buJ.l'dens '°llle persons or groups
but not all other pla~sible individu~l~. 38
short, while the
Bill of Attainder
Clause
serves
as
l),n
~mportant
"bulwor~
I
against tyranny," United States v. Brown, supra, at 443, it
does not clo so by limiting Congress t,o the choice of legisli~.ting
for the u~1iverse, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all.
Th us, in the present case, the Act's spectpcity---,-the fact tqat
it refers t.p appellapt by name-does no~ ~utom~ticaJ.ly offeha
the Bill df Attainder Clause. Indeed, viewed in context, the
focus oi :tibe enactment can be f!iirly a11d rationally under1s tr~e that Title I deals exclusively witp appelstood.

Ip

If

reliance upp' the Equal Protection Clause, apparently reco~nizing that
mere uncle~i~clusiveness is not fatal to the valic\ity of a law under the
Equal Pro~ettion Clause of the Fourteenth All\epdment, New Orleans
v. Dukes , f27 U. S. 297 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 ,
65.7. (1966l , even if . t~e law disadvantages an individual Of identifiable
members ~~ .!l group1 see, e. g., Wuliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
48$ (1955~1 ~oi:itician~); Daniel v. Family Ins . (Jo., 336 U. S. 2~0 (1949)
01s11r~ncej -~tents) . :" J)'or similar reasons" the mere specificity of a law
does 1jot d~ll into plily:. the Bill of Attainder Clause. Cf. Comment, The
Suprdne ourt 's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Neeq for Clari1Jcation,
54,: Cwlif.
Rev. 212, 234-236 (1966); but see Commept, The Bounds
of Le.disla~~~e Specificat ion : A Suggested Approach to the l3i11 of Attainder
C~ause , 72\t'rp-le L. J . 33p (1962 ).
11
" l,1row~ riecognizec\ his by makipg clear that copflict,pf-interest laws,
which mer. 1~bly pr9hibit conduct on tile part qf desigp11ted individuals
or classes J,\ iinc!ividt)al~, do not co~t~avene the bill of attpin4e~ ~uaraµtee .
Brown sr. di,fically noted the vahd1ty of § ~2 ~f the ij~nk111g Act pf
193a, 12 [µ. S. C. § 78, which djsqirnlifi~ identifiable !~embers of a
group, of~ p:'rs and employees of underwritiµg organization~-froi_n serving
as officf rs ~f• Federal Rl1serve banks, 381 U. S., at 453 . Ot~er vahd federal
contlict~oft1/1terest 81,atutes whic_h als? si~gle out ident \fiabl:' members
of groups : tq bear Qlirdens or d1squahfioat1ons are collectild, id., at 467468, n 12 (\WH ITE, J., µiss enting) . See also Regional Rail' Reorganization
Act Cases(i 419 U. S. 102 (1974) (uphodliqg tr~nsfer of: rail propertie$
uf
tai~qai:I. companeis to gov£1rnment-organiz~ corpoJation) -

n·

t.

1
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lant"s papers. But Title II casts a wider net by establishing
a special commission to study and recommend appropriate
legislation regarding the preservation of the records of future
Presidents and all other federal officials. In this light, Congress' action to preserve only appellant's records is easily explamed by the fact that at the time of the Act's passage, only
his materials demanded immediate attention. The Presidential papers of all former Presidents from Hoover to Johnson
were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries.
( 011gress had reason for concern solely with the preservation
JI aJJpella11t s 111atenals. to, he alone had entered into a de1os1tury agreeme11t. the . Jixon-Sampson agreement, which by
terms called for the destructio11 of certain of the materials.
lndeed, as thP Government argues, "appellant's depository
agreement
creatE:>d an imminent danger that the tape
iecon.hngs would bP destroyed if appellant, who had cont racted phlebitis, were to cliP." Brief for Federal Appellee 41.
rn short. appellant constituted a legitimate class of one , and
ibis alone can .1 ustify Congress' decision to proceed with
dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the
status of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further
1:onsideration of generalized standards to govern his successors.
~\1oreuver. eve11 tf WP wete persuaded that the specificity
deme11t 1s satisfied here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would
not automatically be irnplicatc-cl. Forbidden legislative pun1slunent 1s not rnvolved merely because the Act imposes consequences of which appellaut disapproves. Rather, we must
inquire further whether Congress, by lodging appellant's mat,enals m the cu~tody of the General Services Admiµistration
pP ndiiig their screening by government archivists and the
promulgation of further regulations, "inflict[ed] punishment"
\\ 1thi11 the constitutional prosecription against bills of at1,urnder. Umted States v Lovett, supra, at 315; see also
fl nited State8 v Brown, supra, at 4,56-460i Cummings v.

J,t l,';!W'IJ,f1, ,'/U.pro 1
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l
fhe rnfamous history of bills of attJ!J1~ r is a useful starting pornt rn tht> mqui ry wheth er the Actfairly can be characterized as a form of punishment leveled against appellant.
For the substantial experiellce of both England and the United
:-itates with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative
power offer a ready checklist of deprivations a.nd disabilities
::io disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpuni1w "llds
1111 •hey 11n,1uestio11ably have been held to fall
w1th111 the proscnpt1011 of Art. I, ~ 9. A statutory enactment
that imposes any ot those sanctions on 11amed or identifiable
individuals would bt> nnme<liately constitutionally suspect.
ln England ii bill of attamder originally connoted a par11amen tary act SPII te11c111g a named mdividual or identifiable
members of a group to <leath_,., Article I, § 9, however, also
proscribt>~ ena<'tlllPllt ongmally characterized as bills of

'
8et•. 1'01 t•xamplf•, tht" rns5 attamder of ,James Duke of Monmouth
Im High Tr!'a:son. "Whn<'as ,Ja me~ duke of Monmouth ha:s in an lwstile
•11aunP1 mv,,dC'd tin~ kmgdom, and 1s now in open rebellion, levying
wnr aga111:-t tlw kmg, contrary to thr duty of his allegiance; Be it
Pllat·tt·d by thC' Kmg'rs most (•xcc-llPnt m:ijesty, by and with the advice
·ind eon~Pnt of tlw lords :;pmtual and temporal, and commons in this
,>arlrnnwut a:;s!'mblrd, and by the au thority of the :same, That the said
.lam<'s clukr of :\lomno11th ~tand ai1d be convicted and attainted of high
, l'Pn,-,on and that lw ,mff('r pam:,; of dPath, and incur all forfeitures as
1 1ailo1 1·011VH'trd aml .1ttalllt('(I of high treason."
1 Jam . 2, c. 3 (empha:;1::- om1ttPd ).
The nttnmder ol dpath wa::- 11:,ually accompanied by a forfeiture of
•lw condemm•d pl•rsun ,- prop(•rty to the king and the corruption of his
t>Jood, wh<•1rby Im, he1r:s wrH• <lenied the right to inherit his estate.
Blacbto1w traec·d thP praet1ce ol "<'orruption of blood" to the Norman
·onqu<>t<I HP ro11s1dc•rrd tll(' praC'tJ<'P an ·'opprei:;r,;ive mark of feudal
1 r11urr
auJ hoJ>Pd that 11 mny m prore:;s of time br abolished by act
ot parhanwnt" 4 Black,;touc• Cummentarie:s ass (15th ed . 1809) . The
trnmrr,-. of thP \nwrH·an C'n11st11111 1011 re:spnnded to thi:s recommendation,
11

_, :'. _r
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pains aud penalties. that is, legislative acts inflicting punishment other thau execution. United States v. Lovett, supra,
at 323-324 (Frankfurter. J., concurring); Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 323; Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the
Constitution \-17 ( 1956) . Generally addressed to persons con:mlered disloyal to the Crown or State, "pains and penalties"
historically consistent of a wide array of punishments: commonly rncluded were imprisonment,"" banishment,'l 11 and the
punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign.'J7 Our
country's own experience with bills of attainder resulted in
t!H•
I Ii
11
ii,, th, 1 -.u1ctio11 to the list of impermissible
eg1slatiw punish111('11ts. any legislative enactment that bars
specified i11d1v1dualR or groups from participation in certain
types of employment or vocations a mode of punishment
commonly deployed agarnst those legislatively branded as dis1oyal
",ee, e y., Cummings v. Missouri, supra (barring
dergymt'll from 11111ustry rn the abseuce of subscribing to a
oyalty oath), l '111fed 8tates v Lovett, supra (barring named
111div1duals from guwrnme nt employment); United States v.
Nrown, supra ( barring Communist Party members from ofhces 111 labor u1110n~
"' :-;p1•, <' 11. 10 and 11 Will :{. c. I:{: "An ae1 for continuing the
11upn"o11nH•J11 of ( 'ount<-r and othrr~. for the latr horrid eonspimcy
1, .1"i-a:-"111at<• tlw 1wr"on of lrn; sacrrd lvlajest~·."
") H<·<· , I' y .. ('ooµN v Telfair, -+ Dall. 14 (1800) ("all aud every
per"on, 11:imt>Cl and mrludP<l in tlu• :;aid act [declariug pC'rsons guilty
ol tn•:1so11 j are l>an1"hrd from thC' smd :state [GC'orgiaJ"); 2 Wooddeson,
\ S~·,t<lll:it,eal \'H'w ol tlw Law:;; of England G38-639 (1792) (banishllH'III ol Lord C'lan•udon and the Bi:;hop A1terbmy) . See Kennedy v.
l/111(/(l,ll-\fort111e
,{i:.. (' s 144, Hih, II. 2:{ (196:3).
'" Followmg th1• Ifrvoh1t10w1r~· Wnr, States often :seized the property
of allc•iwd Tor~· "~·mp11tluzrn,. Srr, e. (!., James' Claim, 1 Dall. 47 (1780)
",John Parro£·1, wa" atta mtrd of Hioh Treason, and his estate ::;eizC'd and
11hPrl1spd for ,:d,,'), ReN7J11blwa v. Oordvn. 1 Dall. 2:33 (1788) ("at1:1111tl'd ol tn'a,011 for :ulh<'nng to thr king of Great Britain, in con~t•q1H•11r·1· ol \\l ll('h 111,. P"t at1• wa, c·on.fiseatr<l.. 1o the use of th~
OllllllO\l\\'(',l [ 1 h
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1 eedless to say, appellant cannot claim to have suffered
any of these forbidden deprivations at the hands of the
Cougress. Whil<-' it is true that Congress ordered the General
Services Adrniuistra tion to retain control over records that
appellant clairns as his property .3' ~ 105 of the Act makes
provision for an award by the District Court of "just compPnsatioll. " Thi~ unckrcuts evPn a colorable contention that
Lhe Government has punitively confiscated appellant's property. for thP "ow11er [thereby] is put in the same position
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had
,ot b('('II takl'lt
'I
tales , Reynolds, ~97 r. S. 14, 16
1 l\J70), accord r nited States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 373
1943) Thus. no frature of the challenged Act falls within
the historical niea11mg of legislative punishment .

.!.

But our 111qmry 11:; 11ot end ed by the determination that
he Act 11nposes 110 pumshment traditionally judged to be
prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Our treatment
of the scope of th<' Clause has never precluded the possibility
that lit"\\ burdens all(.l deprivatio ns might be legislatively
fash1011ed that art> rncons1steut with the bill of attainder
guarauteP. fhP Court, t~erefore, often has looked beyond
mere historical experie11ce a11d has applied a functional test
,f tlw ex1stl'llC<-' of punishment, analyzing whether the law
under challenge. viewed rn trrms of the type and severity of
burdens uupm,ed. reasonably can be said to further legislative
purposes oth<-'r than punitive .a" Cummings v. Missouri,
,,. I u faC't, 11 n•marn,- uu~t>ttled whetht'r th<' material;; in question are
Ill' prop<'l'1) of ,1ppdlant or of the Govl'rnment. See n. - , supra.
rn l 11 d<'tPrm1m11g whether p111utive or nonpunitive objectives underlie
1
1 law, [ 111ted State.~ \
Rrvtl'ri e:-;tablii;hed that punishment is not re•t net Pd JHm•I\ to rPt nbut1011 tor past events, but may mclude inflicting
dc•pnvatloll>- 011 "om1· blamc•worth~· or tniued mdividual in order to
'm•w111 ht~ futurp m1:-;<'011duct
:31-il U S., at 458-459. This view is
·ou:-;1,-t1•11t with the• trad1t1onal purpose:; of criminal punishment, which

~
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supra, at 319'--320; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193194 (1898) ; Dent v. West V'irgin-ia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (Warren, C. J.);
Kennedy v. Mendo.za-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169
( 1963) . Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not
appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of
the decisiomnakers.
Application of the functional approach to this case leads
to re,iectio1 of appellant's ar ument that the Act rests u on
1s ameworthiness and
a cull •res,,1011;;1,I .1ett, 1wuuon o
Ii < t>sire to pums 1 him.
or, as o e previous y, see supra,
at ---, 1eg1timatf'~ Just1fications for passage of the Act are
r0adily apparent First, in the face of the Nixon-Sampson
agreement winch expressly contemplated the destruction of
some of appellant's materials, Congress stressed the need to
preserw "li]nformatiou included in the ma.terials of former
President Nixon [that] is needed to complete the prosecutions
of Watergate-related crimes." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess .. at 2 (1974). Second, again referring to the
• ixon-::;;ampso11 agreement, Congress expressed its desire to
safeguard the "public mterest in gaining appropriate access
to materials of the .Nixon Presidency which are of general
h1stoncal s1g11ifica11ce. The information in these materials
also mclude a prrveutivr a.,pect. See, e. g., H. Packer, The Limits of
the C'nmrnal Sauct10u 4iHH ( 1968). In Brown the element of punishment wa~ found m t lw fact that " the purpose of the statute before
11:-, i8 to pmge thP gov<>rnmg boards of labor unions of those whom
CongrP8;; rt>ga rd,; a:- guilty of 8Ubv<>rsivc acts and a:;sociations and therefon· unfit Io fill I11111011] po~1tiom; . . . ." 381 U. S., at 460. Thus,
,Bro11•11 ll,f1 undi,-lurbrd the requirement that one who complains of being
attm11t<'d m11:-;t c•,-tabh:,;lt that tllf' legi:;lature's action constituted punishmt·111 and uor nwrrly thr lrgitimate rrgulation of conduct. r ndeed, just
thr<'P 'frrm;; lat<·r, l'mted States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 n. 30
(l9(:IK). al:,;o anthor<'d by Chirf .Ju~tice Warren, reconfirmrd thr need
to <•xamrnc· tlw purpo:-;e:-; :,;t•rvPd by a purported bill of attainder in
l<>tP1m111i1111. wlwthPl· 1t 1n !"art reprrs0nts a punitive law.

)
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will be of great value to the political health and vitality of
the United States." Ibid.4° Indeed, these same objectives
are stated in the text of the Act itself, § 104 (a) , 44 U. S. C.
~ 2107 ( Supp. 1976) , where Congress instructs the General
Services Administration to promulgate regulations that furt her these ends and at the same time protect the constitutional
and legal rights of any individual adversely affected by the
Administrator's retention of appellant's m11,terials.
E valuated in terms of these asserted purposes, the law
plainly mus
held to be a11 act of non unitive le islati
eg1slat1011 c cs1gne to guarantee the availpohcyrnaking.
a'61l[ty ~idence for use at criminal trials is a fair exercise of
Congress rel)onsibility to t he "due process of law in the fair
admimstrati n of justice," United States v. Nixo n, 418 U. S.
683, 713 (19 4), and to the functioning of our adversary legal
~ystern whic depends upon the availability of relevant evidence in car ying out its commitments both to fair play and
to the disc very of truth within the bounds set by law.
Branzbury v Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 ( 1972) ; Blackmer v.
United Stat s, 284 U. S. 421 , 438 ( 1932) ; Blair v. United
States, 250 . S. 273, 28 1 (1919 ). Similarly, Congress' interest rn an~I expansive authority to act in preserv11tion of
monuments and records of historical value to our national
heritage are fully established. United S tates v. Gettysburg
Electnc R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 ( 1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278
l' ;-; gn ( H)29) . 11 A legislature t hus acts responsibly in
111

.

.

Tlw tlPnaH; point Pd to t hr8e 8ame object ive,; in nullifying the Nixon.:ltunp~on agn•eeen t : "[lJ To begin with , prosecut ors, defendant:; and
tlw conrb pror1bly would be depri ved of cm cial evidence bearing on
rlw tlc•frndant~ mnorence or guilt of thr W aterga te crime8 for which
thry ,;tancl arr1srt!. 121 Moreover, the American p eople would be denied
full acce:;:; to all fact:; about the Watergat e affair, and the efforts of
Congrn~8, the Jxecutive brnnch, and others t o take measures to prevent
a rern rrf'ncc• of the Watergatf' a ffai r may be inhibited ." S. Rep. No,
93-1181. 9:3d Cong., 2d Se:ss., at 4 (1974) .
11
ThP8C' cnsoo upheld f'xercise:; of the powf'r of eminent domain in
1H P:-t>rv111~ h1:,;tor1ral monumrnts and thr like fac ilit ies for p u blic use,
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seeking to accomplish either of these objectives. Neither
supports an implication of a legislature policy designed to
inflict punishment on au individual.
3

l

A third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motivational one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a
congressional intent to punish. See, e. g., United States v.
Lovett, supra, at 308-314; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
supra, at 169-170. The District Court unequivocally found
that "l t Ihere is 110 evidenCJ:. presented to us, nor is there any
to be f;und in t~
gisla~ ~
rd.toii1dic&e that ~ ongress' design was to impose a penalty uiJon M r. Nixon ...•
a~ pu msh'n1e1rtr•;:"' ail;geJ';tongao'ings ~ .
The legislative
history leads to only one conclusion. namely, that the Act
b<'fo~·e us is r~gulatory and_ not !:unitive in character.'' 408 ~
F. Supp., at 373 (emphasis omitted). We find 119 cogent
.. ~
n•ason for disagreeing with this conclusion.
~ ·. ,. .both Senate and House Committee reports, in for~
mally explaining their reasons for urging passage of the Act,
expressed no interest in punishing or penalizing appellant.
Rather. the reports justified the Act by reference to objectives
that fairly and properly lie within Congress' legislative competence : preserving the availability of judicial evidence and
of historically relevaut materials. Supra, at-. More specifically. it seems clear that the actions of both Houses of
Congress were predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo
the recently negotiated Nixon-Sampson depository agreenwnt. tlw terms of which departed from the practice of formerPresidents 111 that they expressly contemplated the destruc-

-rrr;t,

Tlit• powrr of Pminc•nt domain . l1owPv(•r, i:s not rf':stricted to iangible
pro p<•r1y or rea11y but l'Xtl'nd,; both to intangiblf's and to personal effects·
1, iuvolvPd ht>rP
Se<• C'mcinnati v. Louisville & Nash R. Co., 223 U . S~
'JOO. 400 (1912) Pm;ter v, U'l1.ited,' States, 473 F . 2d 1329 (CA5 1973).
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tion of certain Presidential materials. 42 Along these lines;
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, supra, at 2, stated: "Despite the
overriding public interest in preserving these materials ...
[the] Administrator of General Services entered into an agreement ... which, if implemented, could seriously limit access
to these records ... and result in the destruction of a substantial portion of them." See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181,
supra, at 4. The relevant committee reports thus cast no as- ·
persions on appellant's personal conduct and contain no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment. Rather, they focus al most exclusively on the meaning
and effect of an agreement recently announced by the General
Services Administration which most Members of Congress
perceived to be inconsistent with the public interest.
Nor do the floor debates 011 the measure suggest that Congress was intent on encroaching on the judicial function of
punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. When one
of the opponents of the legislatio11, mischaracterizing the safeguards embodied in the bill ,'" stated that it is "one which partakes of the characteristics of a bill of attainder . .. ." 120
Cong. Rec. 33872 (1974) (Sen. Hruska). A key sponsor of the
measure responded by expressly denying any intention of determining appellant's blameworthiness or imposing punitive
sanctions :
" The bill does not contain a word to the effect that
Mr. Nixon is guilty of auy violation of the law. It does
Particularly trouble;:;ome was the provision of the agreement requiring the automatic destruction of tape recordings upon appellant's
'1.eath. See note, s·urn·a.
4 ~ In condemning the enactment as a bill of attainder, Senator Hruska
. argued that the bill seizes appellant 's papers and distributes them to
'1itigan1s without affording appellant the opport11ntiy judicially "to assert
a defense or privilrge to the prod11etion of the papers." 120 Cong. Rec.
aasn (1974) . In fact , thr Art l'Xprc::;:;Jy recognizes appellant's right
to present all such defc·n~e~ and privilege:; through an expedited judicial
proceedings. See inf1·a, at · -···
42
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not inflict apy punishment on h,m. So it has no more
relation to a bill of attainder . . . . than my style of
pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of
Sheba." Id., at 33959-33960 (Sen. Ervin).
Tn this respect, the Act stands in marked contrast to tha:t
rnvalidated in United States v. Lovett, supra, at 312, where
a House Report expressly characterized individuals as "subversive ... and unfit ... to continue in Government employment." H. R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1943).
WP, of course. do not suggest that such a formal legislative
a1111ou11ceml'11 t of moral blamC'worthiness of punishment is
necessary to au unlawful bill of attainder. United States v.
Lovett, supra, at 316. But the decided absence from the legislativC' history of any congressional sentiments expressive of
this purpose is probative of non-punitive intentions anq
largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of
attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking
to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it
expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge-or, worse
still, lynch mob. Cf. Z. Chafee, supra, at 161. 44 No such
legislative overreaching is involved here.
We also agree with the District Court that ''specific aspects of the Act . . . just do not square with the claim
that the Act was a punitive measure." 408 F. Supp., at
373. Whereas appellant complains that the Act has for
some two years deprived him of control over the materials
in question. Brief for Appellant 140. the Congress placed the
materials under the auspices of the General Services Admin44

The Court Ill United States v. Brown, supra. at 444, referred to
Hamilton ':; conrC'rn that legislature:; might cater to the "moment ar~· pa~::;ion~ " of a " free people in times of hC'at and violence . . . . "
1n this case, it 1~ obviou:s thnt the ::;11pporten; of this Act :;teadfastly
:ivoideu 111flami11g or appealing to any "pa:ssions" in the community.
l ndc•C'd , rather t han :,;pek expediently to impose punishment and to
circ11111vC'nt the C'ourt:,; , Congre::;s expressly providC'd for access to the
1udic1a ry for rei'ol11tion of any C'on:;titutional and legal rights appellant
n ught a~:;<'rr ~- Ri>p 93-1 lRl , supra, at 2-3, 4-5, 5-6.
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istrat1ou . ~ 101. 44 U. S. C. ~ 2107 (Supp. 1976), the same
agency desig11 ::i t<>d in the Nixo11-Sampson agreement as depository of th(' docu111cnts for a minimum three-year period, App011dix 40. Whereas appellant complains that the Act
<kpri V<'i'- Ii i111 of "rc•ady access" to the materials, Brief for Ap1wllan t 140. tlw .\et provides that "Richard M. Nixon, or any
p<>rson whom lw may designate in writing, shall at all times
haV<' accPss to th<' tape records and other materials ... ," § 102
( <'). Tlw District Court correctly construed this as safeguardrng appellant's right to inspect, copy, and use the materials in
1ssu<'. 408 F. Supp., at 375. paralleling the right to "make
r<>productio us" contained in the Sampson agreement, Appendix 40. And even if we assume that there is merit in a.ppellan t's complaint that his property has been confiscated, Brief
for Appellant 140, the Act expressly provides for the payment
,f compensation in accord with co11stitutional requirements,
~ 10.1 ( c) , see S'ltpra, a t - .
Other features of the Act further belie any punitive interpr<'tatio11. In promulgating regula.tions under the Act, the
Gt'nrral RC'rvie<'s Administration is expressly directed by
( 'ongress to protect appellant's or "any party's opportunity
to ass<'rt any lrgally or unconstitutionally based right or priv1kgr
," ~ 104 (a)(5). If appellant is dissatisfied by
th<' rcgulat10ns, ~ 105 (a) not only assures district court jur1.-dict10n and J uclicial review over all his legal claims, but
commands that any such challenged asserted by appellant
''shall have priority on the docket of such court over other
eases. " The primary sponsor of the bill emphasized that this
exp<'ditcd treatment is expressly designed "to protect Mr.
Nixon's property. or other legal rights . . . ." 18 Cong. Rec,
18239 (1974) (Sen. Ervin). Finally, the Congress has ordered the General Services Administration to establish reg11\ations that recognize "the need to give to Richard M. Nixon,
,r his heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and
other matenals which a.re not likely to be related to" the
_,rt1r11latcd obJectives of the Act, § 104 (a.) (7),. While appel-
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lant obviously is not set at ease by these precautions and
safeguards, they confirm the soundness of the opinion given
the Senate by the law division of the Congressional Research
Service: " [BJ ecause the proposed bill does not impose criminal penalties or other punishment, it would not appear to
violate the Bill of Attainder Clause." 18 Cong. Rec. 18238
( 1974).'i:;

Oi1e final consideration should be mentioned in light of the
unique posture of this controversy. In determining whether
a legislature so ught to inflict punishment on an individual, it
is often useful to inquire into the existence of less burdensome
alternatives by which the Congress could have achieved its
legitimate more nonpu11itive objectives. Today, in framing
his challenge to the Act, appellant contends that such an alternative was readily available:

"If Cougress had provided that the Attorney General or
the Administrator of General Services could institute a
civil suit in an appropriate federal court to enjoin disposition . . of presidential historical materials . . . by any
person who could be shown to be an 'unreliable custodian'
or who had 'e ngaged in misconduct' or who 'would violate
a criminal prohibition,' the statute would have left to
judicial determination, after a fair proceeding, the factual
allegations of Mr. Nixon's blameworthiness." Brief for
Appellant 137.
We have 110 doubt that Congress might have selected this
course. It very WE:'11 may be, however, that Congress chose
uot to do so 011 the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry
lllto appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less punitive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For
~,. ln brirf, tlw h-gi:,;lat 1w hi,;tory of the Act offer:; a paradigm of a
'<'ongre,:, awar<> of <"011stitut10nal constraint:,; on iti; power and carefully

-<P<·long to act w11hi11 those limitation:,;. See generally Bre:st, The Con-.
:-;r1r1111ou,.; Lrg1slator'::; (,11ide to Con:stitutional. Interpretation, ·27 Stan.
t Hr>v, ,585 097,5),
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Congress no doubt was well aware that just three months
earlier, appellant had resisted efforts to involve him and his
records in the activities of the Judicial Branch, United States
v. Nixon, supra, a position apparently maintained to this
day:' 0 A rational and fairminded Congress, therefore, might
well have decided that the carefully tailored law that it
~nacted would be less objectionable to appellant than the
alternative that he today appears to endorse. To be sure, if
the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act
represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact
that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be
of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the
contrary. and the unique choice that Congress faced buttresses our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to
inflict legislative punishment as forbidden by the Constitution.
We. of course, are not blind to appellant's plea that we
recognize the social and political realities of 1974. It was a
period of political turbulence unprecedented in our history.
But this Court .is not free to in.validate acts of Congress based
upon inferences that we may be asked to draw from our
personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent
history. In judging the constitutionality of the Act, we may
only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of
Congress who voted its passage, aud to the existence or non--xistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effects.
Persuaded that none of these factors is suggestive that the
Act is a punitive bill of attainder, or otherwise facially uncon-;titutional, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
u; For example, rn hi~ depo8ition taken in this case, appellant refused
nn8WPr que8tioll>' pertaining to the accuracy and reliability of his prior
pubh<' statem<>ntH as Pre;;ident concerning the contents of the tape
n•cordings nnd othrr matrriab in issur. He invoked a claim of privilege
tnd ll>'>'Prtrd tha1 tlw questions were irrelevant to the jud.irial inquiry.
·~"t' f', (I Appc>ndix 586-590.
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title I of Pub. L. 93-526 (1974), 44 U. S. C. § 2107, the
"Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,"
directs the Administrator of General Services, an official of the
Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers
a~d tape recordings of appellan~, former President ~ichard M.
Nixon, and promulgate regulations that (1) provide for the
orderly processing and screening by Executive Branch archivists of such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant those that are personal and priva.te in nature, ~nd
(2) determine the terms and conditions upon which public
access may eventually be had to those materials that are
retained. The question for decision is whether Title I is unconstitutional on its face as a violation of ( 1) separation of
powers; (2) Presidential privilege doctrines; (3) appellant's
privacy interests; ( 4) appellant's First Amendment associational rights; or ( 5) the Bill of Attainder Clause.
On December 19, 1974, four months after appellant resigned
as President of the United States, his successor, President
Gerald R. Ford, signed Pub. L. 93-526 into law. 88 Stat.
1695-1698 ( 1974). The next day, December 20, 1974, appellant filed this action in the District Court for the District
of Columbia, which under § 105 (a) of the Act has exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain complaints challenging the Act's legal

~

)

q,. ,
.. __ ..,-.,t_f t ' ~ \

/

•

~ -}

~-

't,-,

v' ,

____.J
~~

!, - -

~
__.___

- --

,

~

75-1605-OPINION

NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

2

or constitutional validity, or that of any regulation promulgated by the Administrator. Appellant's complaint challenged the Act's constitutionality on a number of grounds and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforcement. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant
to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284. 1 Because regulations required
by § 104 of. the Act governing public access to the materials
were not yet effective, the District Court held that questions
going to the possibility of future public release under regulations yet to be published were not ripe for review. It found
that there was "no need and no justification for this
court now to reach constitutional claims directed at the
regul&,tions ... the promulgation of [ which] might eliminate,
limit or cast [ the constitutional claims] in a different light."
408 F. Supp. 321, 336 (1976). Accordingly, the District
Court limited review "to consideration of the propriety of
injunctive relief against the alleged facial unconstitutionality
of the statute," id., at 335, and, held that the challenges to
the facial constitutionality of the Act were without merit.
It therefore dismissed the complaint. Id. , at 374-375. We
noted probable jurisdiction, - U.S. (1976). We affirm.

I
The Background

The materials at issue consist of some 42 million pages of
documents and some 880 tape recordings of conversations.
Upon his resignation, iippellant directed government archivists
to pack and ship the materials to him in California. This
shipment was delayed when the Watergate Special Prosecutor
advised President Ford of his continuing need for the materials. At the same time, President Ford requested that the
Attorney General give his opinion respecting ownership of the
For proceedings prior to convention of the thi:ee-judge court, see
Nixon v. Richey, 513 F . 2d 427 (1975) , on reconsideration 513 F . 2d
430 (DC 1975) . See also Nixon v. Samp:son, 389 F . Supp. 107 (1975).
1
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materials. The Attorney General advised that the historical
practice of former Presidents and the absence of any governing statute to the contrary supported ownership in the
appellant, with a possible limited exception. 2 43 Op. Attorney General No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1974), I App., at 220-230.
The Attorney General's opinion emphasized, however, that
"[h]istorically, there has been consistent acknowledgement that Presidential materials are peculiarly affected
by a public interest which may justify subjecting the
p,bsolute ownership rights of the ex-President to certain
limitations directly related to the character of the docu:fnents' as records of government activity."
On September 8, 1974, after issuance of the Attorney General's opinion, the Administrator of General Services, Arthur
F. Sampson, announced that he had signed a depository agreement with appellant under the authority of 44 U. S. C. § 2107.
10 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1104 (1974). We shall refer
to the agreement as the Nixon-Sampson agreement. See
Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp 107, 160-162 (1975) (Appendix A). The agreement recited that appellant retained "all
legal and equitable title to the Materials, including all literary
property rights," and that the materials accordingly were to be
"deposited temporarily" near appellant's California home in an
"existing facility belonging to the United States." The agreement stated further that appellant's purpose was "to donate"
the materials to the United States "with appropriate restrictions." It was provided that all of the materials "shall be
placed within secure storage -areas to which access can be
·gained only by use of two keys," one in appellant's possession
and the other in the possession of the Archivist of the United
2 No opinion was given respecting ownership of certain permanent
files retained by the Chief Executive Clerk of the White House from
administration to administration. The Attorney General was unable
definitively to determine their status on the basis of then available
information. App. 228.

.'
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·States or members of his staff. With exceptions not material
here, appellant agreed "not to withdraw from deposit any
originals of the materials" for a period of three years, but
reserved the right to "make reproductions" and to authorize
other persons to have access on conditions prescribed by him.
After three years, appellant might exercise the "right to withdraw from deposit without formality any or all of the Materials ... and to retain ... [them] for any purpose ... " determined by him.
The Nixon-Sampson agreement treated the tape recordings
separately. They were donated to the United States "effective September 1, 1979" and meanwhile "shall remain on
deposit." It was provided however that "subsequent to September 1, 1979 the administrator shall destroy such tapes as
[Mr. Nixon] shall direct" and in any event the tapes "shall
be destroyed at the time of [his] death or on September 1,
1984, whichever event shall first occur." Otherwise the tapes
were not to be withdrawn and reproductions would be made
only by "mutual agreement." Access until September 1, 1979,
was expressly reserved to appellant, except as he might authorize access by others on terms prescribed by him.
Public announcement of the agreement was followed 10
days later, September 18, by the introduction of S. 4016 by
13 Senators in the United States Senate. The bill, which
became Pub. L. 93-526 and was designed, inter alia, to abrogate the Nixon-Sampson agreement, passed the Senate on
October 4, 1974. It was awaiting action in the House of
Representatives when on October 17, 1974, appellant filed
suit in the District Court seeking specific enforcement of the
Nixon-Sampson agreement. That action was consolidated
with other suits seeking access to Presidential materials pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. 552
(Supp. V), and also seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the agreement. Nixon v. Sampson, supra. 3 The
s The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed

.
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House passed its version of the Senate bill on December 3, 1974. Following conference committee action, both
Houses of Congress passed the conference version of S.
4016 on December 9, 1974, and President Ford signed it
into law on December 19.
II

The Act
Pub. L. 93-52G has two Titles. Title I, the challenged
"Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act" consists of §§ 101 through 106. Title II, the "Public Documents
Act," amends Chapter 33 of Title 44, United States Code, to
add §§ 3315 through 3324 thereto, and establish the National
Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal
Officials.
Section 101 (a) of Title I directs that the Administrator of
General Services, notwithstanding any other law or agreement
or understanding, (e.g., the Nixon-Sampson agreement) "shall
receive, obtain, or retain, complete possession and control of
all original tape recordings of conversations which were recorded or ca used to be recorded by any officer or employee of
the Federal Government and which" ( ! ) Involve former President Richard M. Nixon or
other individuals who, at the time of the conversa.tion
were employed by the Federal Government;
"(2) were recorded in the White House or in the office
of the President in the Executive Office Buildings located
in Washington, District of Columbia; Camp David,
any order effectuating the decision in Nixon v. Sampson pending decision
of the three-judge court whethPr under §105 (a) the instant case was to
" have priority on the docket of [the District] court over other cases,"
Nixon v. Richey, supra, 513 F . 2d, at 431, 435, 446-448. The three-judge
court was of the view that "the central purpose of Congress, in relation
to all pending litigation, is to have an early and prior determination
of the Act's constitutionality" and therefore did not request dissolution of
the stay until entry of judgment. 408 F. Supp., at 333-334, n. 10.

I
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Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, California; and
11
(3) were recorded during the period beginning January
20, 1969 and ending August 9, 1974."
Section 101 (b) provides that notwithstanding any such
agreement or understanding, the Administrator also "shall
receive, retain, or make reasonable efforts to obtain, complete.
possession and control of all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts, and other objects and materials which constitute the Presidential historical materials [as defined by 44
U. S. C. § 2101] of Richard M. Nixon , covering the period
beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974.''
Section 102 (a) prohibits destruction of the tapes or materials except as may be provided by law, and § 102 (b) makes
them available (giving priority of access to the Office of
Watergate Special Prosecutor) in response to court subpoena
or other legal process, or for use in judicial proceedings. This
was made subject however, "to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the Federal Government or any person may
invoke .... " Section 102 (c) affords appellant, or any person
designated by him in writing, access to the recordings and materials for any purpose consistent with the Act "subsequent
and subject to the regulations" issued by the Administrator
under § 103. Section 102 (d) provides for access according to
§ 103 regulations by any agency or department in the Executive Branch for lawful government use. Section 103 requires
custody of the tape recordings and materials to be maintained
in Washington except as may otherwise be necessary to carry
out the Act, and directs that the Administrator promulgate
regulations necessary to assure their protection from loss or
destruction and to prevent access to them by unauthorized
persons.
Section 104, in pertinent part, directs the Administrator to
promulgate regulations governing public access to the tape
recordings and materials. Section 104 (a) requires submis-
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·sion of proposed regulations to each House of Congress, the
regulations to take effect under § 104 (b )( 1) at the end of 90
legislative days unless either House or Senate adopts a resolution disapproving them. The regulations must take into
~ccount seven factors specified in § 104 (a), namely:
" ( 1) the need to provide the public with the full truth,
at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses of governmental power popularly identified under the generic term
'Watergate.'
"(2) the need to make such recordings and materials
available for use in judicial proceedings;
"(3) the need to prevent general access, except in accordance with appropriate procedures established for use in
judicial proceedings, to information relating to the Nation's security;
"(4) the need to protect every individual's right to a
fair trial;
"(5) the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert
any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege
which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such
recordings and materials;
"(6) the need to provide public access to those materials
which have general historical significance, and which are
not likely to be related to the need described in paragraph (1); and
"(7) the need to give to Richa.rd M. Nixon, or his heirs,
for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other
materials which are not likely to be related to the need
described in paragraph ( 1) and are not otherwise of
general historical significance."
Section 105 (a) vests the District Court for the District
of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction not only to hear
constitutional challenges to the Act, but also to hear challenges to the validity of any regulation, and to decide actions
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involving questions of title, ownership, custody, possession or
control of any tape or materials, or involving payment of any
award of just compensation required by § 105 (c) when a
decision of that court holds that any individual has been deprived by the Act of private property without just compensation. Section 105 (b) is a severability provision providing
that any decision invalidating a provision of the Act or a
regulation shall not a.fleet the validity or enforcement oi
any other provision or regulation. Section 106 authorizes
appropriation of such sums as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of the Title.

III
The Scope of the Inquiry
The District Court correctly focused on the Act's requirement that the Administrator of General Services administer
the tape recordings and materials placed in his custody only
under regulations promulgated by him providing for the orderly
processing of such materials for the purpose of returning
to appellant such of them as are personal and private
in nature, and of determining the terms and conditions
upon which public access may eventually be had to those
remaining in the Government's possession. The District
Court also noted that in designing the regulations, the
Administrator must consider the need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant and other individuals against
infringement by the processing itself or, ultimately, by public
access to the materials retained. 408 F. Supp., at 334-340.
This construction is plainly required by the wording of §§ 103
and 104.4
4 This interpretat ion has abundant support in the legislative history
of the Act . Senator Javits, onr of the sponsors of S. 4016 stated that
t he criteria of § 104 (a )
"endeavor to protect due process for individuals who may be named
in the papers as well as any privilege which may be involved in the

'I
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Regulations implementing § § 102 and 103, which did not re.
quire submission to Congress, and which regulate access and
screening by government archivists, have been promulgated,
40 Fed. Reg. 2669 (1975); 41 CFR § 105-63 (1976). Public
access regulations that must be submitted to Congress under
§ 104 (a) have not, however, become effective. The initial set
proposed by the Administrator was disapproved pursuant to
§ 104 (b)(l) by Senate Resolution. S. Res. 244, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. S15803-S15800 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1975). The Senate also disapproved seven provisions of a proposed second set, although that set had been
withdrawn. S. Res. 428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122
Cong. Rec. S5290-S5291 (daily ed., April 8, 1976). The
House disapproved six provisions of a third set. H. R. Res.
1505, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Administrator is of
the view that regulations cannot become effective except as a
package and consequently is preparing a fourth set for submission to Congress. Brief for Federal Appellees, 8-9, n. 4.
The District Court therefore concluded that as no regulapapers, and of course the necessary access of the former President
himself.
"In short, the argument that the bill authorizes absolute unrestricted
, public access does not stand up in the face of the criteria and the requirement for the regulations which we have inserted in the bill today." 120
Cong. Rec. S. 182.44 (daily ed .. Oct. 3, 1974) .
Senator . Nelson, the bill's draftsman, agreed that the primary purpose
to provide for the American people an historical record of the Watergate
events "should not override all regard for the rights of the individual
to privacy and a fair trial." Id., at S. 18236. Senator Ervin, also a
sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated:
"Nobody's rights are affected by this bill, because it provides, as far
as privacy is concerned, that the regulations of the Administrator shall
take into account . . . the opportunity to assert any legally or con'stitutionally based right which would prevent or otherwise limit access
to the tape recordings and other materials." Id., at S. 18329 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1974). See also id., at S. 18320 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id.,
at H. 11209 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Brademas).

I
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tions under § 104 had yet taken effect, and as such regulations once effective were explicitly made subject to judicial
review under § 105, the court could consider only the injury
to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly
worked by the taking of his Presidential materials into custody for screening by government archivists. 408 F. Supp., at
339-340. Citiug WatBe\<I, v. B'ttck, 313 U. 8. 387, 402 (1941),
Judge McGowan, writing for the District Court, 408 F. Sapp~
&t 3367 stated:
"No one c.a n foresee the varying applications of these
separate provisions which conceivably might be made. A
law which is constitutional as applied in one manner may
still contravene the Constitution as applied in another.
Since all contingencies of attempted enforcement cannot
be envisioned in advance of those applications, courts have
in the main found it wiser to delay passing upon the
constitutionally of all the separate phases of comprehensive statute until faced with cases involving particular
provisions as specifically applied to persons who. claim to
be injured. Passing upon the possible significance of
the manifold provisions of a broad statute in advance of
efforts to apply the separate provisions is analogous to l-f0%' f • pvff · >d
rendering an advisory opinion upon a statute or a de- ?i" ) ~ I A } ~ ~
claratory judgment upon hypothetical case." _,l
(
],~
_
, ~' '!> () S, 3!i"7.i
Only this Term we applied this principle in an analogous
situation in declining to adjudicate the constitutionality of
regulations of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection: Act that were in process of revision, stating, "For [ the
Court] to review regulations not yet promulgated, the final
form of which has been only hinted at, would be wholly
U. S. - , (May 2, 1977).
novel." EPA v. Brown, See also Thorpe v. Ho,using Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 283-284
(1969) ; Rosenberg v. Fleute, 374 U. S. 449 , 451 (1963);
United States v. Rames, 362 U.S. 17, 20- 22 (1960),..__ Harmon
v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579 ( 1958) . We too, therefore, limit

'70 7- (I q •I)).
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pur consideration of the merits of appellant's several constitu::
tional claims to those addressing the facial validity of thEJ
provisions of the Act requiring the Administrator to take
the recordings and materials ipto the Government's custoqy
subject to screening by Ggvermnent archivists.
The constitutional questions to be decided are, of cour~«;i,
of considerable importance. They touch the relationship
between two of the three coordinate branches of the Feder1,tl
Government, the Executive and the Legislative, and the relationship of appellant to his Government. They arise in a
context unique in the history of the Presidency and present
issues that this Court has had no occasion heretofore to address. Judge McGowan, speaking for the District Court,
comprehensively canvassed all the claims, and in a thorough
opinion, concluded that none had merit. Our independent
examination of the issues brings us to the same conclusion,
authough our analysis differs somewhat on some questions.

IV
Claims Concerning the, Autonomy of the Executive Branch
The Act was the product of joint adion by the Congress
and President Ford, who signed the bill into law. It is
therefore urged by intervenor-appellees that, in this circumstance, the case does not truly present a controversy concerning the separation of powers, or a controversy concerning the
Presidential privilege of confidentiality, because, it is argued,
such claims may be asserted only by incumbents who are
presently responsible to the American people for their action.
As shall be seen, we need not resolve these contentions,
for even assuming that appellant, as a former President, may
be heard to assert that joint action by the Congress and the
incumbent President will upset the constitutional balance of
governmenta.l powers, we hold that neither his separation of
powers claim nor his claim of breach of constitutional privilege
has merit.
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Appellant argues broadly that the Act encroaches upon
Presidential prerogative to control internal operations of the
Presidential office and therefore offends the autonomy of the
Executive Branch. The argument is divided into separate
put interrelated parts.
First, appellant contends that Congress is without power to
delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the
decision whether to discl<;>se Presidential materials and to
prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure. To do so,
appellant contends, constitutes, without more, an impermissible interference by the Legislative Branch into matters
inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch.
Second, appellant contends, somewhat more narrowly,
that by authorizing the Administrator to take custody of all
Presidential materials in a "broad, undifferentiated'' manner,
and in authorizing future publication except where a privilege
is affirmatively established, the Act offends the presumptive
confidentia1ity of Presidential communications recognized in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). He argues that
the District Court erred in two respects in rejecting this
contention. Initially, he contends that the District Court
erred in distinguishing incumbent from former Presidents in
evaluating appellant's claim of confidentiality. Appellant
asserts that, unlike the very &pecific privilege protecting
aga.i nst disclosure of state secrets and sensitive information
concerning military or diplomatic matters, which appellant
concedes may be asserted only by an incumbent President,
a more generalized Presidential privilege survives the termination of the President•advisor relationship much as the
attorney•client privilege survives the relationship that creates it. Appellant further~ argues that the District Court
erred in applying a balancing test to his claim of Presi•
dential privilege and in concluding that, notwithstanding
the fact that some of the materials might legitimately be
included within a claim of Presidential confidentiality, sub-

-5
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13tantial public interes_ts outweighed and justified the limited
inroads on Presidential confidentiality necessitated by the
Act's provision for government custody and screening of th~
piaterials. Finally, appellant contends that the Act's authorization of the process of screening the materi,a.ls itself violate~
the privilege and will chill the future exercise of constitutionally protected executive functions, thereby impairing th~
ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice necesBttfY to the conduct of their constitutionally i,:nposed dutieJ,
A

Separation of Powers
We reject at the outset appellant's argument that the Act's
regulation of the disposition of Presidential materials within
the Executive Branch constitutes, without more, a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. Neither President
Ford not President Carter supports this claim. The Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when
President Ford signed the Act into law, and the administration of President Carter, acting through the Solicitor
General, vigorously supports affirmance of the District Court's
judgment sustaining its constitutionality. Moreover, the control over the materials remains in the Executive Branch. The
Administrator of the General Services Administration, who
must promulgate a.nd administer the regulations that are the
keystone of the statutory scheme, is himself an official of the
Executive Branch, appointed by the President. The career
archvists appointed to do the initial screening for the purpose
of selecting out and returning to appellant his private and
personal papers similarly are Executive Branch employees.
Appellant's argument is in any event based on an interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine inconsistent with
the origins of that doctrine, recent decisions of the Court, and
the contemporary realities of our political system. True, it
has been said that "each of the three general departments of

'
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government [must remain] entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the
others . . . . " Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 629-630 (1935), and that "[t]he sound application
of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another
who is master there." Id., at 630. See also O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U. S. 516 ( 1933); Springer v. Government
of the Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 201 (1928).
But the more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in
the Federalist papers and later of Mr. Justice Story 5 was
expres3ly affirmed by this Court only three years ago in
Un1:ted States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). There the
same broad argument concerning the separation of powers
was made by appellant in the context of opposition to a
subpoena duces tecum of the Watergate Special Prosecutor
5

Madis:m in The Federalist No. 47, reviewing the origin of the separation of powers doctrine, commented that " [ o] n the slightest view of the
British constitution we must perceive, that the legislative, executive and
judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct
from each other." The Federalist 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). He continued, remarkng that Montesquieu, the "oracle" always consulted on
the subject, id., at 324,
"did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial, agency
in, or no control over the acts of rach other. His meaning, as his own
words import . . . can amount to no more than this, that where the
whole power of our drpartment is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constjtution, are subverted." Id., at 325-326 (emphasis
in original).
Similarly, Justice Story wrote:
"[W]hen we speak of a separation of the three great departments
of the government, and maintain that thr Eeparation is indispensable to
public liberty, we are to undn~tand this maxim in a limited sense. It is
not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate
and distinct, and have no common link of connrction or dependence, the
nne upon the other, in the slightest degree." I J. Story, Comm~aries on
· li<' Com;titution § 525 (M Bigelow ed . 1905).
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for certain Presidential tapes and documents of value to a
pending criminal investigation. Although acknowledging
that each branch of the Government has the duty initially
to interpret the Constitution for itself, and that its interpretation of its powers is due great respect from the other
branches, 418 U. S., at 703, the Court squarely rejected
the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete
division of authority between the three branches. Rather,
the unanimous Court essentially embraced Justice Jackson's
view, expressed in his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & t
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 ( 1952):
"In designing the structure of our Government and
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among the
three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution
sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute
independence." 418 U. S., at 707 (emphasis supplied).
Like the District Court, we therefore find that appellant's
argument rests upon an "archaic view of the separation of
powers as requiring three airtight departments of government,"
408 F. Supp., at 342.6 Rather, in determining whether the
Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordina.te
branches, the pro
focuses on the extent to which
it prevents the
rom accomplis in its
unctions. United tates v. ixon,
supra,
.,
nly where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.
Ibid.

l

See also, e. g., 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1.09 (1958);
G. Gunther, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 400 (9th ed. 1975);
L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 28-30 (1965); Cox,
Executive Privilege, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1387-1391 (1974); Ratner,
Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination, and the Separation of Powers
Illmsion, 22 U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 92-93 (1974).
0
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It is highly relevant that the Act provides for cus.
tody of the materials by officials of the Executive Branch.
and that employees of the Executive Branch shall have Mcess
to the materials only "for lawful Government use, subject to
the [4-dministrator's] regulations." § 102 ( d); 41 CFR
§§ 105-63.205, 105-63.206, and 105-63.302. While the materials may be made available for use in judicial proceedings,
this provision is expressly qualified by any rights, defense, or
privileges that any person may invoke including, of course, a
valid claim of executive privilege. United States v. Nixon,
supra. Similarly, although some of the materials may eventu ..
ally be made available for public access, the Act expressly
recognizes the need both "to protect any party's opportunity to
assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege,"
§ 104 ( a) ( 5), and to return purely private materials to appe)lan t, § 104 (a) ( 7) . These provisions plainly guard against
disclosures barred by any defenses or privileges available
to appellant or the Executive Branch.7 And appellant himself concedes that the Act "does not make the presidential
materials available to the Congress-except insofar as Congressmen are members of the public and entitled to access
when the public has it." Brief for Appellant 119. The
Executive Branch remains in full control of the Presidential
materials, and the Act facially is designed to ensure that the
materials can be released only when release is not barred by
some applicable privilege that inheres in that branch.
Thus, whatever are the future possibilities for constitutional
conflict in the promulgation of regulations respecting public
access to particular documents, nothing contained in the Act
7 The District Court correctly interpreted the Act to require meaningful
notice to appellant of archival decisions that might bring into play rights
secured by § 104 (a ) (5) . 408 F. Supp ., at 340 n. 23. Such notice is required by t he Admini;;trat or's RegulatiOJ}.i_ 41 CFR § 105-63.205, which provide: "The Administrator of General Services or his designated agent will
provide former Pre::;ident Nixon or his designat ed attorney or agent prior
notice of, and allow him to be p resent during, each authorized access."
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renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and,.
therefore, unconstitutional on its face. And, of course, there
is abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive
Branch. See, e. g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C.
§ 552 (Supp. V); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S. C. § 552 (a)
(Supp. V) ; the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. \
94-409, 90 Stat. 1241, adding 5 U. S. C. § 552b; the Federal
Records Act, 44 U. S. C. § 2101 et seq.; and a variety of
other statutes, e. g., 13 U. S. C. §§ 8-9 (census data);
26 U. S: C. §6103 (tax returns). Such regulation of
material generated in the Executive Branch has never been
considered invalid as an invasion of its autonomy. Cf. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 83
(1973); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U. S. 255 (197~). 8 Similar
8 We S<'e no reason to engage in the debate whether appellant has
~egal title to the materials. See Brief for Appellant 90. Such an inquiry
is irrelevant for present purposes because § 105 (c) assures appellant
of just compensation if his private property is taken, and, even if legal
title is his, the materials are not thereby immune from regulation.
It has been accepted at least since Mr. Justice Story's opinion in Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 347 ( 1841) that regardless of where legal
title lies, "from the nature of the public service, or the character of
documents, embracing historical, military, or diplomatic information,
it may be· the right, and even the duty, of the government, to give them
publicity, even against the will of the writers." Appellant's suggestion
that the Folsom principle does not go beyond materials concerning national security and current government business is negated by Mr. Justice
Story's emphasis that it also extended to materials "embracing historical . .. information ." Id., at 347. (Emphasis added.) Significantly,
no such limitation was suggested in the Attorney General's opinion to
President Ford. Although indicating a view that the materials belonged to apprllant, the opinion acknowledged that "Presidential materials" without qualification "a re peculiarly affected by a public interest"
which may justify subj ecting ·' the absolute ownership rights" to certain
"limitations directly related to the character of the documents as records
of government activity." App. 220--230.
Of coiirse if tide is found to be in the Government rather thaw.

I??
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congressional power to regulate Executive Branch documents
exists in this instance, a power that is augmented by the
important interests that the Act seeks to attain. See infra,
at 23-25.
B

Presidential Privilege
Having concluded that the separation of powers principle
is not violated by the Administrator's taking custody and
screening appellant's papers, we next consider the claim that A.
Presidential privilege shields these records from archival
scrutiny. We start with what was established in United
States v. Nixon, supra-that the privilege is a qualified one. 0
Appellant had argued in that case that in camera mspection
by the District Court of Presidential documents and ma.terials
subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor would itself violate
the privilege without regard to whether the documents were
protected from public disclosure. The Court disagreed, stating that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the
generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified
PreEidential privilege . . . ." 10 418 U. S., at 706. The
appellant, then Congress' authority to legislate under the Property Clause,
Art. IV, § 3, is clear. That clause has consistently been given an "expansive reading." Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 536 (1976).
9 Like the District Court, we do not distinguish between the qualified
"executive" privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon and the
"Presidential" privilege to which appellant refers, except to note that
appellant does not argue that the privilege he claims extends beyond
the privilege recoguized in that case. Sec 408 F. Supp., at 343 n. 24.
10 Unit , d States v. Nixon recognized that there is a legitimate governmental intere.,t in the confidentiality of communications between high
government officials, e. g., those who advise the President, and that
" [h]uman experience teaches that thosr who expect public dissemination
of their remarks may wrll temper candor with concern for appearances
and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking
process." Id., at 705.

~
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Court recognized that the privilege of confidentiality of
Presidential communications derives from the supremacy of the
Executive Branch within its assigned area of constitutional
responsibilities," .,cbut distinguished a President's "broad,
undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such [communications]" from the more particularized and less qualified privilege relating to the need "to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets .... " Ibid. The Court held that in the case of the
general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications, its importance must be balanced against the inroads
of the privilege upon the effective functioning of the Judicial
Branch. This balance was struck against the claim of privilege in that case because the Court determined that the
intrusion into the confidentiality of Presidential communications resulting from in camera inspection by the District
Court, "with all the protection that a District Court will be
obliged to provide," would be minimal and therefore that
the claim was outweighed by "[t]he impediment that an
absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the
primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch . . . ."
Id., at 706-707.
Unlike United States v. Nixon, in which appellant asserted a claim of absolute Presidential privilege against inquiry by the coordinate Judicial Branch, this case initially
involves appellant's assertion of a privilege against the very
Executive Branch in whose name the privilege is invoked.
The nonfederal appellees rely on this apparent anomaly to contend that only an incumbent President can assert the privilege
Indeed, the opinion noted, 418 U. S., at 705 n. 15, that government
confidentiality hns been a cornwn from the time of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, the mretings of which were conducted in private,
1 M. Farrand, The Rrcords of tlw Frdeml Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv,
and the records of which were sraled for more than 30 years after
the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., Res. 8 (1818).
Sec generally C. Warren, The Making of the Corn;titution 134-139 (1937).
11
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of the Presidency. Acceptance of that proposition would,
of course, end this inquiry. The contention draws on United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 7- 8 (1953) , where it wa.,
said that the privilege "belongs to the Government and
mwst be asserted by it: it can neither be claimed nor waived
by a private party." The District Court, believed that this
statement was strong support for the contention, but found
resolution of the issue unnecessary. 408 F. Supp., at 343345. It sufficed, said the District Court, that the privilege,
if available to a former President, was at least one that
"c~ries much less weight than a claim asserted by the.l_
....< tbo i!QWador viov.r, tthd we adopt ib
It is true that only the incumbent is charged with performance of the executive duty under the Constitution. And
an incumbent may be inhibited in disclosing confidences of
a predecessor when he believes that the effect may be to
discourage candid presentation of views by his contemporary advisors. Moreover, to the extent that the privilege
serves as a shield for executive officials against burdensorpe
requests for information which might interfere with the proper
performance of their duties, see United States v. Nixon, supra,
418 U. S., at 714; cf. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, ~21 U.S . 491 , 501-503 (1975); Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U. S. 82, 84-85 (1967) (per curiam), a former President
is in less need of it than an incumbent. In addition, there
are obvious political checks against an incumbent's abuse of
the privilege.
Nevertheless, we think that the Solicitor General states
the sounder view, and we adopt it A
"This Court held in United States v. Nixon, [418 U. S.
683 (1974)] that the privilege is necessary to provide the
confidentiality required for the President's conduct of
office. Unless he can give his advisers some assurance of
confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive
the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon

.,t..,V'~
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which effective discharge of his duties depends. The confidentiality necessary to this exchange cannot be measured
by the few months or years between the submission of
the information and the end of the President's tenure;
the privilege is not for the benefit of the President as an
individual, but for the benefit of the Republic. Therefore the privilege survives the individual President's
tenure." Brief for Federal Appellees 33.
At the same time, however, the fact that neither President
Ford nor President Carter supports appellant's claim argues
against his contention that the Act impermissibly intrudes
into the executive function and the needs of the Executive
Branch. This necessarily follows, for it must be presumed
that the incumbent President is vitally concerned with and
in the best position to assess the present and future needs
of the Executive Branch, and to support invocation of the
privilege accordingly.
The appellant may legitimately assert the Presidential
privilege, of course, only as to those materials whose contents
fall within the scope of the privilege recognized in United
States v. Nixon, supra. In that case the Court held that the
privilege is limited to communications "in performance of
[a President's] responsibilities," 418 U. S., at 711, "of his
office," id., at 713, and made "in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions," id., at 708. Of the estimated
42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings whose
custody is at stake, the District Court concluded that the
appellant's claim of .12residential privilege could apply at most
to the 200,000 itemswith which the appellant was personally
familiar.
The appellant bases his claim of Presidential privilege in
this case on the assertion that the potential disclosure of
communications given to the appellant in confidence would
adversely affect the ability of future Presidents to obtain
the candid advice necessary for effective decisionmaking.

4) ~
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We are called upon upon to adjudicate that cla.im, however,
only with respect to the process by which the materials
will be screened and catalogued by professional archivists.
For any eventual public access will be governed by the
guidelines of § 104, which direct the Administrator to take
into account "the need to protect any party's opportunity
to assert any constitutionally based right or privilege," § 104
(a)( 5), and the need to return purely private materials to
the appellant, § 104 (a) (7).
In view of these specific directions, there is no reason
to believe that the restriction on public access ultimately
established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve
executive confidentiality. An absolute barrier to all outside
disclosure is not practically or constitutionally necessary. As
the careful research by the Djstrict Court clearly demonstrates, there has never been an expectation that the confidences of the Executive Office are absolute and _unyielding.
All former Presidents since President Hoover have deposited
their papers in Presidential libraries (an example appellant
has said he intended to follow) for governmental preservation and eventual disclosure. 12 The screening processes for
~orting materials for lodgment in these libraries also involved
comprehensive review by archivists, often involving materials upon which access restrictions ultimately have been
The opinion of the District Court found that, in the Hoover Library,
there are no restrictions on Presidential papers, although some restrictions
exist with respect to personal and private material, and in the Roosevelt
Library, less than 0.5% of the materials are restricted. There is no
evidence in the reocrd as to the percentage of materials currently under
restriction in the Truman or Eisenhower Libraries, but in the Kennedy
Library, 85% of the material has been processed, and of the processed
materials, only 0.6% is under donor (as distinguished from securityrelated) restriction. In the Johnson Library, review of nonclassified
material is virtually complete, and more than 99% of all nonsecurity
classified materials arc unrestricted. In each of the Presidential ¼ibraries,
provision has been made for the removal of the re$trictions with th~
_passage of time, 408 F, Stipp,, at 346 n, 31,
12
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imposed. 408 F. Supp., at 347. The expecjt\ ion of the
confidentiality of executive communications thus has always
been limited and subject to erosion over time after an
administration leaves office.
We are thus left with the bare claim that the mere
screening of the materials by the arcfiivists·w1h impermissibly
interfere with candid communication of views by Presidential advisors. 13 We agree with the District Court that, .thus
framed, the question is readily resolved. The screening constitutes a very limited intrusion by personnel in the Executive
Branch sensitive to executive concerns. These very personnel
have performed the identical task in each of the Presidential
){ibraries, without any suggestion that such activity has in
any way interfered with executive confidentiality. Indeed
in light of this consistent historical practice, past and present
Aside from the public access eventually to be provided under § 104,
the Act mandates two other access routes to the materials. First, under
§ 102(b), access is available in accordance with lawful process served upon
the Administrator. As we have noted, see n. 7, supra, the appellant is to
be advised prior to any access to the materials, and he is thereafter free
to review the specific materials at issue, see§ 102 (c); 41 CFR § 105-63.301/\.
in order to determine whether to assert any rights, privileges, or defenses.
Section 102 (b) expressly conditions ultimate access by way of lawful proce8s upon the right of appellant to invoke any rights, defenses, or
privileges.
Second, § 102(d) of the Act states that "[a]ny agency or department
in the executive branch of the Federal Government shall at all times have
access to the tape recordings and other materials . .. for lawful Government use ... " The District Court eschewed a broad reading of that section as permitting wholesale access by any executive official for any con.~eivable executive purpose. Instead, it construed § 102 (d) in light of
Congress' presumed intent that, the Act operate within constitutional
bounds-an int~nt manifested throughout the statute, see 408 F. Supp., at
·337 n. 15. The District Court thus interpreted§ 102(d), and in particular
the phrase "lawful use," as requiring that once appellant is notified of
requested access by an executive official, see n. 7, supra, he be allowed to
assert any consttiutional right or privilege that in his view would bar
access. See 408 F . Supp., at 338 n. 18. We agree with that interpretation,
13
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exectiuve officials must be well aware of the possibility that,
at some time in the future, their communications may be
reviewed on a confidential basis by professional archivists.
Appellant has suggested no reason why review under the
instant Act, rather than the Presidential Libraries Act, is
significantly more likely to impair confidentiality, nor has
he called into question the District Court's finding that the
archivists "record for discretion in handling confidential material is unblemished." 408 F. Supp., at 347.
Moreover, adequate justifications are shown for this limited
intrusion into executive confidentiality comparable to those
held to justify the in camera inspection of the District Court
sustained in United States v. Nixon, supra. Congress' purposes in enacting the Act are exhaustively treated in the
opinion of the District Court. The legislative history of the
Ast clearly reveals that, among other purposes, Congress
acted to establish regular procedures to deal with the perceived need to preserve the materials for legitimate historical
and governmental purposes. 14 An incumbent President
should not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of
a .,P'rior President when he seeks access to records of past
decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations.15 Nor should the American people's ability to recon• From its exhaustive servey of the legislative history, the District
Court concluded that the public interests served by the Act could be
merged under "the rubric of preservation of an accurate and complete
historical record." 408 F. Supp. 348-349.
15 S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 3, 4, 5 (1974) ; H. R. Rep .
No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Scss., at 3 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. H. 11211
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Abzug). See also section
102(d) of the Act." Id. , at 349-350.
Presidents in the past have had to apply to the Presidential.,t'ibraries
of their predeccessors for permission to examine records of past governmental actions relating to currrnt governmental problems. See 408 F.
Supp., at 351-352. Although it appears that most such requests have
been granted , Congress could legitimately conclude that the situation
was unstable and ripe for change. It is clear from the face of the Act
1
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§truct and come to terms with their history be truncated
f:>y an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only
on the needs of the present. 16 Congress can legitimately act
to rectify the hit-or-miss approach that has characterized
past attempts to protect these substantial interests by entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and
disinterested professionals.
Other substantial public interests that led Congress to seek
to preserve a~
terWs were the desire to restore
public confidence in our political processes by preserving the
materials as a source for facilitating a full airing of the events
leading to appellant's resignation , and Congress' need to
understand how those political processes had in fact operated
in order to gauge the necessity for remedial legislation.
Thus by preserving these mateirals, the Act may be thought
to aid the legislative process and thus to be within the
scope of Congress' broad investigative power, see, e. g. , Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra. And, of
course, the Congress repeatedly referred to the importance
of the materials to the judiciary in the event that they shed
light upon issues in civil or criminal litigation, a social
interest that cannot be €1oublecb, See United States v. Nixon,
supra.11
t hat making t he materials available for the on-going conduct of Presidential policy was at least one of t he objectives of the Act. See§ 102 (d).
10 S. Rep. No . 93-1181 , 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1, 3 (1974); H. R.
Rep . No. 93- 1507, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., at 2, 3, 8 (1974) ; Senate Hearings
on GSA R egulations, at 256 ; 120 Cong. Rec. S. 16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id. , at S. 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974);
id., at S. 18248 (remarks of Sen . Ervin) ; id., at S. 18259 (remarks oi
Sen. Huddleston) ; id., at S. 18260 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); id., at
S. 18261 (remarks of Sen. Muskie) ; id., at S. 18325 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson) ; id., at H. 11207 (daily ed. Dec. 3,
1974) (remarks of Rep . Brademas ) . See also §§ 101 (b) ( 1), 104 (a) (7)
of the Act .
17
As to these several obj ec tives of the legislature, see S. Rep. No.
93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 3- 4, 6 (1974) ; H. R. Rep. No, 93-1507)
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In light of these objectives, the scheme adopted by Congress
for preservation of the appellant's Presidential materials
cannot be said to be overbroad. It is true that among the
voluminous materials to be screened by archivists are some
materials tha.t bear no relationship to any of these objectives
(and whose prompt return to appellant is therefore mandated by § 104 (a) (7) ). But these materials are commingled
with other materials whose preservation the Act requires,
for the appellant, like his predecessors, made no systematic
attempt to segregate official, personal, and private materials.
408 F. Supp., at 355. Even individual documents and tapes
often intermingle communications relating to governmental
duties, and of great interest to historians or future policymakers,. _with priva.te and confidential communications. Ibid.
Thus, as in the Presidential )dbraries, the intermingled
state of the materials requires the comprehensive review and
classification contemplated by the Act if Congress' important objectives are to be furthered. In the course of that
process, the archivists will be required to view the sm~,11
fraction of the materials th.a t implicate Presidential confidentiality, as well as personal and private materials to be
returned to appellant. But given the safeguards built into
93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 8 ; 120 Cong. Rec . S. 16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson) ; id. , at S. 18233, 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1974) ; id., at H. 11207 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep.
Brademas) ; id., at H. 11211 (remarks of Rep . McKinney). See also
§ 104 (a) of the Act. See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., at 3, 4 (1974) ; H. R. Rep . No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at
2, 3, 8 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. S. 16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1974)
(remarks of Sen. Nelson); id., at S. 18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974). See
also S. Rep. No. 93-1181 , 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1, 4, 6 (1974);
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 3, 8 (1974); 120
Cong. Rec. S. 16870-16871 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1974) (remarks of Sen.
Nelson) ; id., at S. 18233 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974); id ., at H . 11207
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Brademas) . See also§§ 102 (b),
104 (a) (2) of the Act.
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the Act to prevent disclosure of such materials and th~ ·
minimal nature of the intrusion into the confidentiality of
the Presidency, we believe that the claims of Presidential
privilege clearly must yield to the important congressional
purposes of preserving the materials and maintaining access
to them for lawful government and historical purposes.
In short, we conclude that the screening process contemplated by the Act will not constitute a more severe intrusioµ
into Presidential confidentiality than the in camera inspection
by the District Court approved in United States v. Nixon,
supra, 418 U.S., at 706. We must of course presume that the
Administrator and the career archivists concerned will carry
out the duties assigned to them by the Act. Thus, there is no
basis for appellant's claim that the Act "reverses" the presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential papers
recognized in United States v. Nixon. Appellant's right to
assert the privilege is specifically preserved by the Act. The
guideline provisions on their face are as bro{l,d as the privilege
itself. If the broadly written protections of the Act should
nevertheless prove inadequate to safeguard appellant's rights
or to prevent usurpation of executive powers, there will be
time enough to consider that problem in a specific factual
context. For the present. we hold, in agreement with the
District Court, that the Act on its face does not violate the
Presidential privilege.
V

Privacy
Appellant concedes that when he entered public life he
voluntarily surrendered the privacy secured by law for those
who elect not to place themselves in the public spotlight.
See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
(1964). He argues, however, that he was not thereby
stripped of all legal protection for his privacy, and contends
that the Act violates fundamental rights of expression and

'
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privacy guaranteed to him by the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.18
The District Court treated appellant's argument as addressed only to the process by which the screening of the
materials will be performed. "Since any claim by [appellant]
that his privacy will be invaded by public access to private
materials must be considered premature when it must actually
be directed to the regulations once they become effective, we
need not consider how the materials will be treated after they
are reviewed." 408 F. Supp., at 358. Although denomi- ,
nating the privacy claim "[t]he most troublesome challenge
that plaintiff raises ... ," - id., at 357, the District Court
concluded tha.t the claim was without merit. The court
reasoned that the proportion of the 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings implicating appellant's privacy
interests was quite small since the great bulk of the materials
related to appellant's conduct of his duties as President, and
were therefore materials to which great public interest
attached. The touchstone of the legality of the archival
processing, in the District Court's view, was its reasonableness.
Balancing the public interest in preserving the materials
touching appellant's performance of his official duties against
the , invasion of appellant's privacy that archival screening necessarily entails, the District Court concluded that
the Act was not unreasonable and hence not facially
unconstitutional :
"Here, we have a processing scheme without which
national interests of overriding importance cannot be
served . . . ," Id., at 364.
Thus, the Act "is a reasonable response to the difficult
problem caused by the mingling of personal and private
1 8 Insofar as appellant. argues a privacy claim based upon the First
Amendment, spe Part VI , infra. In joining this part of t.he opinion,,Jus.tkc ~ adheres to his views on privacy as expressed in his concurrrng
opinion in Whalen v. Roe, - U.S. - , -.

~
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documents and conversations in the midst of a vastly greater
number of nonprivate documents and materials related to
government objectives. The processing contemplated by the
Act-at least as narrowed by carefully tailored regulations-represents the least intrusive manner in which to protect an
adequate level of promotion of government interests of overriding importance." Id., at 367. We agree with the District
Court that the Act does not unconstitutionally invade appellant's right of privacy.
One element of privacy has been characterized as "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters .... " Whalen v. Roe, U. S. - , (1977). We
may agree with appellant that, at least when government
intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy
rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done
by them in their public capacity. Presidents who have
established Presidential,,£ibraries have usually withheld matters concerned with family or personal finances, or have,
deposited such materials with restrictions on their screening.
408 F. Supp., at 360. 1 0 We may assume with the District
19 The District Court, 408 F. Supp., at 360 n. 54, surveyed evidence
in the record respecting depository restrictions for all Presidents since
President Hoover. It is unclear whether President Hoover actually
excluded any of his per,;onal and private materials from the scope of
his gift, although his offer to deposit materials in a Presidential,.,I;ibrary
reserved the right to do so. President Roosevelt also indicated his
intention to select certain materials from his papers to be retained by
his family. Because of his death, this function was performed by designated individuals and by his secretary. Again the record is unclear as
to how many materials were removed. A number of personal documents
deemed to be personal family correspondence were turned over to the
Roosevelt family library in 1948, later returned to the official Library
in 1954-1955, and have been on loan to the family since then. It is
unclear to what extent these materials were reviewed by the library
personnel.
President Truman withheld from deposit the personal file maintained

,e., ...
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Court, for the purposes of this case, that this pattern of
de facto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence
gives rise to appellant's legitimate expectation of privacy
in such materials. Katz v. United Statfs, 389 U. S. 347,
351-353 (1967). 20 This expecttaion is independent of the
question of ownership of the materials, ~ issue we do not
reach. See supra, at n. 8. But the merit of appellant's claim
of invasion of his privacy cannot be considered in the ab- \
stract; rather, the claim must be considered in light of the
specific provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be
weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administration to archival
screening. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534539 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968). 21 Under
this test, the privacy interest asserted by appellant is weaker
than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen
v. Roe, supra. Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New
York State to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of private
medical informa.t ion retained in a state computer bank sysin the White House by his personal secretary. This file was deposited wi-th
the library upon his death in 1974, although the terms of his will excluded
a small number of items determined by the executors of his will to
pertain to personal or business affairs of the Truman family. President
Eisenhower's offer to deposit his Presidential materials excluded materials
determined by him or his representative to be personal or private.
President Kennedy's materials deposited with GSA did not include certain
materials relating to his private affairs, and some recordings of meetings
involving President Kennedy, although physically stored in the Kennedy
Library, have not yet been turned over to the library or reviewed by
government archivists. President .Johnson's offer to deposit materials
excluded items which he determined to be of special or private interest
to personal or family affairs.
20 Even if prior Presidents had declined to assert their privacy interests
in such materials, their failure to do so would not necessarily bind
appellant, for privacy interest:; are not solely dependent for their con:;titutional protection upon established practice of governmental toleration.
21
We agree with the Distrcit Court that the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement is not involved. 408 F . Supp., at 361-362.
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tern, Whalen rejected a constiutional objection to New York's
program on privacy grounds. Not only does the Act challenged here mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing
undue dissemination of private materials but, unlike Whalen,
the Government will not even retain long-term control over
such private information; rather, purely private papers and
recordings will be returned to appellant under § 104 (a)(7) of
the Act.
The overwhelming bulk of the 42 million documents and
the 880 tape recordings pertain, not to appellant's private
communications, but to the official conduct of his Presiden~y.
Most of the 42 million papers were prepared and seen by
others and were widely circulated within the government.
Appellant concedes that he saw no more than 200,000, and
we do not understand him to suggest that his privacy claim
extends to items he never saw. See United States v. Miller,
425 U. S. 435 ( 1976). Further, it is logical to assume that the
tape recordings made in the Presidential offices primarily
relate to the conduct and business of the Presidency. And, of
course, appellant cannot assert any privacy claim as to the
documents and tape recordings that have already been
disclosed to the public. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S.
1, 14 ( 1973) ; Katz v. United States, supra, at 351. Therefore appellant's privacy claim embracing, for example,
"extremely private communications between [him] and,
among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer
and clergyman, and his close friends as well as persoriai diary
dicta.belts and his wife's personal files," 408 F. Supp., at 359,
relates only to a very small fraction of the massive volume of
official materials with which they are presently commingled. 22
22 Some materials are still in appellant 's possession, as the Adminis•
trator has not yet attempted to act on his authority under § 101 (b) ( 1)
to t ake custody of them . 8<'<' Brief for F ederal Appellees 4 n . 1.
Moreover, the Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that there
a re certain purely pri vate materials which "should be returned to [appel•
lant] once . . . idm tified.'' T r. of Oral Arg., at 590. In our view the
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The fact that appellant may assert his privacy claim as tQ
only a small fraction of the materials of his Presidency is
plainly relevant in judging the reasonableness of the screening
process contemplated by the Act, but this of course does not
without more, require rejection of his privacy argument. 408
F. Supp., at 359. Although the Act requires that the regulations promulgated by 'the Administrator under § 104 (a) take
into account appellant's legally and constitutionally based
rights and privileges, presumably including his privacy rights,
§ 104 (a)(5), and also take into account the need to return to
appellant his private materials, § 104 (a)(7), 23 the identity
and separation of these purely private matters can be achieved,
as all parties concede, only by screening all of the materials.
Appellant contends that the Act therefore is tantamount to a
general warrant authorizing search and seizure of all of his
Presidential "papers, and effects." Such "blanket authority,"
appellant contsnds, is precisely the kind of abuse that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent, for "the real evil
aimed by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists of rummaging about
his personal effects to secure evidence against him." Brief for
Appellant 148, quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911,
914 (CA2 1930). Thus, his Brief continues, id., at 150-151:
" ... [Appellant's] most private thoughts and communi~
cations, both written and spoken, will be exposed to and
Government, without awaiting a court order, should promptly disclaim
any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's purely private communications and deliver them to him.
23 The Solicitor General implied at oral argument that the requirement
of the guidelines directing the Administrator to consider the need to return
to appellant "for his sole custody and use . . . materials which are not
[Watergate-related] . . . and arc not otherwise of general historical
significance," § 104 (a) (7), is further qualified by the requirement under
§ 102 (b) and § 104 (a)(5), that the regulations promulgated by the
Administrator tnke into account the need to protect appellant's rights1
defenses, or privileges, Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.
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reviewed by a host of persons whom he does not know
and did not select, and in whom he has no reason to
place his confidence. This group will decide what is
personal, to be returned to [him], and what is historical,
to be opened for public review." "4
Appellant principally relies on Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S.
476 (1965), but that reliance is misplaced. Stanford invalidated a search aimed at obtaining evidence that an individual had violated a "sweeping and many-faceted law
which, among other things, outlaws the Communist Party
and creates various individual criminal offenses, each punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years." Id., at 477. The
searcp warrant authorized a search of his private home for
books, records, and other materials concerning illegal Communist activities. After spending more than four hours in
Stanford's house, police officers seized half of his books which
included works by Sartre, Marx, Pope John XXIII, Justice
Hugo Black, Theodore Draper, and Earl Browder, as well
as private documents including a marriage certificate, insurance policies, household bills and receipts, and personal
correspondence. Id., at 479-480. Stan/ ord held this to be
an unconstitutional general search.
Appellant argues that screening under the Act contrasts with the
screening procedures followed by earlier Presidents who, "in donating
materials to Presidential libraries, have been able . . . to participate
in the selection of persons who would review the llLc'iterials for classification purposes." Brief for Appellant 151 n. 68. We are unable to say
that the record substantiates this assertion. The record is most complete with respect to President Johnson, who appears to have recommended·
the individual who was later selected as Director of the Johnson Library,
but seems not to have played any role in the selection of the archivists
actually performing the day-to-day processing. 408 F. Supp., at 365 n. 60.
Moreover, we agree with the District Court that it is difficult to see
how professional archivists performing a screening task under proper
standards would be meaningfully affected in the performance of their
~uties by loyalty to inqividuals or institutions. Ibid.
24
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The District Court concluded that the Act's provisions for
custody and screening could not be analogized to a general
search and that Stanford, therefore, did not require the Act's
invalidation. 408 F. Supp., at 366-367, n. 63. We agree.
Only a few dcuments among the vast quantity of materials
seized in Stanford were even remotely related to any legitimate
government interest. This case presents precisely the opposite situation: the vast proportion of appellant's Presidential
materials are officia~ docu~en~
records in which appellant
concedes the public has a recognized interest. Moreover, the
Act provides procedures and orders the promulgation of regulations expressly for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion
into appellant's private and personal materials. Finally,
the search in Stanford was an intrusion into an individual's
home to search and seize personal papers in furtherance of
a criminal investigation and designed for exposure in a
criminal trial. In contrast, any intrusion by archivists into
appellant's private papers and effects is undertaken with
the sole purpose of separating private materials to belretained
and preserved by the Government as a record of appellant's
Presidency.
Moreover, the screening will be undertaken by government
archivists with, as the District Court noted , "an unblemished
record for discretion," 408 F. Supp., at 365. That review
can hardly differ materially from that contemplated by appellant's intention to establish a Presidential Library, for
Presidents who ha,ve established such libraries have found
that screening by professional archivists was essential. Although the District Court recognized that this contemplation
of archival review would not defeat appellant's expectation
of privacy, the court held that it does indicate that "in the
special situation of documents accumulated by a President
during his tenure and reviewed by professional government
personnel, pursuant to a practice employed by past Presidents,
a11y intrusion into privacy interests is less substantial than it
1night appear at first. " Ibid. (citation omitted).
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The District Court analogized the screening process contemplated by the Act to electronic surveillance conducted
pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). 408 F.
Supp., at 363. We think the analogy is apt. There are ob..
vious similarities between the two proceclures. Both involve
the problem of separating intermingled communications,
( 1) some of which are expected to be related to legitimate
government objectives, (2) some of which are not, and
(3) for which there is no means to segregate the one from
the other except by reviewing them all. Th us the screening
process under the Act, like electronic surveillance, requires
some intrusion into private communications unconnected with
any legitimate governmental objectives. Yet this fact has
not been thought to render surveillance under the Omnibus
Act unconstitutional. Cf. e. r,., United States v. Donovan, U.S. (1977); Berr,er v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) .
See also 408 F. Supp., at 363-364.
Appellant argues that this analogy is inappropriate because
the electronic surveillance procedure was carefully designed to
meet the constitutional requirements enumerated in Berr,er v.
New York , supra, including (1) prior judicial authorization,
(2) specification of particular offenses said to justify the intrusion, (3) specification "with particularity" of the conversations sought to be seized, ( 4) minimization of the duration
of the wiretap , (5) termination once the conversation sought
is seized, and (6) a showing of exigE;)nt circumstances justifying use of the wiretap procedure. Brief for Appellant 157.
Although the parallel is~ r from_ perfect, we agree with the
District Court that many c;ns'ictera~ supporting the constitutionality of the Omnibus Act also argue for the constitutionality of this Act's materials screening process. For ex•
ample, the Omnibus Act permits electronic surveillance only
to investigate designated crimes that are serious in nature, 18
U. S. C. § 2516 ( 1970), and only when normal investigative
techniques have failed or are likely to do so, id. , § 2518 (3)(c) .
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Similarly, the archival review procedure involved here is designed to serve important national interests asserted by Congress, and the unavailability of less restrictive means necessarily follows from the commingling of the documents. 26
Similarly, just as the Omnibus Act expressly requires that
interception of nonrelevant communications be minimized, 18.
U. S. C. § 2518 (5), the Act's screening process is designed
to minimize any privacy intrusions, a goal that is further
reinforced by regulations which must take those interests into
account. 26 The fact that appa~~ntly only a minute portion
of the materials implicates appellant's privacy interests, 21.
25 Appellant argues that, unlike electronic surveillance, where success
depends upon the subject's ignorance of its existence, appellant could
have been allowed to separate his personal from official materials. But
Congress enacted the Act in part to displace the Nixon-Sampson agreement that expressly provided for automatic destruction of the tape
recordings in the event of appellant's death and that allowed appellant
somplete discretion in the destruction of materials after the initial threeyear storage period.
Moreover, appellant's view of what constitutes official as distinguished
from personal and private materiils might' differ from the view of
Congress, the Executive Branch, or, a reviewing court. Not only may
the use of disinterested archivists le·ad to application of uniform standards
in separating private from nonprivate communications, but the Act
provides for judicial review of their determinations. This would not be
the case as to appellant's determinations.
26 The District Court found, 404 F. Supp., at 364 n. 58, and we agree,
that it is irrelevant that Title III, unlike the Act, requires adherence
to a detailed warrant requirement, 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1970). That
requirement is inapplicable to this Act, since we deal not with standards
governing a generalized right to search by law enforcement officials or
~ b.,.
other government personnel, but with a particularized legislative judg.,
- u~~o
rnent,J similar to 9ondemnation under the power of eminent domain, that
...
cet~in materials are of value to the publi'.A awl inpp1'nn011,ted by jtuheial G)

~
27 The fact that the overwhelming majority of the materials is relevant
to Congress' lawful objectives is in contrast to the experience under
the Omnibus Crime Act. A recent report on surveillance conducted
under the Omnibus Act indicates that for the calendar year 1976 more
than one-half of all wire intercepts authorized by hidicial orqer yielqed
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~Jso negates any conclusion th1tt the scre~ning process is an.
unreasonable solution to the prgblem of ~parating com=plingled communication~.
In sum, appellant has a legitimate expecta~ign of privacy in
his personal communications. B,ut the constitµtionality of the
,Act must be viewed in the cgntex;t of the limited intrusion of
the screening process, of appellant's status llS a public figure, of
his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming m~
jority of the materials, of the important public interest in preeervation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of
eegregating the small quantity of private materials without
comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's
sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, see § IO~
(a) (7), the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion;
and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by
the Administrator will further moot appellant's fears that his
materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons,"@ Brief
for Appellant 150, we are compelled to agree with the District
Court that appellant's privacy claim is without merit.

VI
First Amendment
During his Presidency appellant served also as head of
only nonincriminating communications. Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or
Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communciations, January 1,
1976 to December 31, 1976, at XII (Table 4).
28 Throughout this litigation appellant has claimed that his privacy
·will necessarily be unconstitutionally invaded because the screening requires
a staff of "over one hundred archivists, accompanied by lawyers, technicians, and secretaries [who] will have a right to review word by word
five and one-half years of a man's life ...." Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. The
size of the staff is, of course, necessarily a function of the enormous
quantity of materials involved. But clearly not all engaged in the screening will examine each document. The Administrator initially proposed
that only one archivist examine most documents. See 408 F . Supp.,
365 n. 59.
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his national political party and spend a substantial portion of
his working time on partisan political matters. Records arising from his political activities, like his private and personal
records, are not segregated from the great mass of materials.
He argues that the Act's archival screening process therefore
necessarily entails invasion of his constitutionally protected
rights of associational privacy and political speech. As summarized by the District Court, "It is alleged that the Act
invades the private formulation of political thought critical
to free speech and association, imposing sanctions upon past
expressive activity, and more significantly, limiting that of
the future because individuals who learn the substance of
certain private communications by [him]-especially those
critical of themselves-will refuse to associate with him.
The Act is furthermore said to chill [his] expression because
he will be 'saddled' with prior positions communicated in private, leaving him unable to take inconsistent positions in the
future." 408 F. Supp., at 367-368.
The District Court, viewing these arguments as in essence a
claim that disclosure of the materials violated appellant's
associational privacy, and therefore as not significantly different in structure from appellant's privacy claim, again
treated the arguments as limited to the const1tut10nahty of
the Act's screening process. Id., at 368. As was true with
respect to the more general privacy challenge, only a fraction
of the materials can be said to raise a First Amendment claim.
Nevertheless, the District Court acknowledged that appellant (
"would appear to have a legitimate expectation that he would
have an opportunity to remove some of the sensitive political
documents before any government screening took place."
Ibid. The District Court concluded, however, that there was
no reason to believe that the mandated regulations when
promulgated would not adequately protect against public
access to materials implicating appellant's privacy in
political association, and that "any burden arising solely from

15-1605-OPINION

NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

39

review by professional and discreet archivists is not signifi~
cant." The court therefore held that the Act does not significantly interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendment
rights. Id., at 369. We agree with the District Court's
conclusion.
It is of course true that involvement in partisan politics is
closely protected by the First Amendment, Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1 ( 1976), and that "compelled disclosure in itself can seriously infringe on privacy and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id., at 64. But a compelling
public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way will
override those interests. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 5859 (1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377
(1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1966), "particularly when the 'free functioning of our national institutions' is involved." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 66. Since
no less r
· t' e w
han archival screening has been suggested as a means for identi cation of materials to be returned
to appellant, the burden of that screening is presently the
measure on his First Amendment claim. Id., at 84. The extent of any such burden, however, is speculative in light of
the Act's terms protecting appallant from improper public
disclosures and guaranteeing him full judicial review before
any public access is permitted. §§ 104 (a) (5), (a) (7), 105
(a) .29 As the District Court concluded, the First Amendment
29 Appellant argues that Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147,
150-151 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965); Staub v. Baxl,ey,
355 U. S. 313, 319-321 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 l]. S. 516, 538541 (1945); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452-453 (1938) IA
support his contention that "[a] statute which vests such proad authority
[with respect to First Amendment rights] is unconstitutional on its face,
and the party subjected to it may treat it as a nullity even if its actual
implementation would not harm him." Brief for Appellant 169. The
argument is without merit. Those cases involved regulations that permitted public officials in their arbitrary discretion to impose prior restraints on expressional or associational activities. In contrast, the Act is
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claim is clearly outweighed by the important governmental
interests promoted by the Act.
For the same reasons, we find no merit in appellant's argument that the Act's scheme for custody and archival screening
of the materials "necessarily inhibits [the] freedom of political
activity [of future Presidents] and thereby reduces the 'quantity and diversity' of the political speech and association that
the Nation will be receiving from its leaders." Brief 168.
It is significant, moreover, that this concern has not deterred
President Ford from signing the Act into law, or President
Carter from urging this Court's affi.rmance of the judgment of
the District Court.

VI
Bill of Attainder Clause

A
Finally, we address appellant's argument that the Act
constitutes a bill of attainder proscribed by Art. I , § 9 of
the Constitution. 30 His argument is that Congress acted on
the premise that he had engaged in "misconduct,'' was an
"unreliable custodian" of his own documents, and genera,lly
was deserving of a "legislative judgment of blameworthiness,"
Brief for Appellant 132-133. Thus, he argues, the Act is
pervaded with the key features of a bill of attainder: a law
that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment
upon an identifiable individual without provision of the proconcerned only with materials that record past activities and with a
screening process guided by longstanding archival screening standards.
so Article I , § 9, applicable to Congress, provides "No Bill of Attainder
or ex post fac to law shall be passed," and Art. I , § 10, applicable to the
States, provides that "No State . .. shall pass any Bill of At.taidner, ex
post facto law . . . ." The linking of bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws is explained by the fact that a legislative denunciation
and condemnation of an individual, often acted to impose retroactive
punishment. Sec Z. Chafee, Three Human E,ights in the Coll§tit~tion
~~-93 (1956 ),
,
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tections of a judicial trial. See United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 445, 447 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 315-316 (1946); Ex pa.rte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, m
(1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1866).
Appellant's argument relies almost entirely upon United
States v. Brown, supra, the Court's most recent decision addressing the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It is instructive, therefore, to sketch the broad outline of th'a t case.
Brown invalidated § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 504, that made it a
crime for a Communist Party member to serve 85 an officer
of a labor union. After detailing the infamous history of
bills of attainder, the Court found that the Bill of Attainder
Cla,USe was an important ingredient of the doctrine of "sepa,.
ration of powers," one of the organizing principles of our
system of government. Id., at 442--443. Just as Art. III
confines the judiciary to the task of adjudicating concrete
"cases or controversies," so too the Bill of Attainder Clause
was found to "reflect ... the Framers' belief that the Legisla,.
tive Branch is not so well suited as politically independent
judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon,
specific persons." Id., at 445. Brown thus held that § 504
worked a bill of attainder by focusing upon easily identifiable
members of a class, members of the Communist Party, and
imposing on them the sanction of mandatory forfeiture of
a job or office, long deemed to be punishment within the contemplation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See, e. g., United
States v. Lovett, supra, at 316; Cummings v. Missouri, supra,
at 320.
Brown, Lovett, and earlier cases unquestionably gave
.broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection
against bills of attainder. But appellant's proposed reading
is far broader still. In essence, he argues that Brown establishes that the Constitution is offended whenever a law im-

;
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poses undesired consequences on an individual or on a class
that is not defined at a proper level of generality. The Act
in question therefore is faulted for singling out appellant, as
opposed to all other Presidents or members of the government,
for disfavored treatment.
Appellant's characterization of the meaning of a bill of
attainder obviously proves far too much. By arguing that an
individual or defined group is attainted whenever it is compelled to bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes,
appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill of attainder
guarantee to realistic conceptions of classification and punishment. His view would cripple the very process of legislating, for any individual or group that is made the subject
of adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers
could and should have defined the relevant affected
class at a greater level of generality. 81 Furthermore, every
person or group made subject to legislation which it finds~
.HRdeP Stl::ffle may subjectively feel, and can complain, that it
is being subjected to unwarranted punishment. United States
v. Lovett, supra, at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) .32 How31 In this case, for example, appellant faults the Act for taking custody
of his papers but not those of other Presidents. Brief for Appellant 130.
But even a congressional definition of the class consisting of all Presidents would have been vulnerable to the claim of being overly specific,
since the definition might more generally include all members of the
Executive Branch, or all members of the government, or all in possession
of Presidential papers, or all in possession of government papers.
This does not dispose of appellant's contention that the Act focuses
upon him with the requisite degree of specificity for a bill of attainder,
see infra, at 43-44, but it demonstrates that simple reference to the
breadth of the Act's focus cannot be determinative of the reach of
the Bill of Attainder Clause as a limitation upon legislative action
that disadvantages a person or group. See, e. g., United States v. Brown,
supra, at 474-475 (WHITE, J., di8,;rnting); n. 3~, infra.
82
"The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not
make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may
be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be
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,ever expansive is the prohibition against bills of attainder, it
surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the Equal
Protection Clause, 33 invalidating every act of Congress or
the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups
but not all other plausible individuals. 34 In short, while the
Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important "bulwark
against tyranny," United States v. Brown, supra, at 443, it
does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating
enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such
deprivation."
33 We observe that appellant originally argued in his jurisdictional statement that "for similar reasons" the Act violates both the Bill of Attainder
and Equal Protectioh Clauses. J. S. 27-28. He has since abandoned
reliance upon the Equal Protection Clause, apparently recognizing that
mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641,
657 ( 1966), even if the law disadvantages an individual or identifiable
members of a group, see, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483 (1955) (opticians); Daniel v. Famil,y Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220 (1949)
(insurance agents). "For similar reasons" the mere specificity of a law
does not call into play the Bill of Attainder Clause. Cf. Comment, The
Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification,
54 Calif. L. Rev. 212, 234-236 (1966); but see Comment, The Bounds
of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder
Clause, 72 Yale L. J. 330 (1962).
34
Brown recognized this by making clear that conflict-of-interest laws,
which inevitably prohibit conduct on the part of designated individuals
or classes of individuals, do not contravene the bill of attainder guarantee.
Brown specifically noted the validity of § 32 of the Banking Act of
1933, 12 U. S. C. § 78, which disqualified identifiable members of a
group-officers and employees of underwriting organizations-from serving
as officers of Federal Reserve banks, 381 U. S., at 453. Other valid federal
conflict-of-interest statutes which also single out identifiable members
of groups to bear burdens or disqualifications are collected, id., at 467468, n. 2 (WHITE, .J., dissenting) . See also Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974) (upholding transfer of rail properties
6f 8 railroad companies to government-organized corporation).

•'
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for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all.
Thus, in the present case, the Act's specificity-the fact that
it refers to appellant by name-does not automatically offend
the Bill of Attainder Clause. Indeed, viewed in context, the
focus of the enactment can be fairly and rationally understood. 'lt is true that Title I deals exclusively with appellant's papers. But Title II casts a wider net by establishing
a special commission to study and recommend appropriate
legislation regarding the preservation of the records of future
Presidents and all other federal officials. In this light, Congress' action to preserve only appellant's records is easily explained by the fact that a,t the time of the Act's passage, only
his materials demanded immediate attention. The Presiden'
tial papers of all former Presidents from Hoover to Johnson
were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries.
Congress had reason for concern solely with the preservation
of appella.nt's materials, for he alone had entered into a depository agreement, the Nixon-Sampson agreement, which by
terms called for the destruction of certain of the materials,
Indeed, as the Government argues, "appellant's depository
agreement . . . created an imminent danger that the tape
recordings would be destroyed if appellant, who had contracted phlebitis, were to die." Brief for Federal Appellee 41.
In short, appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and
this provides a basis for Congress' decision to proceed with
dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the
status of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further
consideration of generalized standards to govern his successors.
Moreover, even if the specificity element were deemed to be
satisfied here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would not automatically be implicated. Forbidden legislative punishment is
not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome
consequences. Rather, we must inquire further whether
Congress, by lodging appellant's ma.terials in the custody
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ttf the General Services Administration pending their screen.
ing by government archivists and the promulgation of further

regulations, "inflict[ed] punishment" within the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder. United Statea
v. Lovett, supra, at 315; see also United States v. Brown,
BUpra, at 456-460; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 320.

B
1

The infamous history of bills of attainder is a useful starting point in the inquiry whether the Act fairly can be characterized as a form of punishment leveled against appellant.
For the substantial experience of both England and the United
States with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative
power offer a ready checklist of deprivations and disabilities
so disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall
within the proscription of Art. I, § 9. A statutory enactment
that imposes any of those sanctions on named or identifiable
individuals would be immediately constitutionally suspect.
In England a bill of attainder originally connoted a parliamentary act sentencing a named individual or identifiable
members of a group to death. 35 Article I, § 9, however, also
35 See, for example, the 1685 attainder of James Duke of Monmouth
for High Treason: "Whereas James duke of Monmouth has in an hostile
manner invaded this kingdom, and is now in open rebellion, levying
war against the king, contrary to the duty of his allegiance; Be it
enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the lords spiritual and t€mporal, and commons in this
parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That the said
James duke of Monmouth stand and be convicted and attainted of high
treason, and that he suffer pains of death, and incur all forfeitures as
a traitor convicted and attaintrd of high treason." 1 Jam. 2, c. 3 (emphasis omitted) .
The attainder of death was usually accompanied by a forfeiture of
the condemned person's property to the king and the corruption of his

'-
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proscribes enactments originally characterized as bills of
pains and penalties, that is, legislative acts inflicting punishment other than execution. United States v. Lovett, supra,
at 323-324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 323; Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the
Constitution 97 (1956). Generally addressed to persons considered disloyal to the Crown or State, "pains and penalties"
historically consisted of a wide array of punishments: commonly included were imprisonment/ 0 banishment, 37 and the
punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign. 38 Our
co~ntry's own experience with bills of a.ttainder resulted in
the addition of another sanction to the list of impermissible
legislative punishments: any legislative enactment that bars
specified individuals or groups from participa.tion in certain
types of empoyment or vocations, a mode of punishment
blood, whereby his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate ..
Blackstone traced the practice of "corruption of blood" to the Norman
conquest. He considered the practice an "oppressive mark of feudal
tenure" and hoped that it "may in process of time be abolished by act
of parliament." 4 Blackstone Commentaries 388 ( 15th ed. 1809). The•
framers of the American Constitution responded to this recommendation.
Art. III, § 3.
30 See, e. g., IO and 11 Will. 3, c. 13: "An act for continuing the
imprisonment of Counter and others, for the late horrid conspiracy
to assassinate the person of his sacred Majesty."
37 See, e. g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14 (1800)
("ald and every
persons named and included in the said aot [declaring persons guilty
of treason] are banished from the said state [Georgia]"); 2 Wooddeson,
A Systematical View of the Laws of England 638-639 (1792) (banishment of Lord Clarendon and the Bishop Atterbury). See Kennedy v ..
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168, n. 23 (1963).
38
Following the Revolutionary War, States often seized the property
of alleged Tory sympathizers. See, e. g., James' Claim, 1 Dall. 47 (1780}
("John Parrock was attainted of High Treason, and his estate seized and.
advertised for sale"); Respublica v. Gordon, 1 Dall. 233 (1788) ("at-.
tainted of treason for adhering to the king of Great Britain, in consequence of which his estate was confiscated to the use of the
Qo1nmoti.wealth . , _"),
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-commonly deployed against those legislatively branded as disloyal. See, e. g., Cummings v. Missouri, supra (barring
clergymen from ministry in the absence of subscribing to a
loyalty oath); United States v. Lovett, supra (barring named
individuals from government employment); United States v.
Brown, supra (barring Communist Pa.r ty members from offices in labor unions).
Needless to say, appellant cannot claim to have suffered
any of these forbidden deprivations at the hands of the
Congress. While it is true that Congress ordered the General
Services Administration to retain control over records that
appellant claims as his property,au § 105 of the Act makes
provision for an award by the District Court of "just compensation." This undercuts even a colorable contention that
the Government has punitively confiscated appellant's property, for the "owner [thereby] is put in the same position
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not b~en taken." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 16
(1970); accord United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,373
(1943). Thus, no feature of the challenged Act falls within
the historical meaning of legislative punishment.
2

But our inquiry is not ended by the determination that
the Act imposes no punishment traditionally judged to be
prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Our treatment
of the scope of the Clause has never precluded the possibility
that new burdens and deprivations might be legislatively
fashioned that a.re inconsistent with the bill of attainder
guarantee. The Court, therefore, of ten has looked beyond
mere historical experience and has applied a functional test
of the existence of punishment, analyzing whether the law
under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of
In fact , it remains unsettled whether the materials in question are
the propert.y of appellant or of the Government. See n. 8, _supra,.
89
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burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes. 4 ° Cummings v. Missouri,
supra, at 319'-320; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193194 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (Warren, C. J.);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169
(1963). Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not
appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of
the decisionmakers.
Application of the functional approach to this case leads
to rejection of appellant's argument that the Act rests upon
a congressional determination of his blameworthiness and
a desire to punish him. For, as noted previously, see supra,
at 23- 25, legitimate justifications for passage of the Act are
readily apparent. First, in the face of the Nixon-Sampson
agreement which expressly contemplated the destruction of
some of appellant's materials, Congress stressed the need to
preserve "[i] nformation included in the ma.terials of former
President Nixon [that] is needed to complete the prosecutions
of Watergate-related crimes." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. , at 2 (1974). Second, again referring to the
Nixon-Sampson agreement, Congress expressed its desire to
safeguard the "public interest in gaining appropriate access
to materials of the Nixon Presidency which are of general
historical significance. The information in these materials
4 0 In determining whether punitive or non punitive objectives underlie
a law, United States v. Brown established that punishment is not restricted purely to retribution for past events, but may include iQflicting
-deprivations on some blameworthy or taint ed indvidual in order to
prevent his future misconduct. 381 U. S., at 458-459. This view is
C'C\nsistent with the traditional purposes of criminal punishment, which
also include a preventive aspect. See, e. g., H. Packer, The Limits of
the Criminal Sanction 48-61 ( 1968) . In Brown the element of punishment was found in the fact that " the purpose of the statute before
us is to purge the governing boards of labor unions of those whom
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will be of great value to the political health and vitality of
the United States." /bid .. 41 Indeed, these same objectives
are stated in the text of the Act itself, § 104 (a), 44 U. S. C.
§ 2107 (Supp. 1976), where Congress instructs the General
Services Administration to promulgate regulations that further these ends and at the same time protect the constitutional
and legal rights of any individua.l adversely a.fleeted by the
Administrator's retention of appellant's ma,terials.
Evaluated in terms of these asserted purposes, the law
plainly must be held to be an act of nonpunitive legislative
policymaking. Legislation designed to guarantee the availability of evidence for use at criminal trials is a fair exercise of
Congress' responsibility to the "due process of law in the fair
administration of justice," United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683, 713 ( 1974), and to the functioning of our adversary legal
system which depends upon the availability of relevant evidence in carrying out its commitments both to fair play and
to the discovery of truth within the bounds set by law.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 (1972); Blackmer v.
Congress regards as guilty of subversive acts and associations and therefore unfit to fill [union] positions . . . . " 381 U. S.; at 460. Thus,
Brown left undisturbed the requirement that one who complains of being
attainted must establish that the legislature's action constituted punishment and not merely the legitimate regulation of conduct,. Jndeed, just
three Terms later, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 n. 30
( 1968), also authorPd by Chief Justice Warren, reconfirmed the need
to examine the purposes served by a purported bill of attainder in
determining whether it in fact represents a punitive law.
41 The Senate pointed to these same objectives in nullifying the NixonSampson agreement: "[1] To begin with, prosecutors, defendants and
the courts probably would be deprived of crucial evidence bearing on
the defendants' innocence or guilt of the Watergate crimes for which
they stand accused. [2] Moreover, the American people would pe denied
full access to all facts about the Watergate affair, and the efforts of
Congress, the executive branch, and others to take measures to prevent
a recurrence of the Watergate affair may be inhibited." S. Rep. No.
'93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1974).

,.
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United States, 284 U. S. 421 , 438 ( 1932); Blair v. United
States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 ( 1919). Similarly, Congress' in~
terest in and expansive authority to act in preservation of
monuments and records of historical value to our national
heritage are fully established. United States v. Gettysburg
Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278
U. S. 191 (1929) ·12 A legislature thus acts responsibly in
seeking to accomplish either of these objectives. Neither
supports an implication of a legislature policy designed to
inflict punishment on an individual.
3

A third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motiva~
tional one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a
congressional intent to punish. See, e. (I., United States v.
Lovett, supra, at 308-314; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
supra, at 169-170. The District Court unequivocally found
that " [ t] here is no evidence presented to us, nor is there any
to be found in the legislative record, to indicate that Con ..
gress' design was to impose a penalty upon Mr. Nixon ...
as punishment for alleged wrongdoings . . . . The legislative
history leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the Act
before us is regulatory and not punitive in character." 408
F. Supp., at 373 ( emphasis omitted). We find no cogent
reason for disagreeing with this conclusion.
First, both Senate and House Committee reports, in for~
mally explaining their reasons for urging passage of the Act,
expressed no interest in punishing or p1cmalizing appellant.
Rather, the reports justified the Act by reference to objectivee
that fairly and properly lie within Congress' legislative com ..

pv,

42 These cases upheld exercises of the power of eminent domain in
pr~ ving historical monuments and like facilities for public use"'
The power of eminent domain, however, is not restricted to tangible
property or realty but extends both to intangibles and to personal effects
as involved here. See Cincinnati v. Louisville & N(]}Jh. R. Co., 223 U. S,
390, 400 ( 1912) ; Porter v. U71itec( States, 473 F , 2d 1829 (CA5 1913),
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petence: preserving the availability of judicial evidence and
of historically relevant materials. Supra, at 48-49, More
specifically, it seems clear that the actions of both Houses of
Congress were predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo
the recently negotiated Nixon-Sampson depository agreement, the terms of which departed from the practice of former
Presidents in that they expressly contemplated the destruction of certain Presidential materials:" Along these lines,
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, supra, at 2, stated: "Despite the
overriding public interest in preserving these materials ...
[the] Administrator of General Services entered into an agreement ... which, if implemented, could seriously limit access
to these records ... and result in the destruction of a substantial portion of them." See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181,
supra, at 4. The relevant committee reports thus cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contain no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment. Rather, they focus almost exclusively on the meaning
and effect of an agreement recently announced by the General
Services Administration which most Members of Congress
perceived to be inconsistent with the public interest.
Nor do the floor debates on the measure suggest that Congress was intent on encroaching on the judicial function of
punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. One of
the opponents of the legislation, mischaracterizing the safeguards embodied in the bill/' stated that it is "one which par-

'

I

a Particularly troublesome was the provision of the agreement requiring the automatic destruction of tape recordings upon appellant's
death .
44 In condemning the enactment as a bll of attainder, Senator Hruska
argued that the bill seizes appellant's papers and distributes them to
litigants without affording appellant the opportunity judicially "to assert
a defense or privilege to the production of the papers." 120 Cong. Rec.
33871 ( 1974). In fact, the Act expressly recognizes appellant's right
to present all such defenses and privileges through an expedited judicial
proceedings. See infra, at 53.
4
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takes of the characteristics of a bill of attainder .... " 120
Cong. Rec. 33872 (1974) (Sen. Hruska), a key sponsor of the
measure responded by expressly denying any intention of determining appellant's blameworthiness or imposing punitive
sanctions:
"The bill does not contain a word to the effect that
Mr. Nixon is guilty of any violation of the law. It does
not inflict any punishment on him. So it has no more
relation to a bill of attainder . . . . than my style of
pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of
Sheba." Id., at 33959-33960 (Sen. Ervin).

,

In this respect, the Act stands in marked contrast to that
invalidated in United States v. Lovett, supra, at 312, where
a House Report expressly characterized individuals as "subversive ... and unfit ... to continue in Government employment." H. R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st S~ss., at 6 (1943).
We, of course, do not suggest that such a formal legislative
announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is
necessary to an unlawful bill of attainder. United States v.
Lovett, supra, at 316. But the decided absence from the legislative history of any congressional sentiments expressive of
this purpose is probative of nonpunitive intentions and
largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of
attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking
to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it
expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge-or, worse
still, lynch mob. Cf. Z. Chafee, supra, at 161. 45 No such
legislative overreaching is involved here.
45 The Court in United States v. Brown, supra, at 444, referred to
Alexander Hamilton';; concern that legislatures might cater to the "momentary passions" of a "free people in times of heat and violence . . . ."
In this case, it is obvious that the supporters of this Act steadfastly
avoided inflaming or appealing to any "passions" in the community.
Indeed, rather than seek expediently to impose punishment and to
circumvent the courts, Congress expressly provided for access to the

,I
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We also agree with the District Court that "specific aspects of the Act . . . just do not square with the claim
that the Act was a punitive measure." 408 F. Supp., at
373. Whereas appellant complains that the Act has for
some two years deprived him of control over the materials
in question, Brief for Appellant 140, the Congress placed the
materials under the auspices of the General Services Administration, § 101, 44 U. S. C. § 2107 (Supp. 1976), the same
agency designated in the Nixon-Sampson a.greement as depository of the documents for a minimum three-year period,
App. 40. Whereas appellant complains that the Act deprives him of "ready access" to the materials, Brief for Ap•
pellant 140, the Act provides that "Richard M. Nixon, or any
person whom he may designate in writing, shall at all times
have access to the tape records and other materials ... ," § 102
( C). The District Court correctly construed this as safeguard.
ing appellant's right to inspect, copy, and use the materials in
issue, 408 F. Supp., at 375, paralleling the right to "make
reproductions" contained in the Sampson agreement, App.
40. And even if we assume that there is merit in appellant's complaint that his property has been confiscated, Brief
for Appellant 140, the Act expressly provides for the payment
of compensation in accord with constitutional requirements,
§ 105 (c); see, supra, at 47.
Other features of the Act further belie any punitive interpretation. In promulgating regula.tions under the Act, the
General Services Administration is expressly directed by
Congress to protect appellant's or "any party's opportunity
to assert any legally or unconstitutionally based right or privilege . ... " § 104 (a)(5). More importantly, the Act preserves for appellant all of the protections that inhere in a
judicial proceeding, for ~ 105 (a) not only assures district
court jurisdiction and judicial review over all his legal claims,
judiciary for resolution of any constitutional and legal rights appellant.
might assert. S. Rep . 93- 1181, supr a, at 2-3, 4-5, 5-6.
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but commands that any such challenge asserted by appellant
"shall have priority on the docket of such court over other
cases." The primary sponsor of the bill emphasized that this
expedited treatment is expressly designed "to protect Mr.
Nixon's property, or other legal rights. . . . " 18 Cong. Rec.
18239 (1974) (Sen. Ervin). Finally, the Congress has ordered the General Services Administration to establish regulations that recognize "the need to give to Richard M. Nixon,
or his heirs, for his sole custody and use, ta.pe recordings and
other materials which are not likely to be related to" the
-articulated objectives of the Act, § 104 (a) (7). While appellant obviously is not set at ease by these precautions and
safeguards, they confirm the soundness of the opinion given
the Senate by the law division of the Congressional Research
Service: "[B]ecause the proposed bill does not impose criminal penalties or other punishment, it would not f.Lppear to
violate the Bill of Attainder Clause." 18 Cong. Rec. 18238
(1974). 46
One final consideration should be mentioned in light of the
unique posture of this controversy. In determining whether
a legislature sought to inflict punishment on an individual, it
is often useful to inquire into the existence of less b4rdensome
alternf-1,tives by which the Congress could have achieved its
legitimate nonpunitive objectives. Today, in framing his
challenge to the Act, appellant contends that such an alternative was readily available :
"If Congress had provided that the Attorney General or
the Administrator of General Services could institute a
civil suit in an appropriate federal court to enjoin disposition ... of presidential historical materials ... by any
In brief, the legislative history of the Act offers a paradigm of a
Congress aware of constitutional constraints on its power and carefully
seeking to act within those limitations. See generally Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan.
L . Rev. 585 (1975).
46
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person who could be shown to be an 'unreliable custodian'
or who had 'engaged in misconduct' or who 'would viola.te
a criminal prohibition,' the statute would have left to
judicial determination, after a fair proceeding, the factual
allegations of Mr. Nixon's blameworthiness." Brief for
Appellant 137.
We have no doubt that Congress might have selected this
.course. It very well may be, however, that Congress chose
not to do so on the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry
into appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less punitive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For
Congress H:oJ;doubt was well aware that just three months ~
earlier, appellant had resisted efforts to subject himself and
his records to the scrutiny of the Judicial Branch, United
States v. Nixon, supra, a position apparently maintained to
this day, 17 A rational and fairminded Congress, therefore,
might well have decided that the carefully tailored law that it
enacted would be less objectionable to appellant than the
alternative that he today appears to endorse. To be sure, if
the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act
represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact
that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be
of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the
contrary, and the unique choice that Congress faced buttresses our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to
inflict legislative punishment as forbidden by the Constitution.
We, of course, are not blind to appellant's plea that we
recognize the socia.l and political realities of 1974.. It was a
period of political turbulence unprecedented in our history.
For example, in his deposition taken in this case, appellant refused
to answer questions pertaining to the accuracy and reliability of his prior
public statements as President concerning the contents of the tape
recordings and other materials in issue. He invoked a claim of privilege
and asserted that the questions were irrelevant to the judicial inquiry.
See, e. (J , App . 586-590.
47
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But this Court is not free to invalidate acts of Congress based
upon inferences that we may be asked to draw from our
personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent
history. In judging the constitutiona1ity of the Act, we may
only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of
Congress who voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effects.
We are persuaded that none of these factors is sµggestive that
the Act is a punitive bill of attainder, or otherwise facially
unconstitutional. The judgment of the Courts of Appeals
is
Affirmed.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment.

I

I join the judgment of the Court and all but

Parts IV ana V of its opinion.

For the reasons stated by

the Court, I agree that the Act on its face does not
violate appellant's rights under the First, Fourth, and
1
f Fifth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause.
For reasons quite different from those stated by the
Court, I also would hold that the Act is consistent on its
face with the separation of powers.

I

The Court begins its analysis of the issues by
limiting its inquiry to those constitutional claims that
are addressed to "the facial validity of the provisions of
the Act requiring the Administrator to take the recordings
and materials into the Government's custody subject to

2.

screening by Government archivists."

Ante, at 11.

I

agree that the inquiry must be limited in this manner, but
I would add two qualifications that in my view further
restrict the reach of today's decision.
First, Title I of the Act does not purport to
be a generalized provision addressed to the complex
problem of disposition of the accumulated papers of
Presidents or other Federal officers.

Unlike Title II,

which authorizes a study of that problem, Title I is
specifically and narrowly addressed to the need to
preserve the papers of former President Nixon after his
resignation under threat of impeachment.

It is

legislation, as the Court properly observes, directed
against "a legitimate class of one."

Ante, at 44.

President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974.
Less than two weeks earlier, the House Judiciary Committee
had voted to recommend his impeachment, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1974), including among
the charges of impeachable offenses allegations that the
President had obstructed investigation of the Watergate
break-in and had engaged in other unlawful activities

I during

his Administration.

Id., at 1-4.

One month after

President Nixon's resignation, on September 8, 1974,
President Ford granted him a general pardon for all
offenses against the United States that he might have

I committed

r

in his term of off ice.

3.
On the same day, the Nixon-Sampson agreement
was made public.

The agreement provided for the materials

to be deposited temporarily with the General Services
Administration, in a California facility, but gave the
former President the right to withdraw or direct the
destruction of any of the materials after an initial
period of three years or, in the case of tape recordings,
five years.

During this initial period access would be

limited to President Nixon or to persons authorized by
him, subject only to legal process ordering materials to
be produced.

Upon President Nixon's death, the tapes were

to be destroyed immediately.

10 Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents 1104-1105

(1974).

Those who drafted and sponsored Title I of the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act in
Congress uniformly viewed its provisions as emergency
legislation, necessitated by the extraordinary events that
led to the resignation and pardon and to the former
President's arrangement for the disposition of his
papers.

Senator Neli6n, for example, referred to the Bill

as "an emergency measure" whose principal purpose was to
assure "protective custody" of the materials, 120 Cong.
Rec.

s.

18233,

s.

18235 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1974):

"[T]here is an urgency in the
situation now before us. Under the
existing agreement between the GSA

4.
and Mr. Nixon, if Mr. Nixon died
tomorrow, these tapes -- if I read the
agreement correctly -- are to be
destroyed immediately; it is also
possible that the Nixon papers could be
destroyed by 1977. This would be a
catastrophy [sic] from an historical
standpoint."
Id., at S. 18242.
'
Senator Ervin similarly remarked:
"This bill really deals with an
emergency situation, because some of
these documents are needed in the
courts and by the general public in
order that they might know the full
story of what is known collectively as
the Watergate affair."
Id., at
s. 18240.
Efforts to apply the legislation more generally to all
Presidents or to other Federal officers were resisted on
the Senate floor.

Thus, speaking again of the unique

needs created by the Nixon-Sampson agreement and the
Watergate scandals, Senator Javits stressed that "we seek
to deal in this particular legislation, only with this
particular set of papers of this particular
ex-President."

Id.,. a .t S. 18244.

No. 93-1181, 93dCong., 2dSess.

See generally S. Rep.
(1974).

It is essential in addressing the
constitutional issues before us, not to lose sight of the
limited justification for and objectives of this
legislation.

The extraordinary events that led to the

resignation and pardon, and the agreement providing that
the record of those events might be destroyed by
President Nixon, created an impetus for Congressional
action that may -- without overstatement -- be termed

5.

unique.

I therefore do not share my Brother Rehnquist's

foreboding that this Act "will daily stand as a veritable
sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his
advisors."

Post, at 1.

If the study authorized by Title

II of the Act should lead to more general legislation,
there will be time enough to consider its validity if a
proper case comes before us.
My second reservation follows from the first.
Because Congress acted in what it perceived to be an
emergency, it concentrated on the immediate problem of
establishing governmental custody for the purpose of safeguarding the materials.

It deliberately left to the rule-

making process, and to subsequent judicial review, the difficult and sensitive task of reconciling the long-range
interests of President Nixon, his advisors, the three
branches of Government, and the American public, once
custody was established.

As the District Court observed,

"The Act in terms merely directs GSA
to take custody of the materials that
fall within the scope of section 101,
and to promulgate regulations after
taking into consideration the seven
factors listed in section 104(a).
Those factors provide broad latitude
to the Administrator in establishing
the processes and the standards under
which the materials will be reviewed
and public access to them assured . .
• • " 4 0 8 F . Su pp . 3 21 , 3 35 (19 7 6 )
' (footnote omitted).
In view of the latitude that the Act gives to GSA in
framing regulations, I agree with the District Court that

6.

the question to be resolved in this case is a narrow one:
"Is the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress
unconstitutional without reference to the content of any
conceivable set of regulations falling within the scope of
the Administrator's a,u thority under section 104(a)?"

I at

Id.,

334-335.
No regulations have yet taken effect under

§

104(a).

Ante, at 9.

In these circumstances, I believe

it is appropriate to address appellant's constitutional
claims, as did the District Court, with an eye towards the
kind of regulations and screening practices that would be
consistent with the Act and yet that would afford protection to the important constitutional interests asserted.
Section 104 (a) (5) of the Act directs the Administrator to
take into account:
"the need to protect any party's
opportunity to assert any legally or
constitutionally based right or
privilege which would prevent or
otherwise limit access to such
recordings and materials."
The District Court observed that in considering this
factor, the Administrator might well provide for
meaningful participation by appellant in the screening
process and in the selection of the archivists who would
review the materials.

The court also observed that

procedures might be adopted that would minimize any
intrusion into private materials and that would permit
appellant an opportunity to obtain administrative and

7.

judicial review of all proposed classifications of the
2
( materials. 408 F. Supp., at 339-340.
Finally, the
court noted that substantive restrictions on access might
be adopted, consistent with traditional restrictions
placed on access to Presidential papers, and that such
restrictions could forbid public disclosure of any
confidential communications between appellant and his
advisors "for a fixed period of years, or until the death
of Mr. Nixon and others partic:pating in or the subject of
\

communications."

Id., at 338.

I have no doubt that procedural safeguards and
substantive restrictions such as these are within the
authority of the Administrator to adopt under the broad
mandate of§ 104(a).

While there can be no positive

assurance that such protections will in fact be afforded,
we nonetheless may assume, in reviewing the facial
validity of the Act, that all constitutional and legal
rights will be given full protection.

Indeed, that

assumption is the basis on which I join today's judgment
upholding the facial ·validity of the Act.

As the Court

makes clear in its opinion, the Act plainly requires the
Administrator, in designing the regulations, to

0

consider

the need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant
and other individuals against infringement by the
processing itself or, ultimately, by public access to the
materials retained."

Ante, _at 8.

8.

II

I agree that Title I of the Act cannot be held
unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the
principle of separation of powers or of the Presidential
privilege that derives from that principle.

This is not a

case in which the Legislative Branch has exceeded its
enumerated powers by assuming a function reserved to the
Executive under Article II.

~ , Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 , U.S. 52

(1926).

The question of Governmental power in this case

is whether the Act, by mandating seizure and eventual
public access to the papers of the Nixon Presidency,
impermissibly interferes with the President's power to
carry out his Article II obligations.

In concluding that

the Act is not facially invalid on this ground, I consider

I

it dispositive in the circumstances of this case that the
President has represented to this Court, through the
Solicitor General, that the Act serves rather than hinders
the Article II fun9tions of the Chief Executive.
I would begin by asking whether, putting to one
side other limiting provisions of the Constitution,
Congress has acted beyond the scope of its enumerated
powers.

Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 70 (1957) (Harlan,

J., concurring).

Apart from the legislative concerns

9•

mentioned by the Court, ante, at 49-50, I believe that
Congress unquestionably has acted within the ambit of its
broad authority to investigate, to inform the public, and,
ultimately, to legislate against suspected corruption and
abuse of power in the Executive Branch.
This Court has recognized inherent power in
Congress to pass appropriate legislation to "preserve the
departments and institutions of the general government
from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by
force or by corruption."
U.S. 534, 545

(1934).

Burroughs v. United States, 290

Congress has the power, for

example, to restrict the political activities of civil
servants, e.g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); to punish bribery and conflicts of i n t e r e s t , ~ ,
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344

(1906), to punish

obstructions of lawful governmental functions, Haas v.
Henkel, 216 U.S. 462

(1910), and -- with important

exceptions -- to make available Executive documents to the
public,

EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73

(1973).

The court also

has recognized that - in aid of such legislation Congress
has a broad power "to inquire into and publicize
corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in the
agencies of the Government."
354 U.S. 178, 200

(1957).

Watkins v. United States,

See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S., at 137-138; Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).

10.

The legislation before us rationally serves
these investigative and informative powers.

Congress

legitimately could conclude that the Nixon-Sampson
agreement, following the recommendation of impeachment and
the resignation of President Nixon, might lead to
destruction of those of the former President's papers that
would be most likely to assure public understanding of the
unprecedented events that led to the premature termination
of the Nixon Administration.

Congress similarly could

conclude that preservation of the papers was important to
its own eventual understanding of whether that
Administration had been characterized by deficiences
susceptible of legislative correction.

Providing for

retention of the materials by the Administrator and for
the selection of appropriate materials for eventual
disclosure to the public was a rational means of serving
these legitimate Congressional objectives.
Congress still might be said to have exceeded
its enumerated powers, however, if the Act could be viewed
as an assumption by the Legislative Branch of functions
reserved exclusively to the Executive by Article II.

In

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), for example, the Court buttressed its conclusion
that the President had acted beyond his power under
Article II by characterizing his seizure of the steel
mills as an exercise of a "legislative" function reserved

\

11.
exclusively to Congress by Article I.

Id., at 588-589.

And last Term we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that

the appointment of executive officers is an "executive"
function that Congress is without power to vest in
itself.

Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 85-143.

But the Act

before us presumptively avoids these difficulties by
entrusting the task of ensuring that its provisions are
faithfully executed to an officer of the Executive
4
Branch.
I therefore conclude that the Act cannot be
held invalid on the ground that Congress has exceeded its
affirmative grant of power under the Constitution.

But it

is further argued that Congress nonetheless has
contravened the limitations on legislative power
implicitly imposed by the creation of a co-equal Executive
Branch in Article II.

It is said that by opening up the

operations of a past Administration to eventual public
scrutiny, the Act impairs the ability of present and
future Presidents to obtain unfettered information and
candid advice and thereby limits Executive power in
contravention of Article II and the principle of
separation of powers.

I see no material distinction

between such an argument and the collateral claim that the
Act violates the Presidential privilege in confidential

communications.

12.

In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
we recognized a presumptive, yet qualified, privilege for
confidential communications between the President and his
advisors.

Observing that "those who expect public

dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to
the detriment of the decisionmaking process,"

id., at

705, we recognized that a President's generalized interest
in confidentiality is "constitutionally based" to the
extent that it relates to "the effective discharge of a
President's powers."

Id., at 711.

We held nonetheless

that "[t]he generalized assertion of privilege must yield
to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial."

Id., at 713.

Appellant understandably relies on Nixon I.
Comparing the narrow scope of the judicial subpoenas
considered there with the comprehensive reach of this Act
-- encompassing all of the communications of his
Administration -- appellant argues that there is no
"demonstrated, speciiic need" here that can outweigh the
extraordinary intrusion worked by this legislation.

On

the ground that the result will be to destroy "the
effective discharge of the President's powers," appellant
urges that the Act be held unconstitutional on its face.
These arguments undoubtedly have considerable
force, but I do not think they can support a decision

13.

Jinvalidating this Act on its face.

Section 1 of Article

II vests all of the Executive power in the sitting
-

President and limits his term of office to four years.

It

is his sole responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."

Art II., § 3.

Here, President

Carter has represented to this Court through the Solicitor
General that the Act is consistent with "the effective
discharge of the President's powers":
"Far from constituting a breach of
executive autonomy, the Act . . . is
an appropriate means of ensuring that
the Executive Branch will have access
to the materials necessary to the
performance of its duties." Brief
for the Federal Appellees 29.
This representation is similar to one made earlier on
behalf of President Ford, who signed the Act.
the Federal Appellees to Affirm 15.

Motion of

I would hold that

these representations must be given precedence over

I

appellant's claim of Presidential privilege.

Since the

incumbent President views this Act as furthering rather

than hindering effective execution of the laws, I do not

believe it is within the province of this Court to hold
otherwise.
This is not to say that a former President
lacks standing to assert a claim of Presidential
privilege.

I agree with the Court that the former

14.

President may raise such a claim, whether before a court

I

or a Congressional committee.

In some circumstances the

intervention of the incumbent President will be
impr~ctical or his views unknown, and in such a case I
assume that the former President's views on the effective
operation of the Executive branch would be entitled to the
greatest deference.

It is uncontroverted, I believe, that

the privilege in confidential Presidential communications
survives a change in administrations.

I would only hold

that in the circumstances here presented the incumbent,
having made clear in the appropriate forum his opposition
to the former President's claim, alone can speak for the
Executive Branch.

5

I am not unmindful that "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."
(1803).

Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch 137, 177

As we reiterated in Nixon I,
"Deciding whether a matter has in any
measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of
government . . . is itself a delicate
exercise ' iri constitutional
interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter - of the
Constitution." 418 U.S., at 704,
quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962).
--

My position is simply that a decision to waive the
privileges inhering in the Office of the President with

15.

respect to an otherwise valid Act of Congress is the
1
6
President's alone to make under the Constitution.

III

The difficult constitutional questions lie
ahead.

The President no doubt will see to it that the

interests in confidentiality so forcefully urged by my
dissenting Brethren are taken into account in the final
regulations that are promulgated under§ 104(a). While the
President has supported the constitutionality of the Act
as it is written, there is no indication that he will
oppose appellant's assertions of Presidential privilege as
they relate to the rules that will govern the screening

I process

and the timing of disclosure, and particularly the

restrictions that may be placed on certain documents and

I record1ngs.

I emphasize that the validity of such

assertions of Presidential privilege is not properly
before us at this time.
Similarly, difficult and important questions
concernirig individual rights remain to be resolved.

At

stake are not only the rights of appellant but also those

I

of other individuals whose First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendment interests may be implicated by disclosure of

\ communications as to which a legitimate expectation of
privacy existed.

I agree with the Court that even in the

16.

councils of Government an individual "has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his personal communications,"
(ante, at 37, and also that compelled disclosure of an
individual's political associations, in and out of
Government, can be justified only by "a compelling public
need that cannot - be met in a less restrictive way,"
at 39.

id.,

Today's decision is limited to the facial validity

of the Act's provisions for retention and screening of the
materials.

I do not understand the Court's discussion of

the interests served by those provisions to foreclose in
any way the search that must yet be undertaken for means
of assuring eventual access to important historical
records without infringing individual rights protected by
( the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.

FOOTNOTES

1/
Although I agree with much of Parts IV
and V, I am unable to join those parts of the Court's
opinion because of my uncertainty as to the reach of its
extended discussion of the competing constitutional
interests implicated by the Act.
2/
By way of illustration, the District

Court observed that the following archival practices might
be adopted to limit invasion of appellant's
constitutionally protected interests:

"l. A practice of requiring
archivists to make the minimal
intrusion necessary to classify
material. Identification by
signature, the file within which
material is found, general nature (as
with diaries, or dictabelts serving
the same function), a cursory glance
at the contents, or other means could
significantly limit infringement of
plaintiff's interests without
undermining the effectiveness of
screening by governmental personnel.
Participation by Mr. Nixon in
preliminary identification of
material that might be processed
without word-by-word review would
facilitate such a procedure.
2. A-practice of giving Mr. Nixon
some voice in the designation of the
personnel who will review the
materials, perhaps by selecting from
a body of archivists approved by the
government.

FN-2

3. A practice of giving Mr. Nixon
notice of all proposed
classifications of materials and an
opportunity to obtain administrative
and judicial review of them, on
constitutional or other grounds,
before they are effectuated." 408 F.
!supp. 321, 339-340 (1976) (footnotes
omit tea) .

I

I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice

White in his concurring opinion on the need to return
private materials to appellant.
3
-/

h
·
·
. t ence o f
Te
D1str1ct
Court note d t h e ex1s

"a basic set of donor-imposed access
restrictions that was first formulated by
Herbert Hoover [and] followed by
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson. Under this scheme the following
materials would be restricted:
1) materials that are
security-classified;
2) materials whose disclosure would
be prejudicial to foreign affairs;
3) materials containing statements
made by or to a President in
confidence;
4)
materials relating to the
President's family, personal, or
business .affairs or to such affairs
of individuals corresponding with the
President;
5) materials containing statements
about individuals that might be used
to embarrass or harass them or
members of their families;
6) such other materials as the
President or his representative might
designate as appropriate for
restriction.
President Franklin Roosevelt imposed
restrictions very similar to numbers 1, 2,

FN-3

4, and 5, and in addition restricted
(a) investigative reports on individuals,
(b) applications and recommendations for
positions, and (c) . documents containing
derogatory remarks about an individual.
President Truman's restrictions were like
those of Hoover, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson, except that he made no provision,
like number 6 above, for restriction
merely at his own instance." Id., at 338
n. 19 (citations omitted).
--

!/
§

The validity of the provision of

104(b) for possible disapproval of the Administrator's

regulations by either House of Congress is not before us
at this time.

See id., at 338, n. 17 (1976); Brief for

the Federal Appellees 26 and n. 11.

5/

-

There is at least some risk that

political, and even personal, antagonisms could motivate
Congress and the President to join in a legislative
seizure and public exposure of a former President's papers
without due regard to the long-range implications of such
action for the Article II functions of the Chief
Executive.

Even if such legislation did not violate the

separation of powers, it might well contravene the Bill of
Attainder Clause.
[ 303

(1946).

See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.

But this is not the case before us.

In

passing this legislation, Congress acted to further
legitimate objectives in circumstances that were wholly
unique in the history of our country.

The legislation was

FN-4

approved by President Ford, personally chosen by President

Nixon as his successor, and is now also supported by
President Carter.

~/Cf.Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
\ Sawyer, 343U.S. 579, 635-637

(1952)(Jackson, J.,

concurring):
"When the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.
In these
circumstances, and in these only, may
he be said (for what it may be worth)
to personify the federal
sovereignty. If his act is held
unconstitutional under these
circumstances, it usually means that
the Federal Government as an
undivided whole lacks power . . . . "
(footnote omitted)
See also Williams v. The Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet.
415, 420

(1839):
"[T]his Court ha[s] laid down the
rule, that the action of the
political - branches of the government
in a matter that belongs to them, is
conclusive."
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court and all but Parts IV
\ and V of its opinion. For substantially the reasons stated
by the Court, I agree that the Act on its face does not
violate appellant's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause. 1 For reasons
quite different from those stated by the Court, I also would
hold that the Act is consistent on its face with the separation
of powers.

I
The Court begins its analysis of the issues by limiting
its inquiry to those constitutional claims that are addressed
to "the facial validity of the provisions of the Act requiring
the Administrator to take the recordings and materials into
the Government's custody subject to screening by Government archivists." Ante, at 11. I agree that the inquiry
must be limited in this manner, but I would add two qualifications that in my view further restrict the reach of today's
decision .
First. Title I of the Act docs not purport to be a generalized
1 Although I agrrr with much of Part:- IV and V, I am unable to join
I ho:-:t• parts of thP Courl 's opinion bPcau~P of mr 1mcPrtainty as to the
re:wh of its c·xtendrd disrm;sioll or the eompcting con:stitutional interests
tmpheatecl by the Al'l.
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provision addressed to the complex problem of disposition
of the accumlla.ted papers of Presidents or other federal
officers. Unlike Title II, which authorizes a study of that
problem, Title I is specifically and narrowly addressed to
the need to preserve the papers of former President Nixon
after his resignation under threat of impeachment. It is
legislation, as the Court properly observes, directed against
"a legitimate class of one." Ante, at 44.
President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. Less than
two weeks earlier, the House Judiciary Committee had voted
to recommend his impeachment, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1305,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1974), including among the
charges of impeac~able offenses allegations that the President
had obstructed investigation of the Watergate break-in and
had engaged in other unlawful activities during his Administration. Id., at 1-4. One month after President Nixon's
resignation, on September 8, 1974, President Ford granted
him a general pardon for all offenses against the United
States that he might have committed in his term of office.
On the same day, the Nixon-Sampson agreement was made
public. The agreement provided for the materials to be
deposited temporarily with the General Services Administration, in a California facility, but gave the former President
the right to withdraw or direct the destruction of any materials after an initial period of three years or. in the case
of tape recordings, five years. During this initial period access would be limited to President Nixon or to persons
authorized by him, subject only to legal process ordering
materials to be produced. Upon President Nixon's death,
the tapes were to be destroyed immediately. 10 Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents 1104-1105- (1974).
Those who drafted and sponsored Title I of the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act in Congress uniformly viewed its provisions as emergency legislation, necessitated by the extraordinary events that led to the resignation
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-and pardon and to the former President's arrangement for
the disposition of his papers. Senator Nelson, for example,
•referred to the Bill as "an emergency measure" whose prin~cipal purpose was to assure "protective custody" of the
materials, 120 Cong. Rec. S. 18233, S. 18235 ( daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1974).
"[T] here is an urgency in the situation now before us.
Under the existing agreement between the GSA and
Mr. Nixon, if Mr. Nixon died tomorrow, these tapesif I read the agreement cot-rectly-are to be destroyed
immediately; it is also possible that the Nixon papers
papers could be destroyed by 1977. This would be a
catastrophy [sic] from an historical standpoint." Id.,
at S. 18242.
Senator Ervin similarly remarked:
"This bill really deals with an emergency situation,
because some of these documents are needed in the
courts and by the general public in order that they
might know the full story of what is known collectively
as the Watergate affair." Id., at S. 18240.
Efforts to apply the legislation more generally to all Presidents or to other federal officers were resisted on the Senate
floor. Thus, speaking again of the unique needs created
by the Nixon-Sampson agreement and the Watergate scandals, Senator ,Javits stressed that "we seek to deal in this
particular legislation. only with this particular set of papers
of this particular ex-President." Id., at S. 18244. See generally S. Rep. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
It is essential in addressing the constitutional issues before us, 11ot to lose sight of the limited justification for and
objectives of this legislation. The extraordinary events that
led to the resignation and pardon, and the agreement providing that the record of those events might be destroyed by
President Nixon, created an impetus for congressional action

,.
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that may-without overstatement-be termed unique. I
therefore do not share my Brother REHNQUIST's foreboding
that this Act "will daily stand as a veritable sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his advisors." Post,
at I. If the study authorized by Title II of the Act should
lead to more general legislation, there will be time enough
to consider its validity if a proper case comes before us.
My second reservation follows from the first. Because
Congress acted in what it perceived to be an emergency,
it concentrated on the immediate problem of establishing
governmental custody for the purpose of safeguarding the
materials. It deliberately left to the rulemaking process,
and to subsequent judicial review. the difficult and sensitive
task of reconciling the long-range interests of President Nixon,
his advisors, the three branches of Government, and the
American public, once custody was established. As the District Court observed,
"The Act in terms merely directs GSA to take custody
of the materials that fall within the scope of section
101, and to promulgate regulations after taking into
consideration the seven factors listed in section 104 (a).
Those factors provide broad latitude to the Administrator
in establishing the processes and the standards under
which the materials wi11 be reviewed and public access
to them assured . . . ." 408 F. Supp. 321, 335 ( 1976)
( footnote orni tted).
In view of the latitude that the Act gives to GSA in framing
regulations, I agre~ with the District Court that the question
to be resolved in this case is a narrow one: "ls the regulatory
scheme enacted by Congress unconstitutional without reference to the content of any conceivable set of regula.tions
.falling within the scope of the Administrator's authority
. under section 104 (a)'?" Id., at 334-335.
No regulations have yet taken effect under § 104 (a).
Ante, at 9, In these circumstances, I believe it is appro-
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priate to address appellant's constitutional claims, as did the
District Court, with an eye towards the kind of regulations
and screening practices that would be consistent with the
Act and yet that would afford protection to the important
constitutional interests asserted. Section 104 (a)(5) of the
Act directs the Administrator to take into account:
"the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert
any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege
which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such
recordings and materials."
The District Court observed that in considering this factor,
the Administra.tor might well provide for meaningful participation by appellant in the screening process and in the
selection of the archivists who would review the materials.
The court also observed that procedures might be adopted
that would minimize any intrusion into private materials
and that would permit appellant an opportunity to obtain
administrative and judicial review of all proposed classifica•
tions of the materials. 408 F. Supp., at 339-340.i Finally,
2 By way of illu;;tration, the District Court observed that the following archival practicPi:, might be adopted to limit invasion of appellant's
constitutionally protected intere;;ti:,:
"l. A practirP of requiring archivists to make the minimal intrusion nece::,<i:,ary to clas;;if'y material. Identifica.t.ion by signature, the file within
which material is found, general nature (as with diaries, or dictabelts serving the same function), a cursory glance at the contents, or other means
could signifirm1tly limit infringrment of plaintiff's interests without undermining the rffectiveness of i:,creening by governmental personnel. Participation by Mr. Nixon in preliminary identification of material that
might be processed without word-by-word review would facilitate such a
procedure.
" 2. A practice of giving Mr. Nixon some voice in the designation of the
personnel who will review the materials, perhaps by i:;electing from a
body of arrhi\'ists approved by the government.
" 3. A practicP of giving Mr. Nixon notice of all proposed classifications
of ,materials and an opportunity to obtnin administrative and judicial re-
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the court noted that substa11tive restrictions on access might
be adopted, consistent with traditional restrictions placed
on access to Presidential papers, and that such restrictions
could forbid public disclosure of any confidential communications between appellant and his advisors "for a fixed period
of years. or until the death of Mr. Nixon and others participating in or the subject of communications." Id., at 338.a
I have no doubt that procedural safegua.rcls and substantive restrictions such as these are within the authority of the
Administrator to adopt under the broad mandate of § 104 (a) ..
While there can be no positive assurance that such protections
will in fact be afforded, we nonetheless may assume, in review-

I

view of them, on constitutional or other grounds, before they are effectuated." 408 F . Supp. 321, 3;{9-a40 (1976) (footnoteis omitkd).
I agree with the views expressed by Mn. Jus'l'ICE WHITE, ante, at - - - , on the need to return private mn.t erials to a.ppellant.
3 The Distrirt Court noted the existence of
"a basic set of donor-imposed ::icces:s restrictions that was first formulated
by Herbert Hoover [and] followed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kt>trnedy,
and .Tolrnson. Under this scheme the following materials would be
restrict rd:
"l) matnial~ that are security-chtssified ;
"2) matPrials who~e disrlosure would be prejudicial to foreign affairs;
"3) material;; containin~ statements made by or to a President in
confidence;
"-0 matrrials relating to the President's family , personal, or business
affairs or to surh affain; of individuals corre:;ponding with tlw President;
';5) material s containing stl1tements about, individuals that might be
used to embarr:is;; or harass them or members of their families;
"6) surh other mntcrials as the Pre;;ident or his representative might
designate as appropriate for re;;t,riction .
"President Fmnklin Hoosevelt imposed restrictiom; very similar to
rn1mber,; 1, 2, 4, and 5, and in addition · re,;tricted (:1,) investigative reports
on individuals, (b) npplira,t ions and recommendations for positions, and
(c) documr11ts containing drrogatory remarks about an individual.
Pre::;idrnt Trum:1J1 •~ rr:-trirtion:-< were like thm,e of Hoover, Eisenhower,
:Kr1111rd)·, and .fohnson, cxrept that he made no provision, like number 6
above, for re~( riction merely at his own instance." Id., at 338 n. 19 (citation::; omitted).

75-1005-CONCOR (D)
NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

7

ing the facial validity of the Act, that all constitutional
and legal rights will be given full protection. Indeed, that
assumption is the basis on which I join today's judgment
upholding the facial validity of the Act. As the Court
_makes clear in its opinion, the Act plainly requires the
Administrator, in designing the regulations, to "consider the
need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant and
other individuals against infringement by the processing itself or, ultimately, by public access to the materials retained."
Ante, at 8.

II
I agree that Title I of the Act cannot be held unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the principle of ~paration
of powers or of the Presidential privilege that derives from
that principle. This is not a case in which the Legislative
Branch has exceeded its enumerated powers by assuming
a function reserved to the Executive under Art. II. E. g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States,
272 U. S. 52 (1926). The question of governmental power
in this case is whether the Act, by mandating seizure and
eventual public access to the papers of the Nixon Presidency,
impermissibly interfers with the President's power to carry
out his Art. II obligations. In concluding that the Act is not
facially invalid on this ground, I consider it dispositive in
the circumstances of this case that the President has represented to this Court. through the Solicitor General, that the
Act serves rather than hinders the Art. II functions of the
Chief Executive.
I would begin by asking whether, putting to one side
other limiting provisions of the Constitution, Congress has
acted beyond the scope of its enumerated powers. Cf. Reid
v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 70 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
AJ)art from the legislative concerns mentioned by the Court,
,a nte, at 49- 50, I believe that Congress unquestionably has
acted within the ambit of its broad authority to investigate,

·,
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to inform the public, and, ultimately, to legislate against
suspected corruption and abuse of power in the Executive
Branch.
This Court has recognized inherent power in Congress to
pass appropriate legislation to "preserve the departments and
institutions of the general government from impairment or
destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption."
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 545 (1934).
Congress has the power, for example, to restrict the political
activities of civil servants, e. g., CSC v. Letter Carriers,
413 U. S. 548 (1973); to punish bribery and conflicts of
interest, e. g., Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906),
to punish obstructions of lawful governmental functions,
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462 (1910), and-with important
exceptions--to make available Executive documents to the
public, EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973). The Court also
has recognized that in aid of such legislation Congress has
a broad power "to inquire into and publicize corruption,
n'laladministration or inefficiency in the agencies of the Government." Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200
(1957). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S .. at 137-138;
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491
(1975).
The legislation before us rationally serves these investigative and informative powers. Congress legitimately could
conclude that the Nixon-Sampson agreement, following the
recommendation of impeachment and the resignation of President Nixon, might lead to destruction of those of the former
President's papers that would be most likely to assure public
understanding of the unprecedented events that led to the
premature termination of the Nixon Administration. Congress similarly could conclude that preservation of the papers
was important to its own eventual understanding of whether
that Administration had been characterized by deficiencies
susceptible of legislative correction. Providing for retention
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of the materials by the Administrator and for the selection
of appropriate materials for eventual disclosure to the public
was a rational means of serving these legitimate congressional objectives.
Congress still might be said to have exceeded its enumerated
powers, however, if the Act could be viewed as an assumption
by the Legislative Branch of functions reserved exclusively
to the Executive by Art. II. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 ( 1952), for example, the Court
buttressed its conclusion that the President had acted beyond
his power under Art. II by characterizing his seizure of the
steel mills as an exercise of a "legislative" function reserved
exclusively to Congress by Art. I. Id., at 588-589. And
last Term we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that the
appointment of executive officers is an "executive" function
that Congress is without power to vest in itself. Buckley v.
Valeo, supra, a,t 85-143. But the Act before us presumptively avoids these difficulties by entrusting the task of ensuring that its provisions are faithfully executed to an officer
of the Executive Branch:1
I therefore conclude that the Act cannot be held invalid
on the ground that Congress has exceeded its affirmative
grant of power under the Constitution. But it is further
argued that Congress nonetheless has contr{tvened the limitations on legislative power implicitly imposed by the creation
of a coequal Executive Branch in Art. II. It is said that
by opening up the operations of a past Administration to
eventual public scrutiny, the Act impairs the ability of
present and future Presidents to obtain unfettered informa,t,ion and candid advice and thereby limits executive power
in contravention of Art. II and the principle of separation
1
Thr validity of the provi,,;ion of § 104 (b) for possible disapproval of
!hr Administrator's regulations by either Howse of Congre ·::; is not before
lit; at this timr.
See id., at 338 n. 17 (1976); Brief for the Federal ApJlPllee~ 26, and n. 11.

•
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of powers. I see no material distinction between such an
argument and the collateral claim that the Act violates the
Presidential pri~ilege ·in confidential communications.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), we recognized a presumptive. yet qualified, privilege for confidential
communications between the President and his advisors.
Observing that "those who expect public dissemination of
their remarks may well temper candor with a co11cem for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment
of the decisionmaking process," id., at 705, we recognized that
a President's generalized interest in confidentiality is "constitutionally based" to the extent that it relates to "the
effective discharge of a President's powers." Id., at 711.
We held nonetheless that " [ t] he generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specified need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id., at 713.
Appellant understandably relies on Nixon I. Comparing
the narrow scope of the judicial subpoenas considered there
with the comprehensive reach of this Act-encompassing
all of the communications of his Administration-appellant
argues that there is no "demonstrated, specific need" here
that can outweigh the extraordinary intrusion worked by this
legislation. 011 the ground that the result will be to destroy
"the effective discharge of the President's powers," appellant
urges that the Act be held unconstitutional on its face.
These argu1~ents undoubtedly have considerable force, but
1 do not think they can support a decision invalidating this
Act on its face. Section 1 of Art. II· vests all of the executive power in the sitting President and limits his term
of office to four years. It is his sole responsibility to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. IL. § 3.
Here. President Carter has represented to this Court through
the Solicitor General that the Act is consistent with "the
-effective discharge of the President's powers":
"Far from constituting a breach of executive autonomy,
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the Act . . . is an appropriate means of ensuring that
the Executive Branch will have access to the materials
necessary to the performance of its duties." Brief for
the Federal Appllees 29.
This representation is similar to one made earlier on behalf
of President Ford. who signed the Act. Motion of the Federal
Appellees to Affirm 15. I would hold that these representations must be given precedents over appellant's claim of
Presidential privilege. Since the incumbent President views
this Act as furthering rather than hindering effective execution of the laws. I do not believe it is within' the province
of this Court to hold otherwise.
This is not to say that a former President lacks standing
to assert a claim of Presidential privilege. I agree with the
Court that the former President may raise such a claim,
whether before a court or a congressional committee. In
some circumstances the intervention of the incumbent President will be impractical or his views unknown, and in such
a case I assume that the former President's views on the
effective operation of the Executive Branch would be entitled
to the greatest deference. It is uncontroverted, I believe,
that the privilege in confidential Presidential communications
survives a change in administrations. I would only hold that
in the circumstances here presented the incumbent, having
made clear in the appropriate forum his opposition to the
former President's claim, alone can speak for the Executive
Branch.:;
" TIH'n' is at lea:st some risk that politiC"al, and even per,·.onn.1 antag11, legislntivP ~eizure and public exposure of a former President's paper;; without
dttr rega.rd to t.he long-range implicationb" of :such n.ction for the Art. II
funrtions of the Chief Exrctttiw. Even if such legislation did not violate
the srparntion of power~, it, rrught well infringe individual liberties prolt•cted b~· the Bill of Attninder Clau;:e or thr Bill of Rights. Bttt this is
110t the case before us. In pa~:sing this lrgislation, Congrf'ss acted to furUwr legitimate ol:ljectives in .r.in·um~tance:s tlrnt were wholly unique in U1e

011i:sms Pottld motivat<' Congrcvs; nnd the President to join in

'
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I am not unmindful that "[i] t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'t
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). As we reiterated in iVixon II,
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government ... is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." 418 U. S.,
at 704, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962),
My position is simply tha.t a decision to waive the privileges
i11heri11g in the Office of "the President with respect to valid
Act of Congress is the President's alone to make under the
Constitution. 0

III
The difficult constitutional questions lie ahead. The Preside11t no doubt will see to it that the interests i11 co11fidenhi1Stor~· of our country. ThC' legii,-lation was approved by President Ford,
prnmnally rho:;en by Pre:;idrnt Nixon as his successor, and i:; now al8o
~upported by Prr:,ident Carter. In view of the circumst:mces leading to
iti-1 pa;;sage and the protection it provides for "any ... constitutionally
based right or privilege." p. 6, supra. t hi;.: Act on it;; face dews not violate
the per~onal ('Oll8titutional right,-; a;;sPrted br appellant.
6 Cf. Youngstow11 ::.heet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-637
(1952) (Jack8ou, J., concurring):
·· When the PrP,-;ide11t acts pur:;uant to an exprPs:s or implied authorizal 1011 of Congre:s:s, hi:; authorit~· is at its maximum, for it include:; nil that
hC' posse:,;i:ie:,; in hi~ ow11 right plus all that Congre8;; can delegate. In
tbesr rirc11m;.:tancr:,;, aud in tht>:se only, may hr be said (for what it may
he worth) to personify t hi' frdrral sovrreignt y. If his act is held unconstitutional undrr tlw:-:t> circumstances, it usually means tlrnt thr Fedrral Govc•rnnwut. a::< ,111 11ndividPd wholr lack:, power . . . . . " (Footnoe omittnl.)
SN' also Williams v. The Suffolk !nsuraucr Co ., 13 Pet. 415,420 (1839):
" I1' Ihi:- Court ha I s·I laid down the rule, that the action of the political
hranrhr~ of th<' O'ovrrnment in a matter that belo11gs to them, ~
<·onch1:;;ive,"

l
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tiality so forcefully urged by my dissenting Brethren are
taken into account i11 the final regulations that are promulgated under ~ 104 ( a). While the Pm, ,de11t ha~ ~llf'l'L'rtl'cl
thr constitutiouality of the Act as it is writte11. l!wi·e ::.- nu
indicatiou that he will oppose appellant's assertions o;: PrH;ic!Pntial privilege as they relate to the rules that will go·, nn
the ~<'rt'P11iug process and tht> timing of c.lisclosure. and parti<·1il:11 I_, I IJ,, rP:-trictions that Ill/\}' b" plar,,J () 11 c•prtain doruments anc.l recordings. I f•mphasi.ze that the validity of such
l:l"'('rtwn::, of P, <·-icleutial privilege i:· not p1'op1·1'1~ h(-'lur,, u~
at this time.
Similarly. dith<·ult and important questions concerning individual rights remain to be resolved. At stake are not
only the rights of a.pµella11t but also those of other individmtls
whose First. Fourth. all(! F'ifth Amendment iuterests may
be implicated by disclosun· of communications as to which
a legitimate expectation of privacy existed. I agree with
the Court that even in th<· C'ouncils of governmnet an individual "has a legtimate expecta.t ion of privacy in his personal
communications," ante, at 37. and also that compelled disclosure of an individual's political associations, in and out of
government, can be justified only by "a compelling public
need that cannot be met in a less restrictve way," id., at 39.
Today's decision is limited to the facial validity of the Act's
provisions for retention and screening of the materials. I
do not understand the Court's discussion of the interests
served by those provisions to foreclose in any way the
search that must yet be undertaken for means of assuring
eventual access to important historical records without infringing i11dividual rights protected by the First, Fourth,
a nd- Fifth Amendments,
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
I dissent. I see the Court's holding as a grave repudiation ~ j ~
of nearly 200 years of judicial precedent and historical prac- <hr,~~ . 'i,;:t- ~ . ...1~ .
tice. That repudiation arises out of an Act of Congress passed If'--..,
~
in the aftermath of a great national crisis which culminated in ~ ~ '-i-the resignation of a President. The Act i,s special legislation,
f_,,, •
applying only to one former President by name, and violates - ~ u--,,._.
firmly established constitutional principles.
~ k~
I find it very disturbing that significant and fundamental
I)':::____
principles of constitutional law are subordinated to what ~ ~ ~ , , , _
~•
seem the needs of a particular situation. That moments of ..
public distress give rise to passions leading to unwise actions
Al~~ .. ~ , , .
_
reminds us why the three Branches of government were
~
created as separate and coequal, each intended as a check, in
L.fc"/4,,u•· A, _;
1
turn, on possible excesses by one or both of the others.
I
Any case in this Court calling upon principles of sep~ration ~ c,..., ~
of powers, rights of privacy, the prohibitions against bills of ~ ~ c..:._..
attainder and denial of due process, whether urged by a ~
;.._~
former President or an ordinary person, is inevitably a major 43'.- E,,., __ . _
constitutional case. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking of the
- ~
tendency of "great cases like hard cases [to make] bad law,"~
~ ..fl ~
went on to observe the dangers inherent when
"some accident of immediate overwhelming interest, ... ~ , / - ,
.
L,c,.,
__
appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
•
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which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful
and before which even well settled principles of law will
bend." Holmes, J., dissenting, Northern Securities Co,
v. United States, 193 U. S., at 400-401 (1903).
That risk is inherent in sucfi a case as this.

I
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Appellant urges that, even though naming only him, the
measure represents an unconstitutional intrusion by Congress
into the internal workings of the office of the President, in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. Three reasons, in my view, Sl,!Pport that conclusion.
The well-established principles of separation of powers, as
developed in the decisions of this Court, are violated if Congress compels or coerces the President, in matters relating to
the operation and conduct of his office. 1 Next, the Act is an
exercise of executive-not "legislative-power by foe Legislative Branch, in violation of separation-of-powers principles.
Finally, the Act works a sweeping modification of the consti- J
tutional privilege of confidentiality historically surrounding
the President in the conduct of his office, both during and
after his term.
A
It is important to establish the yardstick by which we are
to measure the Act's constitutionality. If, in effect, we
require only that the statute represent a rational means for
achieving legitimate governmental purposes, then the Court
could reasonably conclude that the statute on its face is
constitutional. But neither this standard nor any similar
benchmark is proper. Despite my strong agreement with the
view that this Court does not sit as a super legislature or a
1

Later, I will disct1ss the importance of the legislation's applicability
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Council of Revision, see, e. (1., Trimble v. Gordon, ante,
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), I am persuaded that prior decisions of this Court command a more demanding scrutiny on
our part.
The presumption of constitutionality attaching to traditional forms of legisratio"nd oes not, this Court has held, apply
with the same force in certain carefully defined areas, such as
where the very legitimacy of the composition of representative ~
institutions is at stake, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 ( 1964). T • -r--.-/
The presumption of constitutionality likewise loses force when
le islation directly impinges upon the basic tripartite structure ,)
of our governmen .
I his prmc1ple is by no means novel. It engaged the attention of the authors of The Federalist:
"The legislative department derives a superiority in
our government from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less
susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater
facility, m~sk under complicated and indirect measures,
the encroachments which it ml:\kes on the co-ordinate departments." The Federalist, No. 48. See also The Federalist, No. 51.

l

The Court in Kilbourn v. Thome.son, 103 U. S. 168 (1880),
therefore cautioned that the exercise of power by Congress
directly affecting the potential independence of another
branch "should be watched with vigilance, and when called in
question before any other tribunal . . . should receive the
most careful scrutiny." 103 U. S., at 192. The judicial role
in this context, therefore, is akin to that which obtains when
reviewing legislation that touches on First Amendment rights.
See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976). Since our
system of separation of powers was designed, above all, to
secure and protect liberty , The Federalist, No. 49, nothing less
than "the most careful scrutiny" of the legislation before us is
required under Kilbourn.

-----
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B
Separation of powers is in no sense a formalism. Along
with federalism, separation of powers among the branches of
government is "one of the two great structural principles of
the American constitutional system . . . ." E. Corwin, The
President 9 (1957). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U. S. 479, 501 (Har1an, J., concurring). In pursuit of that
principle, the Framers created three coordinate branches of
government, each having defined powers. Executive oower
Wa.§ vested in the President; no other offices in the Executive
Brancli, ~ er than the Vice Presidency,2 were created or l > - 4 - 1 , - ~ ~
mandated by the Constitution. In the entire Execl!tive
4-cvJ,a,,~
Branch, consequently, only two offices are creatures of the
Coii'stitution; aU other departments and agencies, from the
State Dep~rtment to the General Services Administration, are
creatures of the Congress, owing their very existence to the
J..-~I
Legislative Branch. Congress can, and has, directed action on c::::t, ~ - , the part of heads of departments, which those officials are
~~
duty bound to obey. 3
~
J
The Presidency, in contrast, stands on a very different foot~
S / ~'
ing. Unlike the vast array of departments which the Presi)

£,c.'P~

--p'"'

!:;r-t1

("'-f /

The Vi ce Prn,ident performs not only such executive functions as may
bP as;;igned by the Pre::;ident, from time to time, but legisla,t,ive functions
.is well.
a Statutes relating to departments or agencies created by Congress
frequently are phrased in mandatory terms. For example, in the 1949
legislation crea.ting the General Services Administration, Congress provided as follows:
"The Administrator is authorized and directed to coordinate and provide
for the . . . effi cient purchase, lease and maintenance of ... equipment
by Federal agencies." 40 U. S. C. § 759 (a) .
Even with respect to international relations, Congress has affirmatively
imposed certa in requiremen ts on t he Secretary of Sta te:
"The Secretary of State shall furnish to the Public Printer a correct
<'.O])Y of every t reaty between t he United States and any foregin governtnent., . ." 22 U. S. C. § 2660 (1970) .
2

-,r-- -
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dent oversees, the Presidency is in no sense a creature of the
Legislature. T1!,_e Presidentli 2ow~ s originate not from statute, but from the constitutional command to "take Care that
the Laws ""be faTtlrruily'executed . . . . " These independent,
constitutional origins of the Presidency have an important
bearing on determining the appropriate extent of congressional
power over the Chief Executive or his records and work papers.
For, although the branches of government are obviously not
divided into "watertight compartments," Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J.) , the
office of the Presidency, as a constitutional equal of 'Congres~,
must as a general proposition be free from Congress' coercive
powers, if the constitutional autonomy of the Executive
Branch is not to be compromised. 4 This is not simply an
abstract proposition of political philosophy; it is a prohibi.tion plainly established by the decisions of this Court.
A unanimous Court (which included Chief :Justice Taft
and Justices Holmes and Brandeis) stated:
"The general rule is that neither department [ of government] may . .. control, direct or restrain the action of
the other:" Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
( 1923) .
Similarly, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 209 U. S. 516, 530
(1933) , the Court emphasized the need for each branch of
government to be free from the coercive influence of the
other branches :
"[E] ach department should be kept completely independent of the others- independent not in the sense that
they shall not cooperate to the common end of carrying
into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but in the
sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by,
-1Cf. MR. JusTICE WHITE's discussion in United States - v: Brewster,
-!OX U. S. 510; 558 (1972), where he spoke of the "evil" of "executive
control of legislative behavior.•.." (Emphasis supplied .)

'.·

.,
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or be subjected, directly or indirectly to, the coercive
influence of either of the other departments."
Likewise, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 629-630 ( 1935), the Court held:
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is
hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in
the very fact of the separation of powers.... " (Emphasis supplied.)
To bring this fundamental principle closer to home, the
unbroken practice since Washington with respect to congressional demands for White House papers has been, in Chief
Justice Taft's words, "that, while either house [of Col_!gfess]
may remiest information, it cannot c""ompel 1t.... " Taft, The
fri'.esidency iio7"ittt6). This tradition of noncompulsion was
established early in the Republic. President Washington
declined to produce papers requested by the House of Representatives relating to important matters of foreign policy by
·saying:
"To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives
to demand and to have as a matter of course all the
papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power
would be to establish a dangerous precedent." 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194.
In noting the first President's practice, this Court stated in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320
( 1936) . that Washington's historic precedent was "a refusal
the wisdom of which was recognized by the House itself and
has never since been doubted." 5
5 This Presidential preroga.t,ive has not been limited to foreign affairs,
where of course secrecy and confident,i:ality may be of the utmost.
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Part of o,;1~constitutional fa~ic, then, from the beginnin~
h3:s b ee;the P,,r_esi_gfiit 's freed°;;in from control or coercion by
Q.Qngress.l 1.hclu~ h lpts
ptocure docufuents that/
though cleariy pertaining to matters of important governtnentai interests, belong and pertaih to the President. This
freedom from Congress; coercive influence, in the words of
Humphrey's Executor, "is implied in the very fact of separation of powers.... H 295 U. S., at 630. 6 Moreover, it is not
significant in any constitutional sense that Congress has not,
through Title I , dictated that the papers be turned over to it
for examination or retention. Separation of powers is fuily
impiicated simpiy by Congress; mandating the disposition of
the papers of another Branch.
The present statute is a drastic departure from the consti ..
tutiona1 tradition of noncompufs[o;' Regardless of the former J'Sreside~rt'.'s -;rstes, the statute commands the head of a
tei islatively cre"ated department to take and maintain custody
of the Presidential papers, including many purely personal
papers. Title I does not concern itself in any way with
materials belonging to departments of the Executive Branch

· ro-

importan ce. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 79 (19-75); Taft,
The Presidency 110 (1916) .
G This necessity for independence of the three BraJ1ches of government,
including control over the pa pers of each, lies at t.lie heart of this
Court's broad holdings concerning the immunity of congresswnal, papers
from outside scrntin y . The Const.itut-ion expressly grants immunity to
Members of Congress as to any "Speech or Debate in either House .. . .";
yet, the Court has r,efused to constrne the Clause literally " to words
spoken in debate. . . ." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U . S. 486, 500
(1969) . Congressional p apers, including Congressional reports , ha.ve been
held protect.ed by the Clause in order " to prevent intimida.tion [of
legisla.tors] by the <'Xccutive and accounta bility before a J~bly hostile
judiciar)·." !bid. Iu a word, to preserve the constitutionally rooted
independence of each Branch of government, each Branch must be ablo
to control its own papers.

..

!

•
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created and controlled by the Congress. 1 If the statute had
been passed while the former President was in office ( over
what would likely have been his veto), there is hardly room
for doubt that the legislation would be struck down in the
courts.

~~ ~

~r

~~~

C
The statute, therefore. violates separation-of-powers principles because it exercises a coercive influence b another
Branch over the resi en .
he egislation is also invalid on
another ground pertaining to sepa.ration of powers, because it
is an attempt by Congress to exercise powers elementary to
and vested in the President-the power to control files, records
and paQerS of the offls e'.
The generaf prfnciple as to this aspect of separation of
powers was stated in Kilbourn, supra:
"[E]ach branch shall by the law of its creation be limited
to the exercise of the powers a.ppropriate to its own de-:
partment and no other . . . [A]s a general rule ... the
:powers confided by the Constitution to one of these de-:
partments cannot be exercised by another:" 103 U. S.,
at 191.
Madison also expressed this maxim:
"For this reason that Convention which passed the ordi..
nance of government, laid its foundation on this basis,
that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments
should be separate and distinct, so that no person should
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same
time." The Federalist, No. 48.
And in the 1975 Term, in the face of a holding by a Court of
Appeals that the separation-of-powers challenge was meritless, we unanimously invalidated an attempt by Congress to
7

Tha,t i;:;,;ue, of course, is not presented, and I express no view o:q
i 552 (Fteellom ~ ll)formation Acq,

~t, See, e. q., 5 U. S. C.

I
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exercise appointing powers constitutionally vested in the
Chief Executive. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 109-143
(1976).
The, control of the President's papers is, in my view, a
power entrusted exclusively to the President. 8 The Constitution does not speak of Presidential papers, just as it does not
speak of work papers of Members of Congress or of judges. 0
But there ca.n be no room for doubt that, up to now, it has
been the implied prerogative of the President-as of Members
of Congress and of judges-to memorialize matters, establish
filing systems, and to provide uniiaterally for disposition of
their work papers. Control of Presidential pl¼,pers is, obviously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad discretion
vested in the President in order for him to discharge his
duties:1°
To be sure, we recognized a narrowly limited exception to ~~ ~
Presidential control of Presidential p~pers in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). But that case permits compul- -f,..,...,. • J- ,.,,._,,
sory judicial intrusions only when a vital constitutional func- ~ ____ -"' _,,,,.,,.
tion, i. e., the conduct of criminal proceedings, would be im- ~ ' - /

J.1--

::-;:a:,-:;-U.

Umted States
S. 683 (1974), as noted infra,
represents a limited exception to this general ' principle, in the event
the functjons of one branch are impaired by a, refusal of the President
to turn over, temporarily, specific documents for an in camera inspection.
11 As t,0 congressional papers, see n. 6, supra.
Despite the Constitution's silence as to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court
had no difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by
other Branches. See also MR. JUSTICE BRJ>:NNAN's dissenting opinion
in United States v. B.rewster, 408 U. S. 501, 532-533 (1972), where he
quotes approvingly from Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, and Coffin v. Coffin,
4 Mass. 1 ( 1808). In both of those cases, written materials by legislators
were deemed to be protected by legislative immunity from intntsion or
seizure.
10 This discret.ion was exercised, as we have seen, by President Washington in the face of a coqgressiona.l demand for production.
Obviou:;ly, official documents fall into an entirely different category and.
a.re not involved· in this case.
8

t/,o ~ ~
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paired and when the President makes no more "than a generalized claim of . . . public interest . . . " id., at 707, in
maintaining complete control of papers and in preserving confidentiality of conversations. That case, in short, is an interbranch conflict case, where the effective functioning of both
Branches demanded an accommodation and where the prosecutorial and judicial demands upon the President were very
· narrowly restricted with great specificity "to a limited number
of conversations...." Moreover, the request for production
· was limited to materials that might themselves contain evidence of criminal activity of persons then under inquiry or
indictment. Finally, the intrusion was ca.refullv limited to an
in camera e~ min~tion by a single United States District
Judge under sfrict limits: · That case does not stand for the
propbsition that the Judiciary is at liberty to order all papers
of a President into the custody of United States Marshals. 11
United States v. Nixon, therefore, provides no authority
for Congress' regulation of Presidential papers simply "to
promote the General Welfare." No showing has been made,
nor could it, that Congress' functions will be impaired by the
former President's being allowed to control his own Presidential papers. 12 Without any threat whatever to its own func.,
tions, Congress has by this statute, as in Buckley v. Valeo,
exercised authority entrusted to the Executive Branch.
11

Appellees, of course, would view that sort of intrusion as an int.ra..,
branch confrontation, since United States Marshals are officials of the
Execut,ive Branch, at least so long as the District Judge simply ordered
the Marsha.ls to take custody of and to review the documents without
turning them over to the court. This is, of course, sheer sophistry.
12 Of course, United States v. Nixon pertained only to the setting of
judicial-executive conflict,. Nothing in our holding suggests that, even
if Congress needed Pre.sidential documents in connection with its legis-,
lative functions, the constitutional tradition of Presidential control over
Presidential documents in the face of legislative demands could be
abrogated. We express!~· stated in Nixon, "[w]e are not here concerned
with the balance between . . . the confidentia.lity interest and congr~:
s.iQnal demandR for informatiQll, . , ," 4l8 · U. S., at 712 u. t9,

I
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n ?~~Y~
Finally, in my view, the Act violates principles of separa•
tion"of owe
by intruding into £he confiaenh ality of
Presid~~l ~ r~m~ mc~tions, up o now protec e
e onstitutionallyF"asecf aoctrine of Presidential privilege. A
unanimous Court in United States
hi_x"on c'ottlct not have
been clearer in its holding that a privilege guaranteeing confidentiality of such communications derives from the
Constitution, subject to disclosure only in narrowly limited
circumstances:
"A President and those who assist him must be free
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 418 U. S., at 708.

v.

As a constitutionally based prerogative, Presidential priv•
ilege inures to the President himself. It is a personal privilege,
in the same sense as that against compelled self-incrimination,
for example, which would be breached by an uninvited intrusion by subordinate officials of the Executive departments into
Presidential files, even if the intrusion was for a purpose
relating to on-going governmental business. Presidential
privilege would be largely illusory unless it could be interposed
by the President against the countless thousands of persons in
the Executive Branch, and most certainly if the Executive
officials are acting, as this statute contemplates, at the command of a different branch of government. 1 8
13 Civil service statutes aside, we know now that an Executive official
cannot replace all of hi:s underlings on the basis of a patronage system.
Tho,, as a.. matter of constitutional law, a Chief Executive would not

•

/~:E:.-J-L
'.

12

~>
) "':;

This statute requires that persons neither designated n~r
approved by the former President ~ill review all Presidential
papers. Even if the government agents follow literally the
limiting suggestions offered by the District Court in culling
through the documents, the fact remains that their job re~
quires them to abrogate the Presidential privilege. Congress
has, in essence, commanded them to review and catalog numerous documents that are undoubtedly privileged and to do
.so over the objection of the holder of the privilege. Given
that fact, there is no doubt that the Presidential privilege of
one;pccupant of that office will have been rendered a nullity
by an act of Congress. 14

E
There remains another inquiry under the issue of separa~
tion of powers. Does the fact that the Act applies only to a
former President after he has left office justify what would
otherwise be an unlawful measure if applicable to , ~n
incumbent?
On the face of it, congressional regulation of the papers
of a former President ~ ill have a less directly disruptive j lJlpact on the on-going operations of an i ncumbent President
than an effort at regulation or control over current White
House papers of the incumbent. But even if we characterized
this as "remoteness," it does not byany means eliminate the
three principal separation-of-powers aefects. First, the prinbe at liberty to repla.ce all Executive Branch officials with persons
who, for political reasons, enjoy the President's trust and .confidence.
Elrod v. Burns; 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
1'l I cannot accept. the argument pressed by appellees tha.t review is
rendered harmless by the fact that many of the documents may not be
protected b~· Presidential privilege. How "harmless" review justifies
manifestly " hnrmful" rc·view e,;ca.pes me. Moreover, I regard as cynical
the Governmcni.'i,; argumrnt that the former President "commingled"
all th~ papen; and lwnce is foreclosed from complaining. Every
)Iember of thi:; Court "cq!Jllllingles" persQnal and judicial papers in
thif; i-;<;ni;e,

I

I
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ciple that a President must be free from coercion should apply
to a former President, so long as Congress is inquiring or acting with respect to operations of the government while the
former President was in office. 1 ~
To the extent Congress is empowered to coerce a former
President, every future President is at risk of denial of a la.rge
measure of the autonomy and independence contemplated by
the Constitution and of the confidentiality attending it.
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). Indeed, the
President, if he is to have autonomy while in office, needs the
assurance that Con ress will not immediate} be endow w th
full wer to coerce im to o en a
les .nd
ords and
give an account of residential actions at the instant his C,c • . , . y ~
successor is sworn in. 10 Absent the validity of the expecta- ~
tion of privacy of such papers (save for a subpoena, under
United States v. Nixon, supra), future Presidents and those ~
they consult must inevitably take into account the possibility >( d.tl,. ,.,.#'1,4,.._,,.~
,
that their most confidential correspondence, work papers, and 1~
,,!
-;diaries may well be open to government review, with no time ' ~ ~
limit, should they in some way arouse the ire of Congress.
~ ~
The consequences of this development on what a President
. ~- . ~ I
expresses to others in writing and orally are incalculable; ~ WJIII"'~ ~
perhaps even more crucial is the inhibiting impw;t on those to
whom the President turns for information and for counsel,
whether they are officials in the government, business or labor
leaders, or foreign diplomats and statesmen. (The Act has

I

~~
1-..4'. ,._

~J....,W.

~w-4£i~
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no doubt been the sub· ect of careful scrutiny and analysis in
the foreign offi~ s of other countries w ose representa 1ves
speak to a 'president on matters they will not put in writing,
but which may be memorialized by a President or an aide.')
Similarly,.Title I may well be a "ghost" at future White House
conferences, with conferees choosing their words more cautiously because of the enlarged prospect of their being made
known to others. We carefully took this into account 'in
United States v. Nixon, supra:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality
of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has
all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making." 418 U. S., at 708.
Second, although a President may have left office, it is
clear that legislation as to his Presidential papers is still a
legislative exercise of what have historically been rega.rded as
executive powers. Presidential papers do not, after all, instantly lose their nature quadrenniaUy at high noon on a
January 20. Moreover, under the challenged Act it is now
the Congress, not the incumbent President, 17 that has decided
17 The fact that the President signs a bill into law, and thereafter
defends it, without, more, does not mean of course tha.t, the policy·
rrnboclied in the legislation is that of the President, nor does it even
rnra n that. the President personally approves of the measure. When
~igning a bill int.a law, numerous Presidents have actually expressed
disagreement with the legislation but felt const.rained for a variety of
rrasons to permit. the bill to becomr law. President. Roosevelt repudiated
the "Lovett. Ridrr" later ,;truck down by this Court. in Lovett v.
r·11ited States. 328 U.S. 303, 325 (1946). President Ford did not. request
1 his legislation iu order to as.sure t he effective functioning of th~
E,,rcu.ti_ve l3ranch,

l
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what to do, not with "public" papers generally, but with all
the papers of one named former President.
Third, it is conceded by the Government that Presidential /
privilege, a vital incident of our separation-of-powers system,
does not terminate instantly upon a President's departure
from office. The Government candidly acknowledges, "the
pri_vile/l.e 5 ~the. iµ divj dual f.ry§identzJ ten w e," Brief,
at 33, because of the vital public interests underlying the
privilege. This principle, as all parties concede, finds explicit
sy,pport in_history; former President Truman in 1953 refused
ccurring
to provfcte7n1"d'r mation to the Congress on matt~
during his Administration:
"It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of
separation of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally ap-

plicable to a President after his term of office has expired
when he is sought to be examined with respect to any
a.cts occurring while he [ was] President."
Rec. 17994 (1974). (Emphasis supplied.) 18

-

120 Cong.

Indeed, to assure institutional integrity and confidentiality,
Presidents and their advisers must have assurance, as do
,i udges and Members of Congress, that their internal communications will not become subject to retroactive legislation
calling for intrusions into matters as to which there was a
well-founded expectation of privacy when the communications
took place. Just as Mr. Truman pointedly rejected Congressional power to inquire of him as to his Presidential
activities a.fter he has left office, this Court has always assumed
that the immunity conferred by the Speech or Debate Clause
is available to a Member of Congress after he has left office.
United States v. Brewster, SU'f)'ra. It would therefore be
1 ' Sinr<' by definition the concern is with former Presidents, I see no
ili~tinrtion in Congre:;:;' seeking t.o compel the appea.ranoe and testimony
<ll a former Pre;;ident and in, alternatively, seeking to compel the
proctnrtiQn of Prei-idential paper:< over the former President's objection.

,.
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illogical to conclude that the President loses all immunity
from legislative coercion as to his Presidential papers from
the moment he leaves office.

The discussion of se a 10n of powers concerns, of course,
the structure of government, not the rights of the sole individ~
ual ostensibly affected by this legislation. But Title I of the
Act before us touches not only upon the independence of a
coordinate branch of government, it also affects, in the most
direct way, the basic rights of one named individual. The
statute J2,ro':ides, as we have seen, for governmental custQ_dy
~ r-and revie~ of-all of the former President's written a d
recorded m terials at t e time he e o ce me u m diary
recordin an conversat10ns m 1s private residences outside
Was mgton, D. C. 1 1 (a
The District Court was deeply troubled by this admittedly
unprecedented intrusion. Its opinion candidly acknowledged
that the personal-privacy claim was the "most troublesome"
point raised by this unique statute.10 In addition to com~
munications and memoranda reflecting the President's con~
fidential deliberations, the District Court admitted that the
materials subject to GSA review included highly personal
communications.
"Among all of the papers and tape recordings falling
within the Act, however, are some papers and materials
containing extremely private communications between
[Mr. Nixon] and, among others, his wife, his daughters,
his physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends,
as well as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal
:t1J The District Court concluded its discussion of the privacy challenge
as follows: "We would be less than candid were we to state that we
find it as easy to dispose of Mr. Nixon's privacy claims as hjs claim
of presidential privilege." App., at 87a.

'

)
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files. Segregating those that are private from those that ,,....,
;1
are not private requires rather comprehensive screening, ~ J,,,,..,,
and archivists entrusted with that duty will be required rr-------r
to read or listen to private communications." App., at

~""'.-.,'-1

71a.

A

1,,aA,.lcdJ..

Given this admitted intr~ ion, the legislation before us
must be subjected to the most searc.fii'ng '.kmct of udl.cial
scrutmy.
a utes t a renc on un amental Ii rties, like
those affecting significantly the structure of our government,
are not entitled to the same pr~~umption of constitutionality
we normally accord legislation. Moore v. City of East Clevel.il!!;_d,~ lip op., at 3-4. The burdeii of justHicat10n l.s r(,Jversed;
the burden rest upon government, not on the individual
whose liberties are a ecte , to Justify the measure. Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, No. 75-1153 (concurring opinion). We recently reaffirmed the standard or review in such
cases as one of "exacting scrutiny."
"We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere
showing of some legitimate governmental interest . . .
[W] e have required that the subordinating interests of

-

20 Although the District Court expressly concluded tha.t the fonner
President, had a "legitimate expectation" that his Presidential materials
would not be subject to "compulsive review by government personnel
without his consent," App., at 74a-75a, the Court nonetheless deemed
the compulsory intrusion permissible given the constitutionality of the
federal wiretap stat.ute, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, which of course
permits substantial governmental intrusions into the privacy of individuals.
Not only is this analogy imperfect, as the District Court, itself admitted,
id., at Sla., but this analysis fails to apply the "exacting scrutiny"
called for by our decisions. Above all, the present statute fails to
provide any of the stringent :,;afeguards, including a warrant, mandated
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. Indeed, the District
C0\1.rt, flatly admitted as much. App., at Sla,.

?)
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the State must survive exacting scrutiny." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 64 (1976).

B
Constitutional analysis must, of course, take fully into
account the nature of the Government's interests underlying
challenged legislation. Once those interests are identified, we
must then focus on the nature of the individual interests affected by the statute. Id., at 14-15. Finally, we must decide whether the Government's interests are of sufficient
weight to subordinate the individual's interests, and, if so,
whether the Government has nonetheless employed unneces. sarily broad means for achieving its purposes. Lamont v.
Postmast-er General, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring).
Two governmental interests are asserted as the justification
for this statute: to ensure the general efficiency of the Executive Branch's operations 21 and to preserve historically significant papers and tape recordings for posterity. 22 Both these
21 Administrative efficiency is obviously a highly desirable goal.
See,
e. g., Dixon v. Love, Slip op., at 9; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319,
347-349 (1976). However, I am constrained to recall that "administrative efficiency" has not uniformly been regarded as of "overriding
importance." Indeed, claims of administrative efficiency ha,ve been
r,wiftly dismissed a,t times as mere "bald assertion[s]." Richardson v.
Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 222 (1972) (BRENNAN, ,T., dissenting). Numerous
other opinions ha,ve held that individual interests, including t.he right to
welfare payments, '·clearly outweigh" government interests in promoting
"administrative efficiency," Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970)
(BRENNAN, J.). And, MH. JUSTICE MARSHALL in Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969), stated that when "fundamental" rights a.re
at stake, such as the "right to travel," government must demonst,rate
a "compelling" interest, not merely a "rational relationship between
[the underlying statute] and [the] . . . admit.tedly permissible state
objectives . . . ."
22
· The initial interest in prer,erving tJ1e materials for judicial purposes
has diminished substantially. Since the Special -Prosecutor has disclajmed
any fl_lrther interest in the ma,teria.ls for purposes of pos.sible criminal
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purposes are legitimate and important. Yet, there was no
Berious suggestion by Congress that the operations of the
Executive Branch would actually be impaired unless, contrary
to nearly 200 years' past pra.ctice, all Presidential papers of
the one named incumbent were required by law to be impounded in the sole control of government agents. The statute on its face, moreover, does not purport to address a particularized need, such as the need to Se<)ure Presidential papers
concerning the Middle East, the SALT talks, or problems in
Panama. 23 Indeed , the congressionally perceived "need" is a
fa.r more "generalized need" than that rejected in United
States v. Nixon by a unanimous Court.
As to the interest in preserving historical materials, there
is nothing whatever in our national experience to suggest that
existing mechanisms, such as the 20-year-old Presidential
Libraries Act, were insufficient to achieve that purpose. 24 In
·a ny event, the interest in preserving "historical materials"
·c annot justify seizing, without notice or hearing, private papers
preliminary to a line-by-line examination by government

.~

In contrast to Congress' purposes underlying the statute,
this Act intrudes significantly on two areas of traditional

invest.igations, the only conceivably rema.ining judicial need is to preserve
the materials for possible use in civil litigation between private parties.
The admittedly important interests in the enforcement of the criminal
law, recognized in United States v. Nixon, supra, are no longer pressed
by the Government.
23 If there were a particula,rized need, the statute suffers from greater
overbreadth than others we have inva.Jidated.
2 4 At, the time the statute was passed, appellant had made tentative
arrangements with the University of Southern California in Los Angeles
for the establishment of a Presidential Library, under the terms of the
Presidential Libraries Act,. Appendix, a,t 167-168. That has now
r ipened into a formal agreement so that in the event Title I is invalidated,
appellant 's historical materials will be housed in a facility on the USC
campus under terms applicable to other _fresident.ial Libraries of _pa.&t

Presidents.

I
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privacy interests of Presidents. One embraces Presidential
papers relating to his decisions, development of policies, appointments, and communications in his role as leader of a
political party; the other encompasses purely private matters
of family, property, investments, diaries and intimate conversations. Both interests are of the highest order, with
perhaps some primacy for family papers. 25 Cf. Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, Slip op., at 4.
Title I thus touches directly on what MR. JUSTICE PowELL
once referred to as the "intimate areas of an individual's
personal affairs," California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S.
21, 78 (concurring opinion). The papers in both of these
areas-family and political decisionmaking-are of the most
private na.ture, enjoying an almost sacred status under our
law. MR. JusTICE BR~NNAN recently put it this way: "Per- ,
sonal letters ?onstitute a_n integral aspect of a person's private
enclave." Fisher v. United Sta.tes, 425 U. S. 391, 427 (1976)
(concurring opinion). An individual's papers, he said, are
"an extension of his person." Id., at 4~0. 'MR. ·JusTICE
MARSHALL made the same point: "Dairies and personal ·let~
ters that record orily their author's personal thoughts lie at
the heart of our sense of privacy." Couch v. United -States,
409 U. S. 322, 350 (1973). In discussing private papers, he
referred even more emphatically to the "deeply held belief
on the part of the Members of this Court throughout its his~
tory that there are certain documents no person ought to be
compelled to produce at the Government's request." Fisher
v. United States, supra, at 431-432. This echoes Lord Camden's oft-quoted description of personal papers as a man's
"dearest property." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 628
(1885). (I have frequently quoted this in distinguishing·
"papers" from weapons and contraband. See, e. g., Stone y ..
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 497-498 (concurring opinion).)
Intru:;iom; i11to bu:;iness premises, however, implicate privacy -interr:;t;; consistently protected by this Court. See G. M. Leci~ing Corp ..
v. United States, No, 75-235\ decicled.Januaq, 12 1 1977..
25

I
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One point emerges clearly: the papers here involve the
most fundamental First and Fourth Amendment interests.
Since the Act asserts exclusive government custodY. over
all papers of a former President, the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is surely
implicated. 20 Indeed, where papers or books are the subject
of a government intrusion, our cases uniformly hold that the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against a general search requires that warrants contain descriptions reflecting "the most
scrupulous exactitude . . . ," Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S.
476, 485 (1965). Those cases proscribe general language in a
warrant-or a statute-of "indiscriminate sweep ...." Id.,
at 486. Title I , commanding seizure followed by permanent
control of all materials having "historical or commemorative value," evidences the "indiscriminate sweep" we have long
denounced. This "broad broom" statute provides virtually
no standa.rd at all to guide the government agents combing
through the papers; the agents are left to roam a.t large
through confidential materials, something to which no other
President, no Member of Congress ~r of the Judicial Branch
has been subjected.
In addition to Fourth Amendment considerations, highly
important First Amendment interests pervade all Presidential
papers, since they include expressions of privately held views
about politics, diplomacy or peoplr of all walks of life, within
a.nd outside this country. The former President's freedom of
association is also implicated, since his recordings and papers
will likely reveal much aboµt his relationships with both in20 The fact tha.t GSA initially secured possession of the Presidential
paper::; through the agreement with the former President does not change
the fact that t,he agency wru; commanded by Congress to take exclusive
custody of and retain all Presidential historical materials. Moreover,
ewryone admits that the Act contemplates a careful screening process
b ~· government, agent:;. The fact that the governmental intrusion is noncriminal in n,tture does not, of course, render the Fourth Amendment's
prohibit ions inapplicable. See South Dakota v. Opperman1 428 U. S.

:314 (1976) .
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dividuals and organizations. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U. S. 449, 462 (1958), the Court said:
"This Court has recognized the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."
Thus, in passing on a statute compelling disclosure of political
contributions, the Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, imposed the
strict standard of "exacting scrutiny" because of the signifi..
cant impact on First Amendment rights.
The fact that the former President was an important na,.. )
tional and world political figure obviously does not diminish
the traditional priva.cy interest in his papers. Forced dis-closure of private information, even to Government officials,
is by no means sanctioned by this Court's decisions, except for
the most compelling reasons. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, U. S,
- - (1977). I do not tl)ink, for example, that this Court
would readily sustain, as a condition to holding public office,
a requirement that a candidate reveal publicly membership in
every organization, religious, social, or pol~tic~l. After aU,
our decision in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, was presumably
intended to protect from compelled disclosure members of
the organization who were actively involved in public affairs
or who held public office in Alabama.

C
In short, a former President up to now has had essentially
the same expectation of privacy with respect to his papers:
and records as every other person. This expectation is
soundly based on two factors: first, under our constitutional
t raditions, Presidential papers have been, for more than 180
years, deemed by the Congress to belong to the President.
Congress ratified this tradition by specific acts: (a,) Congressional appropriations following authoriza.tion to purchase,
Presidential papers; (b) Congressional enactment of a nonmandatory system of Presidential libraries; and (c) statutes
prrmittin~, until 1969, a charitable-cQntribution ded.uction for·

7
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papers of Presidents donated to the United States or to
nonprofit institutions.
Second, in the absence of any legislation to the contrary,
there was no reason whatever for a President to take time
from his official duties to ensure that there was no "commingling" of "public" and private papers. Indeed, the fact that
the former President commingled Presidential and private
family papers, absent any then-existing laws to the contrary,
points strongly to the conclusion that he did in fact have an
expectation of privacy with respect to both categories of
papers, based on constitutional principles, on Acts of Congress and on common law.
On the basis of this Court's holdings, I am unable to understand why the former President's privacy interests do not
outweigh the generalized, undifferentiated goals sought to be
achieved by this unique statute. Without a more carefully
defined focus, these legislative goals do not represent "paramount government interests," to use MR. JUSTICE PowELL's
term in his concurring opinion in Abood, supra, nor is this
particular piece of legislation needed to achieve those goals,
even if we assume, arguendo, they are of a "compelling" or
"overriding" nature. But even if other Members of the Court
strike the balance differently , the Government has nonetheless
failed to choose narrowly tailored means of ca.r rying out its
purposes so as not to unnecessarily invade important First and
Fourth Amendment liberties. The Court demanded no.less in
Buckley v. Valeo, supa, and nothing less will do here. Cf.
Hynes v. Mayor of Borough of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610, 620
( 1976).
The Government points to two factors as mitigating the
effects of this admitted intrusion. First, in its view, most
of the President's papers and conversations relate to the
b usiness of government, rather than to personal or family
matters. Second , the intrusion is limited as much as possible,
since the review will be carried out by specially trained
government agents.

I

·.
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Even if the Government has a valid interest in identifying
the governmentally related papers in order to preserve them
for histprical purposes, that interR.._t., canpJU,.jus.tif>:: a seizure (
and sear~h oLeJ,. the. papers taken here. Since compulsory
review oTpersonal a nd family papers and tape recordings is an
admittedly improper invasion of privacy, no constitutional
principle justifies an intrusion into admittedly protected areas
in order to carry out the "generalized" sta,tutory objective.
Second, the intrusion cannot be saved by the credentials,
however impeccable, of the government a.gents. The initial
problem with this justification is that no one knows whether
these agents are, as the Government contends, uniformly
discreet. Despite the lip service pa.id by the District Court
and appellees to the record of archivists generally, there is
nothing before us to justify the conclusion that each of the
more than 100 persons who will have access to, and will
monitor and examine, the materials is indeed reliably discreet.
The Act, furthermore, provides GSA with no mea,ningf ul
st_!l,ndard,§, to minimize the extent of intrusions ·upon appellant's privacy. We are thus faced with precisely the same
standardless discretion vested in governmental officials which
this Court has unhesitatingly struck down in other First
Amendment areas. See, e. g., Hynes v. ·Mayor of Borough
of Oradell, supra. In the absence of any meaningful statutory
standards. which might help secure the privacy interests at
stake, I question whether we ca.n assume, as a matter of law,
that government agents will be able to formulate for themselves constitutionally valid standards of review in examining, segregating and cataloging the papers of the former
President.
Nor does the possibility that, had Title I not been passed,
appellant would perhaps use government specialists to help
classify and catalog his papers eliminate the objections to this
intrusion. Had appellant, like all his recent predecessors,
been permitted to deposit his papers in a Presidential library,
government archivists would have been working directly under

I

1

75-1605-DISSENT
NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

25

11,ppellant's guidance and direction, not solely that of Congress
or GSA. He, not Congress, would have established standards
for preservation, to ensure that traditional privacy would
be protected. Similarly, he would have been able to participate personally in the reviewing process and could th us assure
that any governmental review of purely personal papers was
minimized or entirely eliminated. He, not Congress, would
have controlled the selection of which experts, if any, would
have access to his papers. Finally, and most important, the
"intrusion" would have been consented to, eliminating any
constitutional question. But the possibility of a consent
intrusion cannot, under our law, justify a nonconsensual
invasion. Actual consent is required, cf. Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218 ( 1973), not the mere possibility of
consent under drastically different circt~mstances.
Finally, even if the government agents are completely discreet, they are still government officials charged with reviewing highly private papers and tape recordings. Unless we are
to say that a police seizure and examination of private papers
is justified by the "impeccable" record of a discreet police
officer, I have considerable difficulty understanding how a
compulsory review of admittedly private papers by government agents is constitutionally permissible.

III
BILL OF ATTAINDER
A
Under Art. I , § 9, cl. 3, as construed and applied by this
Court since the time of Chief Justice Ml\.rshall, Title I violates
the Bill of Attainder Clause. In contrast to Title II of the
Act, which establishes a National Study Commission to study
questions concerning the preservation of records of all Fedetal
officials, Title I commands the Ad1ninistrator to seize all tape
recordings "involv[ing] former President Richard M. Nixon
~nd all Presidential historic.al materials of Richard M.

'v
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Nixon . . . ." § 101 (a)(l), (b)(l). By contrast with Title
II, which is general legislation, "Title I is special legislation
sjngling out one individual as the target.
Title I must therefore be tested against the prohibition
of Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Although the prohibition against bills
of attainder has been addressed only infrequently by this
Court, it is now settled beyond dispute that a bill of attainder,
within the meaning of Art. I, · is, li~e double jeopardy, by
no means the same as a bill of ~ttainder at common law.
The definition departed frolll the common-law concept very
early in our history, in a most fundamental way. At common law, the bill was a legislative death sentence. Anything
Jess than death was not a bill of attainder, but was, rather,
"a bill of pains and penalties." This restrictive definition was
recognized tangentially in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cran ch
137, 179 (1803), 27 but the Court soon thereafter rejected
conclusively any notion that only a legislative death sentence
or legislatively imposed incarceration on nitmed individuals fell
within the prohibition. Chief Justice Marshall firmly settled
the matter in 1810, holding that legislative punishment in the
form of a deprivation of property was prohibited by the Bill
of Attainder Clause :
"A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual,
or may confiscate his property, or may do both.'>
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810). (Emphasis
supplied.)
The same point was made 17 years later in Ogden v. Saunders,.
12 Wheat. 213, 286 (1827), where the Court stated:
"By classing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and
n "The constitution declares that no 'bill of atta.inder or ex post facto,
law shall be passed.'
" If, however , such a bill should be passed and a person should be
prosecuted under it, must the court condemn to death those victililS'
whom the constitu.tion endeavors to .{>resetv~." Marbur11 v. MadisQT!.,,
:Jtt 179,
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laws impairing the obligation of contracts together, the
general intent becomes very a.ppa.rent; it is a general
provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over
existing rights, whether of person or property." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear beyond doubt, therefore, tha.t in interpreting Art. I,
~ 9, cl. 3, neither incarceration nor death is a requisite element
of bills of attainder. More than 100 years ago this Court
struck down statutes which had the effect of preventing
defined c11tegories of persons from practicing their professions. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 177 (1866) (a priest);
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1966) (a lawyer). Those
two cases established more broadly that "punishment" for
purposes of bills of attainder is not limited to criminal sanctions; rather, "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil, or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment ...." 4 Wall.,
at 320.
Chief Justice Warren pointed out that the Constitution, in
prohibiting bills of attainder, did not envision "a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition ... ."
United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 442 (1965). To the
contrary, the evil was a legislatively imposed deprivation of
existing rights, including property rights, directed at named
individuals. Mr. Justice Black, in United States v. Lovett,
328 U. S. 303, 316 (1946) , stated that:
" [The cases] stand for the proposition that legislative
acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members
of a group in such a way as to infli,c t punishment on them
without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by
the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied.)
The only "punishment" in Lovett,.in fact, was the deprivation
of Lovett's salary as a government employee-an indirect
pmiishment for his "bad" associations.

•'
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Under our cases, therefore, bills of attainder require two
elements: first, a specific designation of persons or groups as
subjects of the legislation, and, second, a Garland, Cummings,
Lovett-type deprivation, including of property rights, without
notice, trial or other hearing. No one disputes that Title I
of the Act before us suffers from the first infirmity, since it
applies only to one former President. The issue that remains
is whether there has been a legislatively mandated deprivation
of an existing right.

B
Since George Washington's Presidency, our constitutional
tradition, without a single exception, has treated Presidential
papers as the President's personal pro rty. This view has
been congressionally an JU ic1a y ratI ed, both as to the
ownership of Presidential papers, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas.
342 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J., sitting as Circuit
Justice), and, by the practice of Justices as to ownership of
their judicial papers.
Congress itself has consistently legislated on this assumption. I have noted earlier that appropriation legislation has
been enacted on various occasions providing for Congress'
purchase of Presidential papers. See Hearings on H. J. Res.
330, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1955). Those hearings led
Congress to establish a nonmandatory system of Presidential
libraries, again explicitly recognizing that Presidential papers
were the personal property of the Chief Executive. In the
floor debate on that measure, Congressman John Moss, a
supporter of the legislation, stated: "Finally, it should be
remembered that Presidential papers belong to the President . . . ." 101 Cong. Rec. 9935 (1955). Indeed, in 1955
in testimony pertaining to this proposed legislation, the
Archivist of the United States confirmed that:
"The papers of the Presidents have always been considered
to be their personal property, both during their inQlJ,mb~ncy a,nd Mterward. This bas the sanction of law

l
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and custom and has never been authoritatively challenged." Hearing on H. J. Res. 330, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., 32 (1955).
Similt\-rly, the GSA Administrator testified:
"As a matter of ordinary practice, the President has
removed his papers from the White House at the end
of his term. This has been in keeping with the tradition
and the fact that the 'f)Q,pers are the personal property
of the retiring Presidents." (Emphasis supplied.)

Hearing on H. J. Res. 330, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 20
(1955).

In keeping with this background, it was not surprising that
the Attorney General stated in an opinion in September
1974:

"To conclude that such materials are not the property of former President Nixon would be to reverse what
has apparently been the almost universal understanding
of all three branches of Government since the beginning
of the Republic, and to call into question the practices
of our Presidents from the earliest times." Appendix,
at 220-221.
I see no escape, therefore, from the qonclusion that, on the
basis of more than 180 years' history, the former President
has been deprived of a property right enjoyed by all Presidents after leaving office, namely, the control of his Presidential papers.
Even more starkly, Title I deprives only one former President of the right vested by statute in other former Presidents by the 1955 Act-the right to have a Presidential
Library at a facility of his own choosing for the deposit
of such Presidential papers as he unilaterally selects. 28 Title
28 While he was President, Lyndon Johnson wrote the following to
t,lle GSA Administrator : "[S]ince the President . . . is the recipient

'
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I did not purport to repeal the Presidential Libraries Act:
that statute remains in effect, available to present a,nd future
Presidents, and has already been av.ailed of by former President Ford. The operative effect of Title I, therefore, is .to
-exclude, by name, one former President and deprive him
of what his predecessors- and his successor-have already
been allowed. This invokes what Mr. Ju.stice Black said. in
Lovett, supra, could not be constitutio1ially done:
"Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the
danger inherent in speci,al legisla,tive acts which ·take
away the life, liberty, or property of particular named
persons because the legislature thinks them guilty · of
conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to
safeguard the people of this country from punishment
without trial by duly constituted courts." 328 U. S. 1
at 317. (Emphasis supplied.)
But apart from Presidential papers generally, Title I on
its face contemplates that even the former President's purely
family and persona,} papers and tape recordings are like\Xise
t o be taken into custody for whatever period of time is required for review. Some items, such a.s the originals ,, of
tape recordings of the former President's conversations, will
never be returned to him under the Act.
'
I need not, and do not, inquire into the motives of Con ..
gress in imposing this deprivation on only one named person,
Our cases plainly hold that retribution and vindictiveness ar&
not requisite elements of a bill of attainder. Chief Justice
of many confidences from others, and since the inviolability of such
confidence is essential to the funct.ioning of the constitutional office of
t,he Presidency, it will be necessa.ry to withhold from public scrutiny
certain papers and classes of papers for varying periods of time. Therefo re . . . I re.;erve the right, to restrict the use and avajlability of
any materials . . . for such time as I, in my solP discretion, may . .•.
specify . . . ." Hearing on H. ,J. Res. 632, Subcomm. of House GoverP,-:
nient Operations Comm., 89th Con~s., ls~~~., l7 (1965) •.
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Warren in Brown v. United States, supra, concluded, for extt,mple, that retributive motives on the part of Congress were
irrelevant to bill-of-attainder analysis. To the contrary, he
said flatly: It would be archaic to limit the definition of
punishment to 'retribution.' " Indeed, he expressly noted that
bills of attainder had historically been enacted for regulatory
,o r preventive purposes:
"Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of attainder ban to instances of retribution. A number of English bills of attainder were
enacted for preventive purposes-that is, the legislature
made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts
and associations ... that a given person or group was
likely to cause trouble ... and therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person or group in order to keep it from
bringing about the feared event.'' 381 U. S., at 458-459.
Under the long line of our decisien.s, therefore, 'the Court
·has the heavy burden of demonstrating that legislation whi~h
·singles out one named individual for deprivation-without a,ny
procedural safeguards-of what had for nearly 200 years been
treated by all three Branches of government as private prop. erty, can survive the prohibition of the Bill of Attainder
·Clause. In deciding this case, the Court provides-or it will
reject-the basis for a future Congress to enact yet another
'Title I, directed at some future former President, or a Member of the House or the Senate because the individual has
incurred public disfavor, and that of the Congress. Cf.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969). As in Brown
v. United States, SU'f)1"a, Title I of the present statute, in
contrast to Title II, does "not set forth a generally applicable
rule . .. .'' 381 U. S., at 450; it is beyond doubt special
legislation doing precisely the evil against which the prohibitions of the "bill of attainder, ex post facto laws and laws
impairing the obligation of contracts .. ;" were aimed. 12

"Wheat., at 286.

,_ ,..

____

'15-1605-DISSEN'f

a2

NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

IV
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
:--t 5
,,-,
....
..J
Title I of the statute "rails to provide any procedural
safeguards, either before or after seizure of the Presidential
papers. As I have previously suggested, under an unbroken
constitutional tradition, Presidential papers belong to the
President. Moreover, the lact that Congress, until receiitly,
by its tax laws permitted a charitable-contribution deduction
for donation of public papers-including gifts to the United
States-confirms the solid basis for the expectation of every
President that the Presidential papers belong to the
Preeident. 20
In another context, MR. JusTICE STEWART once noted:
"'[P]roperty' denotes a broad range of interests that are
secured by 'existing rules or understandings.' " Perry
v. Sinderrnann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972).
Again, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577
(1972), he stated:
"It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.))
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under our cases, where this kind of interest is recognized
by statute/ 0 an individual must be afforded adequate proce211

This longshlJlding tax benefit, which was utilized by a large number
of public officials, including former Presidents Tnunan, Eisenhower, and
,Tohnson, and possibly others, was eliminated under the comprehensive
Ta.x Reform Act of 1969. The change was effected by changing thedefinition of a "capital asset" under § 1221 (3) to exclude "a letter·
or memorandum . . . .", coupled with an amendment of § 170 of the
Codr, governing charitable contributions. Under amended § 170 (e),
there is no longer a tax benefit, of any consequence in donating "letters
or memoranda," which are now ordinary a8Sf'ts for ta.x purposes.
3 0 In addition to tlw longstanding charitable-contribution deduction
pcrmiUed ur stn.tut,c 1,1ntil 1969, Hl)pellaut Wi\S, throughout his tenur~
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dural safeguards to assure that he will not arbitrarily be
deprived of an interest such as MR. JusTICE STEWART described. Compare Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), with Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montayne v. Haymes,
427 U. S. 326 (1976). Title I fails to provide hornbook elements of procedural due process as required by these cases.
The Act at the outset directs the Administrator to retain
only those recordings and papers which are "the Presidential
historical materials of Richard M. Nixon.'' All other papers,
at least impliedly, are to be returned. · § 104 (a)(7). The
statute recognizes that the former President has a property
interest in all the papers presently in GSA custody which
the agency ultimately determines not to have historical value,
Thus, the statute leaves the determination of whether mate~
rials are of historical importance wholly in the hands of government agents.
There is no provision in the Act permitting the former
President to be heard in this decision-making process. The
question whether certain ma.terials have 11historical" or "commemorative" value, as defined by 44 U.S. C. § 2101, can surely
be a difficult one. Letters of a high public official to his
wife, children or intimate friends and political associates may
well be far more fascinating to historia,ns than materials on
economics, tax or welfare reform. Moreover, determination of
ns President, entitled to rely upon the provisions of the Presidential
Libraries Act, which was not repealed by Title I. The net effect of tl1e
present statute, in fact., is to permit, every former President except
appellant to est,ablish a Library, at a facility of his choosing, for the
housing of his Presidential papers.
That appellnnt relied upon the provisions of tJ1e Presidential Libra.ries
Act prior to the passage of Title I is clear beyond doubt. Under the
11.~reement with t,he GSA Administrator, dated Sept. 6, 1974, appellant
expr<'SS!y mdicated hi;; intent to deposit his papers in a "permanent
PresidPntial archival depository as provide4 for in 44 U . S. C. Section
J106, " Appendix, ,1.t 110,

·'
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the issue of historical significance requires a highly sophisticated appraisal; probably, a substantial portion of the materials falls into a gray area as to which historians may
disagree.
Any individual whose property interests will be affected
by this kind of a government determination must--at least
so we have held up to now-be given a.n opportunity to be
heard. Mullane v. Cen_trai ·Hanover Bank, 339 U. S. · 306
(1950). Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said, the "right to· be
heard before being condemned to suffer grievious loss of any
kind, .even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships
of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society;"
Joint Anti-Facist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 122, 168
(1951) (concurring opinion). Title I provides no such
opportunity.
A second objection from the due process perspective ia
that the screening process fails to accommodate adequately
the constitutionally protected rights to privacy and free aseociation, a matter I have 'discussed earlier. ·The Court has
held repeatedly that the process which is due in a particular
case must be tailored to fit the needs and interests involved.
See, e. g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481. This requires a weighing of the competing interests, with special
deference being given to fundamental personal and privacy
interests. In light of those competing interests, due process
procedural requirements are to be interposed "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner:" Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U. S. 545, 552 (1963).
No meaningful procedure whatever is provided by this extraordinary statute. Even accepting the notion that screening
by trained government agents was otherwise constitutiona.lly
unobjectionable, Titlf' I's procedure is plainly violative of due
process standards because of its destructively intrusive effects
upon appellant's fundamental interests in property, privacy
and free association, As we previously noted, ante, at 16.,
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everyone concedes that included in the materials seized are
many of appellant's most private and personal papers. In
screening the materials to determine what papers have sufficient historical value to justify permanent control by the
Government, the government agents wHl be required to read
such personal communications, thereby intruding into the
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944).
There is nothing inevitable about this process. Nothing in
the Government's interest fn selecting historically significant
materials requires wholesale seizure and screening of a former
government official's private papers. Dµe process, in my view,
requires a procedure far more closely tajlored to accommodate
the fundamental privacy interests involved.
A third obj~ction to the procedure here is that no time
restraints are pla.ced upon GSA's decision-making process.
This Court has consistently recognized that when dealing with
First Amendment interests, the timing of the governmental
decision-making process is crucial. Thus, in Freedman v.
Mary/,a,nd, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), the Court, through MR.
JusTICE BRENNAN, invalidated a motion picture censorship
statute for failing to provide for a prompt resolution of questions concerning a film's legality, so that constitutionally
protected material could be swiftly freed from governmental
restraints and restored to its lawful owner. Even more
clearly, in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 727 (1961),
the Court, again speaking through MR. JusTICE BRENNAN,
invalidated certain obscenity confiscation procedures because
two months had gone by without a determination of the
material's status.
As I pointed out earlier, appellant's interest in materials
containing private communications with his family and with
other individuals has clear First Amendment origins. Cf.
Stanley v. Georg'm, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). Under Freedman
and Marcus, .any statute which se.par,ates a person, against
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his will, from these First Amendment protected material3
must, it would seem, be strictly limited in a timeframe,
The Act in question, by contrast, places no limits whatever
with respect to GSA's retention of custody over appellant 1§
private papers. In fact, almost thtee years have now gone
by since the statute's enfl,Ctment, yet the record reveals . no
~teps whatever to return constitutionally protected paperi
to the former President.
I have not attempted to analyze Title I a.s against the
substantive protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.
That serious constitutional problems are present in that respect as well is beyond doubt. We have, after all, held tha,t,
certain personal matters or decisions are so fundamental to
free people as to be virtually beyond the power of government
to regulate. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-153
(1973). I would assume that those who are of the view that,
a State's power · to define "f~mily" for regulatory purpose"
is severely restricted, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, supra,
would also find severe limitations on government's power to
obtain and review private communications among family
members. And I should also think that, as to substantive
due process protections, legislation singling out one family only
for compulsory reading of that family's correspondence and
compulsory listening to that family's conversations would
raise equally disturbing questions. Almost 100 years ago,
the Court made this observation, on which I conclude:
"But it is not to be supposed that these legislative
powers are absolute ... and that the amendment prescribing due process of law is too vague and indefinite
to operate as a pra.ctical restraint. It is not every act,
legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more
than mere will exerted as an act of power. It must not
be a special rule for a particular person or a particular
.case, but [it must be a] 'general law, a law which hears
Qf;/ore' it oondemn~ •. . so that every citizen shall hold
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his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society .... ' "
,H'!'rtado v. California, 110 U. S. 5l6, 535-536 (1884)'.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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dissenting.
Appellant resigned -the Office of the Presidency nearly three
years ago, and if the issue here were limited to the right
of Congress to dispose of his particular Presidential papers, L f- .d ~.l., ~-1..,,1
thi1;1 c~e would not be of major constitutional significance.
.L ~ _ ~
Unfortunately, however, today's decision countenances the a...T ' ~
power of any future Congress to seize the official p~pers of ~ d,d-- yan out-going President as he leaves the inaugural stand. In J P i ~ ~
so doing, it poses a real threat to the ability , of future , ~ - - · ~: • Presidents to receive candid advice and to give candid in- a # ~~
structions. This result, so at odds with our previous case
•~rifa--.~
'taw on the separation of powers, will daily stand as a veritable/4
:.c;;...i~sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his ~
_
advisors. Believing as I do that the Act is a clear violation'....--,- ·
of the constitutional principle separation of powers, I need~
../--r:,
not address the other issues considered by the Court. 1
~ ~ . ; /2
JUSTICE REHNQUIST,

/'tfl,,yj

1 While the entire substance of t.his dissent is devoted to the constitutional principle of separation of powers, and not to the other issues that
the Court addresses separately, it o:eems to me that t.he Court. is too facile
. in ~eparati ng appellant 's "privacy" claims from his "separation of powers"
claim:;, a~ if they were two srparate and wholly unrelated attacks on the
statute. The concrpt of "priviwy" can be a coat of many colors, and
quite differing kinds of rights t.o "privacy" ha ve been recognized in the
Jaw. P roperty ma.y be "private," in the sense tha.t the Fifth Amendment
p rohibits the Government from seizing it wit hout paying just compensa,tion . A dicta.belt tape or diary may be "private" in that sense, but may

~
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My conclusion that the Act violates the principle of separa~
tion of powers is based upon three fundamental propositions.
First, candid and open discourse among the President, his
also be "private" in the sense that the Fourth Amendment, would prohibit
an unreasonable seizure of it even though in making such a seizure the
Government, agreed to pay for the fa:ir value of the diary as not to run
afoul of the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment. Many
states have recognized a common law "right of privacy" first publicized
in the fam,ous Warren and Brandeis !Lrticle, 'l'he Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
L. _Rev. 193 (1890). Privileges, such a::; the executive p"rivilege embodied
in the Constitution as a result of the separation of powers, United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, and t.~e attorney-client privilege, recognized under
case and statutory law in most jurisdictions, protect still a different form
of privacy. The invocation of such privileges has the effect of protecting
the priv-acy of a communication made confidentially to the President or by
a client t-0 an at.torney; the purpose of the privilege, in each case, is t-0
assure free communication on the part of the confidant and of the client,
respectively.
The Court states, ante, a.t 31, that "it is logical to assume that the ta.pe
recordings made in the Presidential office primarily relate to the conduct
·and business of the .Presidency." Whatever the merits of this argument
may be against, a claim based on other types of privacy, it makes crystal
clear that the Act is a serious intrusion upon the type of "privacy" that
i:s protected by the principle of executive privilege. The Court's compleui
separation of its discussion of the executive privilege claim from the
privacy claim thus enables it to take inconsistent positions in the different
sections of its opinion.
The Court's position with respect to the appellant's individ_ual privacy
heightens my concern regarding the privacy interest served by executive
privilege. In attempting to minimize the Act's impact upon appellant.'s
privacy, the Court concludes "purely private papers and recordings will be
returned to appellant under § 104 (a.) (7) of the Act." Ante, at 31. How•
ever, this conclu:sion raises more quest-ions than answers. Under § 104 (a)
(7), the return of paper::; to the appellant, is conditioned on their being
"not otherwise of general historical significance." Given the expansive
nature of this phrase, see Tr. of Oral Arg., at 39, it is quite conceivable
that virtually none of the papers will be returned, and the Court's repre.
sentation i:s an empty gesture. See also§ 104 (a) (6). What is meant by
" purely private paper::;"? Is a personal letter to or from the President,
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advisors, foreign heads of state and Ambassadors, Members of Congress, and the others· who deal with the White
House on a sensitive basis is an absolute prerequisite to
the effective discharge of the duties of that high office.
Second, the effect of the Act, and of this Court's decision
upholding its constitutionality, will undoubtedly restrain the
necessary free flow of information to and from present and
future .Presidents. Third, any substantial intrusion upon the
effective discharge of the duties of the President is sufficient
to ,violate the principle of separation of powers, and our
prior cases do not permit the sustaining of an Act such
as this by "balancing'' an intrusion of substantial magnitude
ag~inst the interests assertedly fostered by the Act.
With respect to 'the second point, it is of course true that the \
Act is directed solely at the papers of former President Nixon. 2
but concerning the dutfos of the President considered "priva.te," or is a
document replete with personal communications, but containing some reference to the affairs of sta.te, "purely private"? The dictabelts of the
President's personal recollections, dictated in diary form at the end of each
da.y, are assumedly private, and a.re to be returned. See Tr. of Ora.I Arg.,
at · 59. But the dictabelt. dictat.ion is also recorded on the voice-activated
White House ta.ping system, and those tapes will be retained and reviewed.
Hence, appellant's privacy interest will not be served by the return of
the dictabeltH, and the retention of the tapes will seriously erode Presidential communications, as discus.;ed infra. By approaching these issues in
compartmentalized fashion the Court obscures the fallacy of its result.
I fully subscribe to most of what is said respecting the separation of
powers in the dissent of THE CHIEF JusTICE. Indeed, it is because I so
thoroughly agree with his observation that the Court's holding today is
a "grave repudiation of nearly two hundred yea.rs of judicial precedent
and historical pract.ice" that I take this opportunity to write separately
on the subject, thinking that its importance justifies such an opinion.
2
I am not unmindful of the excesses of Watergate, and of the impetus it
gave to this legislation. However, the Court's opinion does not 8et forth
a principled distinction that would limit the constitutionality of an Act
.;uch as this to Prrsident Nixon's papers. Absent such a distinction:
''The emotional aspC'ct:s of a case make it difficult to decide dispassionately,
bat do not qualif · our obligation to apply the law with an eye to the fu-

;
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Although the terms of the Act, therefore, have no direct
application to present or future occupants of the Office, the
effect upon candid communication to and from these future
Presidents depends, in the long run, not upon the limited
nature of the present Act, but ·upon the precedential effect of
today's decision. Unless the authority of Congress to seize
the papers of this appellant is limited only to him in some
principled way, future Presidents and their advisors will be
wary of a similar Act directed at their papers out of pure
political hostility.
We are dealing with a privilege, albeit a qualified one, that
both the Court and the Solicitor General concede may be
asserted by an ex-President. It is a privilege which has been
relied upon by chief executives since the time of George
Washington. See, e. g., the dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF
JusTICE, ante, at 6. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion upholding the constitutionality of this Act is obscure, to say the
least, as to the circumstances tha.t will justify Congress in
seizing the papers of an ex-President. 8 A potpourri of reasons
is advanced as to why the Act is not an unconstitutional
infringement upon the principle of separation of powers,"' but
ture as well as the concern for the result in a particular case before
Brewer v. Williams, U. S. - , (Mn. Jus'l'ICE STEVENS,
concurring).
8
Indeed , there is nothing in the Court's logic which would invalidate
such an Act if it applied to an incumbent President during his term of
office. It is of course not likely that an incumbent would sign such a
measure, but- a sufficiently determined Congress could pass it over his
veto nonetheless.
4
In my view, the Court.'s decision itself, by not offering any principled
basis for distiuguishing appellant's ca.,;e from that of any future Bresident,
has a present and future impact on the functioning of the Office of the
Presidency. Hence the validity of the rea:sons asi;erted by the Court for
upholding this particular Act ii; a ·ubject which I find it unneces&'lry to
uddre~s in detail. I feel bound t-0 observe, however, that the Court's
heavy reliance, e. g., ante, at 16, upon the fact that. the seized papers are
t-0 br lodged with the General Services Administration, an agency created

ms."
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the weight to be attached to any of the factors is left wholly
unclear.
The Court speaks of the need to establish procedures to
preserve Presidential materials, to allow a successor President
access to the papers of the prior President, to grant the
American public historical access, and to rectify the present
"hit-or-miss" approttCh by entrusting the materials to the
expert handling of the 11,rchivists. Ante, at 24-2p. These
justifications are equally applicable to each and every future
President, and other than one cryptic paragraph, ante, at 25,
the Court's treatment contains no suggestion that Congress
might not permissibly seize the papers of any outgoing future
President. The unclear scope of today's opinion will cause
future Presidents and their advisors to be uneasy over the
confidentiality of their communications t ereby restraining
those communications.
The position of my rothers PowELL 5 and BLACKMUN is
that today's opinion will ___ -.;;.;=-=-impediment to future
Presidential communications since this case is '<unique"'by Congress but housed in the Executive Branch of the Government, is a
thin reed indeed.
Control and management of an agency such as the General Services
Administration is shared between the incumbent President, by virtue of his
authority to nomina.t.e its officials, and Congress, by virtue of its authority
to ern1ct substantive legislation defining the functions of the agency. But
the physical placement of the seized Presidential ppaers with such an
agency does not solve the separa,tion of powers problem. The principle of
sepa.rat.ion of powers is infringed when, by Act of Congress, Presidential
communications are impeded because the Pre:;ident. no longer has exclusive
control over the relea.w of his confidential papers. The fact that this Act
places physical custody in l,he hands of the General Services Administration, rather than a congressional cq~ittee, makes little difference so far
as divestiture of Presidential control is concerned.
5 My Brother STEVENS, ante, 8eek:; to at.t ribute a similar uniqueness to
the precedential value of this cnse, but his observations are djrected to
appellant's bill of attainder cla im, rather than to the separatjon of powers
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appellant resigned in disgrace from the Presidency during
events unique in the history of our Nation. MR. JusTICE
PowELL recognizes that this position is quite different from
that of the Court. Ante, at - . Unfortunately his concurring view tha.t the authority of Congress is limited to the
situation he describes does not itself change the expansive
scope of the Court's opinion, and will serve as scant consolation to future Presidential advisors. For so long as the
Court's opinion represents a threat to confidential communications, the concurrences of MR. JtJSTICE POWELL and MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I fear, are based on no more than wishful
thinking.
Were the Court to advance a principled justification for
affirming the judgment solely on the facts surrounding appellant's fall from office, the effect of its decision upon future
presidential communications would be far less serious. But
the Court does not advance any such justification.

A
It would require far more of a discourse than could
profitably be included in an opinion such as this to fully
describe the pre-eminent position that the President of the
United States occupies with respect to our Republic. Suffice it to say that the Presiden't is made the sole repository
of the executive powers of the United States, and the powers
entrusted to him as well as the duties imposed upon him
are awesome indeed. Given the vast spectrum of the deci0

Article II empowers him "by and with the advice and consent of tho
Senate" to make treaties, to appoint numerous other high officials of the
Federal Government, to rrceive ambassadors and other public ministers,
and to commi:ssion all the officers of the United States. That· Article enjoins him to "t,ike care that the laws be faithfully executed.," and authorize;; him to "give to the Congress information on the· State of the
1.Jnion, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall
judge nc•ce~»ary and expedient." It is difficult to imagine a public office
who~e occupant would be more dependent upon the confidentiality of .
6
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sions that confront him-domestic affairs, relationships with
foreign powers, direction of the military as Commander-inChief-it is by no means an overstatement to conclude that
current, accurate, and absolutely candid information is essential to the proper performance of his office. Nor is it an
overstatement to conclude that the President must be free
to give frank and candid instructions to his subordinates.
the advice which he received, and the confidentiality of Hie instructions
which he gave, for the successful execution of his duties. This is particularly true in the area of foreign affairs and international relations; in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 this Court
stated:
"Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs
in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs,
but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In
this vast external realm, with its irpportant, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen
as a representatjve of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. In to the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade
it. As Marshall said .in his great argument of March 7, 1800, ii:i, the
House of Repre,,entatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations:"
Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
at a very early day in our hi~tory (February 15, 1816), reported to the
Senate, among other things, as follows:
"The President is the constitutional representative of the United States
with regU;_rd to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign
nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how,
and upon what subjects negofoition may be urged with the greatest
prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution.
The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his du(y. They think the interference of the Senate in
the direction of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety.
The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and · unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy
and dispatch.' U. S. Senate, Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations,
vol. 8, p. 24."

·.
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It cannot be denied that one of the principal determinant$
of the quality of the information furnished to the President
will be the degree of trust placed in him by those who confide in him. The Court itself, ante, at 19, cites approvingly
the following language of the Solicitor General:
"Unless he can• give his advisors some assurance of
confidentiality, µ, President could not expect to receive
the full and frank submission of facts and opinion,
upon which effective discharge of his duties depends."
See Brief of the . Solicitor General, at 33.
The public papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had
the advantage of discharging executive responsibilities first as
the Comman.der-in-Chief of the United States forces in Europe during the Second World War and then as President of
the United States for two terms, attest to the critical importance of this trust in the President's discretion:
"And if any commander is going to get the free, 4npre,i udiced opinions of his subordinat,es, he had better
protect what they have 1:.-9 say to him on a confidential basis." Public Papers of President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1955, at 674 (1959).
The effect of a contrary course likewise impressed President
Eisenhower :
"But when it comes to the conversations that take place
between any responsible official and his advisers or ex_.
change of little, mere slips of this or that, expressing
personal opinions on the most confidential basis, those
are not subject to investigation by anybody, and if they
are, will wreck the Government." Ib'id. (Emphasis
added.)
There simply can be no doubt that it is of the utmost importance for sensitive communications to the President to be
viewed as confidential, and generally unreachable without the
President's consent.
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B
In order to fully understand the impact of this Act upon
the confidential communications in the White House, it must
be understood that the Act will affect not merely former ·
President Nixon, but the present and future Presidents.
As discussed above, while this Act itself addresses only the
papers of former President Nixon, today's decision upholding
its constitutionality renders uncertain the constitutionality of
future congressional action directed at any ex-President.
Thus Presidential confidants will assume, correctly, that any
records of communications to the President could be subject to
"appropriation" in much the same manner as the present Act
seized the records of confidential communications to and from
President Nixon. When advice is sought by future Presidents,
no one will be unmindful of the fact that, as a result of the
uncertainty engendered by today's decision, all confidential \
communications of any ex-President could be subject to seizure over his objection, as he leaves the inaugural stand on
,J anuary 20.
And Presidential communications will undoubtedly be impeded by the recognition that there is a substantial probability of public disclosure of material seized under this Act,
which, by today's decision , is a constitutional blueprint for
future Acts. First, the Act on its face requires that 100-odd
government -archivists study and review Presidential papers,
· heretofore accessible only with the specific consent of the
President. Second, the Act requires that public access is to
be granted by future regulations consistent with "the need
to provide public access to those materials which have general
historical significance . ..." Section 104 (a)(6). Either of
these pyovisions is sufficient to detract markedly from the
ca1~dor of communications to and from the President.
In brushing ,aside the fact that the archivists are empowered to review the papers, the Court concludes that the
archivists will be "discrete." Ante, at 23. But there is no-

I
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foundation for the Court's assumption that there will be no
leaks. Any reviews that the archivists have made of Presidential papers in the past have been done only after authorization by the President, and after the President has had
an opportunity to cull the most sensitive documents. It
strikes me as extremely· naive, and I dare say that this
view will be shared by a large number of potential confidants
of future Presidents, to suppose that ·each and every one
of the archivists who might participate in a similar screening
by virtue of a future Act would remain completely sUent
with respect to those portions of the Presidential papers which
are extremely newsworthy. The Solicitor General, supporting
the constitutionality of the Act, candidly conceded as much
in oral argument:
"Question: . . . I now ask you a question that may
sound frivolous, but do you think if a hundred people
know anything of great interest in the city of Washington, it will remain a secret?
" f Laughter] .
"McCree: 'MR. JusTICE PowELL, I have heard that if
two people have heard it, it will not.'" Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 46.
It borders on the absurd for the Court to cite our recent
U. S. - , as a precedent
decision in Whalen v. Roe, for the proposition that government officials will invariably
honor provisions in a law dedicated to the preservation of
privacy. It is quite doubtful, at least to my mind, that
columnists or investigative reporters will be avidly searching
for what doctor prescribed what drug for what patient in
the State of New York, which was the information required
to be furnished in Whalen v. Roe. But with respect to the
advice received by a President, or the instructions given by
him , on highly sensitive matters of great historical significance, the case is quite the opposite. Hence, at the minimum,
today's decision upholding the constitutionality of this Act,
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mandating review by archivists, will engender the expectation
that future confidential communications to the President may
be subject to leaks or public disclosure without his consent.
In addition to this review by archivists, Presidential papers
may now be seized and shown to the public if they are of
"general historical significance." The Court attempts to
avoid this problem with the wishful expectation that the
regulations regarding public access, when promulgated, will
be narrowly drawn. However, this assumes that a Presidential advisor will speak candidly based upon this same wishful
assumption that the regulations, when ultimately issued and
interpreted, will protect his confidences. But the current Act
is over two and one-half years old and no binding regulations have yet been promulgated. And it is anyone's guess
as to how long it will take before such ambiguous terms
as "historical significance" are definitively interpreted, and
as to whether some future administrator as yet unknown
might issue a broader definition. Thus, the public access required by this Act will at the very least engender substantial uncertainty regarding whether future confidential communications will, in fact, remain confidential.
The critical factor in all of this is not that confidential
material might be disclosed, since the President himself might
choose to "go public" with it. The critical factor is that the
determination as to whether to disclose is wrested by the
Act from the President. When one speaks in confidence to
a President, he necessarily relies upon the President's discretion not to disclose the sensitive. The President similarly
relies on the discretion of a subordinate when instructing
him. Thus it is no answer to suggest, as does the Court,
a'llte, at 22, that the expectation of confidentiality has always been limited because Presidential papers have in the
past been turned over to Presidential libraries or otherwise
subsequently disclosed. In those cases, ultimate reliance w~
11pon the discretion of the President to cull the sensitive

•.
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before disclosure. But when, as is the case under this Act,
the decision whether to disclose n n - + r ~ T ~ resides in the
President. communication will in itably e r tra.ined.
The Court, as does MR. Jus CE PowELL, eeks to diminish ·
the impact of this Act on the ffice of the resident by virtue
of the fact that neither Preside.,..___.,_.,...,, nor President Carter
support appellant's claim. Ante, at 13, 19. It is quite true
that President Ford signed the Act into law. and that the
Solicitor General, representing President Carter, supports its
constitutionality. While we must give due rega.rd to the fact
that these Presidents have not opposed the Act. we must also
give due regard to the unusual political forces that have contrib~
uted to making this situation "unique." Ante, at 4 (MR.
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring). MR. JUSTICE POWELL refers to
the stance of the current executive as "dispositive," ante, at
- . and the Court places great emphasis upon it. I think
this analysis is mistaken.
The current occupant of the Presidency cannot by signing
into law a bill passed by Congress waive the claim of a successor President that the Act violates the separation of powers.
We so held in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
And only last Term we unanimously held in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1 (1976), that persons with no connection to the
Executive Branch of the Government may attack the constitutiona.Iity of a law signed by the President on the ground
that it invaded authority reserved for the Executive Branch
under the prniciple of tl separation of powers. This principle, perhaps the most fu 1da.mental in our constitutional
framework. ma 10t be 'g11 d away by the temporary incumbant of the o ce which it as designed to protect.
MR. JusT CE PowELL's iew that the incumbent President
must join t e challenge f the ex-President places Preside11t ial commu111 tions· · 1 limbo, since advisors, at the time of
the> communicat1011. cannot know who the sucessor will be or
w!lat his stance will be regarding seizure by Congress of his
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predecessor's papers. Since the advisors cannot be sure that
the President to whom they are communicating can ·protect
their confidences, communication will be inhibited. MR.
JUSTICE PowELL's view. requiring an ex-President to depend
upon his successor blinks at political and historical reality.
The tripartite system of government established by the Constitution has on more than one occasion bred political hostility
not merely between Congress and a lame duck President, but
between the latter and his successor. ·To substantiate this
view one need only recall the relationship at the time of the
transfer to the reins of power from -John Adams to Thomas
Jefferson, from James Buchanan to Abraham Lincoln, from
Herbert Hoover to Fra.nklin Roosevelt, and from Harry
Truman to Dwight Eisenhower. Thus while the Court's decision is an invitation for a hostile Congress to legislate against
an unpopular lame duck President. MR. JusTICE PowELL's
tJosi'tion places the ultimate disposition of a challenge to sucli
legislation in the hands of what history has shown may be a
hostile incom'ing President. I cannot believe that the Constitution countenances this result. One may ascribe no such
motives to Congress and the successor Presidents in this case,
without nevertheless harboring a fear that they may play a
· part in some succeeding case.
The shadow that today's decision casts upon the daily
operation of the Office of the President during his entire
four-year term sharply differentiates it from our · previous
separation of powers decisions, which have dealt with much
more specific amr limitation intrusions. These cases have:focused upon unique aspects of the operation of a particular·
branch of government·. rather than upo1r an intrusio11; such as"
the present one. that permeates the entire decisionmalcing··
process of the Office of the President For example, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U~ S. 579'
( 1952) (the "Steel"Seizure Cases"), this·Court helcf that the·
President coulil not by Executive ord_e r· seize s~eP mills_ iii~
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order to prevent a work stoppage when Congress had provided
other methods for dealing with such an eventuality. In
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), the Court struck
down the 1867 Tenure of Office Act which had attempted to
restrict the President's power to remove Postmasters without
congressional approval. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1
( 1976), the Court struck down Congress' attempt to vest the
power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission in persons other than the President.
To say that these cases dealt with discrete instances of
governmental action is by no means to disparage their importance in the development of our constitutional law. But
is does contrast them quite sharply with the issue involved
in the present case. To uphold the "Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act" is not simply to sustain
or invalidate a particular instance of the exercise of govern~
mental power by Congress or by the President; it has the
much more far reaching effect of significantly hampering
the President, during his entire term of office, in his ability
to gather the necessary information to perform the countless
discrete acts which are the prerogative of his office under
Art. II of the Constitution.
C
It thus appears to me indisputable that this Act is a
significant intrusion into the operations of the Presidency.
T do not think that this severe dampening of free communi~
cation to and from the President may be discounted by the
Court's adoption of a novel "balancing" test for determining
whether it is constitutional. 7 I agree with the Court that the
7 As a matter of original inquir~·, it might plausibly be claimed that t.!10
concrrn:; C"xpre;:,;ed by th e Fr:1mrrs of the Com,titution during their debates,
,incl similar rxpre~,;ions found i11 the Federali,;t Paper;;, by no means
n•q11ire 1hr ro 11 <" l11:;io11 that the ,Judicin.1 Bran ch is thEl ultimate arbiter of
ll' hNher 011r branch has tran"grrssc·d upon powers constitutionally reserved
1,0 ,111othr.r, It rould havr been plnu~ibly m,1intt1 ined that the Framcrl::

75-1605-DISSENT (A)
NIXON ·v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

15

three branches of government need not be airtight, ante, at
15, and that the separate branches are not intended to operate
with absolute independence, United States v. Nixon, 418
U. S. 683, 707 (1974). But I find no support in the Constitution or in our cases for the Court's pronouncement that
the operations of the Office of the President may be severely
impeded by Congress simply because Congress had a good
reason for doing so.
Surely if ever there were a case for "balancing," and
giving weight to the asserted "national interest" to sustain
governmental action, it was in the Steel Seizure Cases, supra.
There the challenged Presidential proclamation recited, withthought that the Constitution it.-sC'lf had armed each branch with ;;ufficient
political weapon,.; to f<'nd off intrusions by :mother which would violate
11or nf'cp:;.,:ity for judicial invalidation of such intru:;ion. But tha.t is not
no neces:sit.y for judicial invalidation of such intrusion. But that is 11ot
tlw way th<' law ha:s devrloped in this Court.
.lfarlmry v. Madison, Crnnch 137 (1803), not on]~- established the
au1 hority of this Court to hold a.n Act of Congress unconstitutional, but,
t h1~ particular r·ou:-tit utional 4urstion which it decided wai-; e.:'sPntially a
"separat.ion of powPrs" i:ssuP: whether Congress was empowered under thP
Constitution to expand the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court
hy Article Ill of the Con~titution.
Any argument that Marbury is limit~d to cases involving the powers of
th<' Judicial Brnnch and that the Court had no power to intervene i11 any
di;;pute rrlating to ;;eparntion of power,, between the otJier two branches
has been rejectPd in Myers v. United States, supra; Humpreys Executor v.
United States, lJ. S. (19-) and Buckley v. Valeo, supra. In so
doing, tlwse casf's ar<' rntirely consi;;t.ent with the following language from
United States v. Nixon:
"In the performa.nC<' of a-,;signecl constitutional duties each branch of
llw GovC'rnmC'nt must inifo,lly interpret t.he Com;titution, and the interpretation of its power,; by an~' branch is duC' great. respect from thP at.hers.
Thf' Pm,iident',; coim,;l'l, HI' WP have notPd, read;; the Con;;tit.ution as
vroviding an ab~oh1te privilrge of confidentiality for all Pre,:idential comnmnicatiom;, :Vlany dPci;;ion,; of this Court, howevPr, have unequivoeally
reaffirmed th<' holding of Marbusy v. Madison, 1 Craneh 137 (1803), that
'I i]t is emphatically the provinre and dut.y of the judicial department to
.,.iy wlw.t-th<' law i;;.' J,t., at 177." 41S 0. S., at. 703.
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out contradiction by its challengers, that "American fighting
men and fighting men of other nations of the United States
are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggresion in Korea"; that "the weapons and other materials
needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us
in the defense of the free world are produced to a great
extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials";
and that a work stoppa.ge in the steel industry "would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and
those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add
to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and air men
engaged in combat in the field." 343 U. S., at 590. Although the "legislative" actions by the President could have
been qui~kly overriden by an act of Congress, id., at 677, this
Court struck down the executive order as violative of the
separation of powers principle with nary a mention of the
national interest to be fostered by what could have been
characterized as a relatively minimal and temporary intrusion upon the role of Congress. The analysis was simple and
straightffrward: Congress had exclusive authority to legislate; thf President's Executive order was an exercise of
legislativ~ power that impinged upon that authority of Congress, an'd was therefore unconstitutional. Id., at 588-589.
See also fuckley v. Valeo, supra. 0
I thin~ that not only the Executive Branch of the Federal
Govermr1ent, but the Legislative and Judicial Branches as
well, wil~ come to regret this day when the Court has upheld
an Act of Congress that trenches so significantly on the functioning qf the Office of the Presidency. I dissent.

°For t he reasons set forth by THE CHIEF J Ui:,'l'ICE , ante, a t, 9-10, it is
d ear that t he circumstances in United States v. Nixon, supra, involving a
na rrow request for specified documents in connection with a criminal
p rosecution , provide no support for the Court's use of a balancing test
1
in a case ~uch as this where t he seizure is a broad and undifferentiated
intrusion into the daily 01)erat ions of the Office of the President.

